Georgia State University College of Law

Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year

Faculty Publications

1-1-2008

The Corruption of Civilizations
Timothy K. Kuhner
Georgia State University College of Law, tkuhner@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Law and Politics Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Legal History
Commons
Recommended Citation
Timothy K. Kuhner, The Corruption of Civilizations, 13 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 349 (2008).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 13
Spring 2008

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
© 2008 Roger Williams University Law Review
ISSN 1090-3968
i

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME THIRTEEN

SPRING 2008

NUMBER TWO

EDITORIAL BOARD
Matthew L. Fabisch
Editor-in-Chief

Mary B. Kibble
Managing Editor

J. David Freel
Executive Articles Editor
Aaron L. Shapira
Articles Editor

Adam Noska
Articles Editor

John M. Greene
Articles Editor

Alexandria E. Baez
Executive Notes & Comments Editor
Megan K. Maciasz
Notes & Comments Editor

Kenneth Rampino
Notes & Comments Editor
Ronald LaRocca
Rhode Island Editor
ASSISTANT EDITORS

Wendy Andre
Debra Conry
J. Timothy Lebsock
Allyson Picard

Kathleen J. Andresen
Monica Fanesi
Kevin W. Lewis
Micah Penn
Ashley Taylor

Alison Conboy
Michelle Gobin
Christina Paradise
Hadley Perry

STAFF
Kimberly Ahern
Scott M. Carlson
Gwendolyn M. Hancock
Meaghan E. Kelly
Sally P. McDonald
Alexandra W. Pezzello
Tim St. Lawrence
Jillian N. Taylor

FACULTY ADVISOR
Peter S. Margulies

Amanda J. Argentieri
David Casale
Andrea Harrison
B Jennifer Lemieux
Kathryn H. Petit
Alec Rice
Jessica Stanford
L. Evan Van Gorder
Alexandra C. Wilcox
SYMPOSIUM ADVISOR
Peter S. Margulies

iii

Stephanie J. Bowser
Siobhan L. Gannon
Kristina I. Hultman
Maureen McCrann
David R Petrarca, Jr.
Erin B. Rosenthal
Katherine A. Sulentic
A. Chace Wessling

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
Shirley Staskiewicz

ERRATUM
In the Introduction to the Symposium on Genuine Tort Reform
in the Winter 2008 issue of the Roger Williams University Law
Review, we erroneously stated that symposium was made possible by
a generous grant of the Roscoe Pound Foundation. In fact, it was the
American Association for Justice Robert L. Habush Endowment
(hereinafter AAJ Endowment) that made that very generous grant.
We sincerely apologize for the error, and thank the AAJ
Endowment for supporting our Symposium on Genuine Tort Reform
and the important scholarship it produced.
We also take this opportunity to set forth the mission of the AAJ
Endowment:
The mission of the AAJ Endowment, in conjunction with AAJ, is
to preserve and protect the civil justice system and individual rights.
It accomplishes this through the following priorities:

• providing consistent public education and research to promote
informed public dialogue on, understanding of and appreciation for
the civil justice system;
• sponsoring prestigious education programs and well-received
publications for judges and law professors; and,
• funding innovative scholarship and far reaching research on
the civil justice system and individual rights.
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Symposium
Introduction: The Emerging Power of
Context over Conventional Wisdom in
Scholarship on Law and Terrorism
Peter Margulies* and Laura Corbin**

Conventional wisdom has produced two schools of thought on
legal responses to September 11. On the one hand, some scholars
have argued that the law prior to September 11 provided all the
flexibility that the government ever needed, and that measures
such as the Patriot Act that increased government power were
dangerous to the delicate balance between liberty and security.1
Other scholars have been either apologists for or architects of the
Bush administration’s policies, arguing that the legal constraints
in place before the attacks and pressed by administration critics
today are a form of “lawfare” exploited by America’s enemies.2
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I thank Dean
David Logan for his generous support of this symposium.
** J.D. 2008, Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY
AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (New Press 2007). The description of
this school of thought is, to be sure, a broad-brush portrayal that masks some
concessions to the post-September 11 environment. See id. (acknowledging
that intervention in Afghanistan was appropriate).
2. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF
THE WAR ON TERROR 106-08 (Atlantic Monthly Press 2006) (arguing that
restrictions on wiretapping and data collection endanger national security).
Some prominent commentators identified with this view nevertheless have
voiced concern about the unilateralism of the Bush administration’s moves
and the failure of some legal opinions to address adverse authority. Compare
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 58 (W.W. Norton and Company 2007) (describing
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Neither view does justice to the complexities of the post-9/11
world.
The participants in this symposium seek to avoid such stark
stances.3 Their contributions, presented on November 9, 2007 at
the Roger Williams University School of Law symposium on
“Legal Dilemmas in a Dangerous World: Law, Terrorism and
National Security,” cover a wide range of issues, including the
habeas corpus rights of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, the state
secrets privilege, defense lawyering before the military
commissions, and opportunities for Muslim-Americans to both
comply with laws regulating the financing of terrorist groups and
fulfill their faith-bound obligation of charitable giving. Running
through each essay is a conviction that the rule of law is flexible
enough to protect national security without endangering core
freedoms.
In The Corruption of Civilization, Professor Timothy Kuhner
denies that security and liberty are competing sides in a zero-sum
game.4 Instead, Kuhner argues, our security is often best served
by adhering to our political values, viewing war as a last resort,
and seeking solutions through the application of “soft power,”
including political, social, and cultural influence.5 According to
Kuhner, preemptive war in Iraq, indefinite detention of terror
suspects, and torture have simultaneously undermined both our
hard won national tradition of human dignity and our end-game:
national security.6 “War” fighters on both sides, Kuhner asserts,
are violating international law as well as “norms of due process
concept of “lawfare” against American interests), with id. at 71 (noting
displeasure of senior Bush administration official when author, former head
of Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, indicated legal doubts about
counterterrorism initiative); cf. Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law:
National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of
Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. ( forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1097314 (discussing influence of lawfare paradigm within Bush
administration legal circles).
3. This striving for balance has also marked the best discussions of
previous national security challenges. See Robert H. Jackson, Wartime
Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 116 (1951) (contrasting
“exaggerated claims of security” with opposing flaw of “contemptuously
ignoring the reasonable anxieties of wartime”).
4. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Corruption of Civilization, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 349, 371 & n.71 (2008).
5. Id. at 365 & n.56. Kuhner discusses the merits of JOSEPH S. NYE,
SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS (Public Affairs 2004).
6. Id. at 363 & n.47; id. at 362.

and civilized treatment.”7 After laying the legal and historical
foundations for his premise that the identity of the United States
rests on human rights, Kuhner reinforces the idea that protecting
human rights, and therefore the strength of our appeal to the rest
of the world, is the path to both freedom and security.8 His
challenge to us “as citizens in a democracy [is] to produce
something better than a war on terrorism.”9
Professor Nina Crimm argues in her essay, MuslimAmericans’ Charitable Giving Dilemma: What About a Terror-free
Donor Advised Fund?, that terrorist financing restrictions can be
counterproductive when they ignore the importance of core
Islamic beliefs.10 Crimm notes that millions of Muslim-Americans
face a dilemma in the aftermath of September 11 when they wish
to uphold one of the pillars of their Islamic faith: the obligation of
zakat or charity.11 As Crimm explains, zakat is often focused on
assisting the “world’s neediest Muslims.”12 After September 11,
however, donating to Muslim charities became a minefield.13
Through an analysis of the fallout after passage of the USA
Patriot Act and other laws, Crimm demonstrates that MuslimAmericans fear investigation or prosecution for making a
charitable contribution to impoverished Muslims overseas.14

7. Id. at 351 & n.7.
8. Id. at 372 (see text before n.72). For more of Professor Kuhner’s
thoughts about human rights, see Timothy K. Kuhner, Human Rights
Treaties in U.S. Law: The Status Quo, Its Underlying Bases, and Pathways
for Change, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 419 (2003). See also Harold Hongju
Koh, Restoring America’s Human Rights Reputation, 40 CORNELL INT’L. L.J.
635 (2007) (describing how the U.S. war on terror has undermined U.S.
human rights policy and therefore its soft power).
9. Id. (see text after n.73).
10. See Nina J. Crimm, Muslim Americans’ Charitable Giving Dilemma:
What About a Terror-Free Donor Advised Fund?, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 375, 392 (2008).
11. Id. at 377 (see text before n.11). Cf. Peter Margulies, Laws of
Unintended Consequences: Terrorist Financing Restrictions and Transitions
to Democracy, 20 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 65 (2007) (discussing virtues and vices of
terrorist financing statutes).
12. Crimm, supra note 10, at 378 & n.17.
13. For more of Crimm’s views on this topic, see Nina J. Crimm, High
Alert: The Government’s War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its
Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global
Philanthropy (High Alert), 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004).
14. Crimm, supra note 10, at 385-392 & nn.60-95; See Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title I, § 106, 115

To remedy this problem, Crimm proposes creation of a “terrorfree Donor Advised Fund.”15 Such a fund, she suggests, would
ensure that charitable contributions from Muslims in the U.S. are
not supporting terrorism, but instead are helping to relieve
poverty and suffering in parts of the world where those
deprivations might “exacerbate terrorism.”16 Striking a balance
on the financial front between Americans’ religious identity and
national security enhances both.
In Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies, and the Myth of
Swain v. Pressley,17 Professor Stephen Vladeck moves from policy
to legal doctrine regarding terror detainees.18 Recent doctrinal
clashes19 have centered on the availability to detainees of the writ
of habeas corpus. The struggle over habeas came to a head with
Congress’ passage of the Military Commissions Act, which
purports to withhold access to the writ.20 In earlier cases, the
Supreme Court has typically cited to its decision in Swain v.
Pressley for the proposition that when Congress limits the writ
through some means short of outright suspension, it must provide
an adequate substitute.21 Vladeck argues that the Supreme
Court’s dutiful citation of Pressley
in cases involving
congressional efforts to limit access to habeas corpus masks a
significant gap in habeas jurisprudence: the Court has repeatedly
declined to define what procedures are adequate.22 According to
Vladeck, Congress rushed into this vacuum with the Military
Stat. 272 (2001).
15. Crimm, supra note 10, at 395 (see text between nn.108-09).
16. Id. at 385 & n.57; cf. Garry W. Jenkins, Soft Power, Strategic Security
and International Philanthropy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2007) (arguing that
international philanthropy is an ally not an enemy in the war on terror).
17. 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
18. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies, and
the Myth of Swain v. Pressley, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 411. For more
on Vladeck’s inquiry into the availability of habeas corpus in the context of
the war on terror, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property,
and Access to the Courts, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 963 (2007).
19. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted,
127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
485–88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Gherebi v. Bush,
352 F.3d 1278, 1285–99 (9th Cir. 2003).
20. 10 U.S.C.A. § 950j(b) (West Supp. 2007). In Boumediene v. Bush, 128
S. Ct. 2229 (2008), the Court struck down these restrictions on access to
habeas corpus.
21. See Vladeck, supra note 18, at 412 & n.8.
22. Id. at 426-27.

Commissions Act.23 To ensure that Congress does not “suffocate
the writ,”24 Vladeck concludes that the Court should relinquish
the “myth” of Pressley and offer clear guidance.25
Presenting doctrinal guidance on another important issue,
Professor Robert Chesney squarely addresses the perceived
conflict between our esteem for the rights of the individual and
democratic accountability on the one hand and national security
on the other in Legislative Reform of the State Secrets Privilege.26
The administration has cited the state secrets privilege both as a
shield, to ensure that litigation will not result in the disclosure of
sensitive information, and as a sword, to persuade courts to
dismiss litigation (for example, lawsuits based on the
government’s Terrorist Surveillance Program).27
Chesney
recognizes that all too often government officials have exploited
the state secrets privilege to shield the government from
revelations of its own incompetence.28 However, Chesney also
acknowledges that wholesale disclosure of sensitive information
could do real damage to national security interests.29
In search of the right balance, Chesney focuses on the newly
introduced State Secrets Protection Act.30 He points out the Act’s
benefits for plaintiffs: a mandate that the court examine evidence
claimed as privileged, its provisions for substitute evidence when
the privilege does attach, judicially appointed experts to advise
the court, and the introduction of guardians ad litem to represent
the non-government party in what are currently ex parte
23. Id. at 435-37 & nn.110-15.
24. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973).
25. Vladeck, supra note 18, at 441-42 & n.130.
26. Robert M. Chesney, Legislative Reform of the State Secrets Privilege,
13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 442 (2008). For further discussion of the state
secrets privilege, see Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of
National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007). The U.S.
Supreme Court recognized the state secrets privilege in United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
27. See e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev'd,
493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); Hepting v. AT&T, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D.
Cal. 2006).
28. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (discussing privilege); cf. STEPHEN
DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1043 (Aspen Publisher 4th ed. 2006)
(noting that information for which government claimed privilege in Reynolds
concerned not advanced technology but mere pilot error).
29. Chesney, supra note 26, at 457-58.
30. See S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://frwebgate.access
.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s2533is.txt.pdf.

hearings.31 He also suggests that the Act goes too far at times,
potentially compromising national security by allowing attorneys
for the non-government party to learn about evidence that is later
found to be privileged.32 Chesney has submitted his commentary
as testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee which held a
hearing on the legislation in February.33
Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky takes on conventional wisdom
about the role of lawyers in terrorism cases in her thoughtful
contribution, Zealous Lawyering Succeeds Against All Odds:
Major Mori and the Legal Team for David Hicks at Guantanamo
Bay.34 After President Bush issued his order establishing the
military commissions, some progressives criticized the order
(which the Supreme Court in Hamdan35 ruled exceeded the
president’s authority) by raising doubts about the independence of
military lawyers who would defend the detainees.36 Indeed,
supporters of the military commissions appeared to implicitly
accept this premise, believing that military lawyers would be
docile advocates at best. Yaroshefsky’s essay counters this
assumption with a compelling narrative about how the Hicks team
succeeded by challenging the legitimacy of the commissions both
in the tribunal itself and in the court of public opinion.37 The
Hicks team concentrated their efforts on Hicks’ home country,
Australia, which also happens to be an ally of the United States.
The result was a negotiated plea for Hicks that secured his release
from Guantanamo.38
Yaroshefsky poignantly portrays the
lawyers’ anxiety that the plea would legitimize the Bush
Nevertheless, she argues
administration’s overreaching.39
31. Chesney supra note 26, at 466.
32. Id. at 457-58.
33. STATE SECRETS PROTECTION ACT, S. Rep No. 110-938 (2008).
34. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Zealous Lawyering Succeeds Against All
Odds: Major Mori and the Legal Team for David Hicks at Guantanamo Bay,
13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 468.
35. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
36. See Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice
Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 656-57 (2002).
37. Yaroshefsky, supra note 34, at 479.
38. Yaroshefsky, supra note 34, at 490-92 & nn.106-17.
39. Id. at 478 & nn.49-50. For a further perspective on the ethics of
lawyers representing clients in an arguably unfair system, see Mary Cheh,
Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems? The Case of the Military
Commissions, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 375 (2005).

convincingly that the plea not only helped Hicks but also
underscored the ongoing problems with the military
commissions.40 Ironically, the committed and creative advocacy of
the Hicks team furnished rare common ground for the Bush
administration and its critics, each of whom had underestimated
the institutional culture and pride of military lawyers.
As the authors in this Symposium demonstrate, conventional
wisdom only goes so far in meeting the challenges of the postSeptember 11 legal environment. In place of the old ideologically
entrenched positions, new approaches are necessary. The authors
in this Symposium make substantial contributions to that crucial
debate.

40.

Yaroshefsky, supra note 34, at 490-92 & nn.108-114.

The Corruption of Civilizations
Timothy K. Kuhner*

Remarks by other panelists at today’s conference1 have
clarified and problematized increases in executive power,
detriments to human rights, and the emergence of an ever-more
adversarial and evasive political environment that removes
transparency, accountability, rationality, and even principle from
legal discourse. These remarks eulogize the war on terrorism’s
non-human casualties. I wish to point out with acute remorse
that these casualties all belonged to a single family and that this
family constituted our tradition. This was a tradition of liberal
democracy, where torture was off the table and procedural
protections were a centerpiece. Aggressive warfare signaled
criminality, not patriotism. Human dignity, the rule of law, and
the intelligent pursuit of peace, prosperity, and stability
emblazoned the halls of this place where we resided. This
tradition was hard-won; its emergence costly and far-sighted, a
precious gift of heritage that we were tasked with maintaining, or
even improving.
I also wish to say that although the rhetoric of our tradition’s
demise is appealing for its dramatic excess, it is too conceited for
me to maintain to the end, for it is not the demise of our tradition
that we are witnessing but our abandonment of the same. The
tradition will endure, at least in a cryogenically frozen state, until
new adherents seek it out. My position, however, is that we
should re-adhere to it now and save future generations the
trouble. Here, focusing on our treatment of detainees and
aggressive warfare—just two of the ways we have abandoned our
* Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; J.D.
and LL.M., magna cum laude, Duke University School of Law. I thank Peter
Margulies and Jason Morgan-Foster for their comments.
1. Roger Williams University School of Law, Legal Dilemmas in a
Dangerous World: Law, Terrorism, and National Security, (Nov. 9, 2007).
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tradition—I will lay out a brief civilizational requiem. This
redescribes the war on terrorism in a way that makes its excesses
all the less appealing and its broader consequences all the more
clear.
I. A DIALECTIC OF EXTREMISM

I submit that the supposed conflict between terrorists and the
architects of our war on terrorism is in reality a collaborative
relationship between two groups of extremists whose modes of
action undermine civilizational commitments. The “clash of
civilizations” predicted by Samuel Huntington and endorsed by
Osama Bin Laden2 and George Bush3 alike ought to be described
2. Referring to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11, Bin Laden
sees a united front in the West: “[t]he entire West, with the exception of a few
countries, supports this unfair, barbaric campaign, although there is no
evidence of the involvement of the people of Afghanistan in what happened in
America.” He then goes on to describe creed as the basis that divides the
East from the West:
“This war is fundamentally religious. The people of the East are
Muslims. They sympathized with Muslims against the people of the
West, who are the crusaders. Those who try to cover this crystal
clear fact, which the entire world has admitted, are deceiving the
Islamic nation . . . Under no circumstances should we forget this
enmity between us and the infidels. For, the enmity is based on
creed . . . We should also renounce the atheists and infidels. It
suffices me to seek God's help against them. God says: ‘Never will
the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with thee unless thou follow
their form of religion.’”
Also notable in this same speech is Bin Laden’s characterization of the
conflict itself, which he defines as religious and having nothing to do with
terrorism, except the terrorism that he believes the West has consistently
committed against Muslims. Bin Laden Rails Against Crusaders and UN,
B.B.C. NEWS, Nov. 3, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/
monitoring/media_reports/1636782.stm. Phrases such as “the crusaderZionist alliance” also deserve mention. Statement of the World Islamic Front,
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/
docs/980223-fatwa.htm.
3. On the night September 11, 2001, the President addressed the
nation: “Today . . . our way of life, our very freedom came under attack.”
George W. Bush, President, United States, Address to the Nation (Sept. 11,
2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010911-16.html Here, I wish to be cautious, because it is the case that
Bush has been careful in his comments about Muslims generally and making
a distinction between terrorists ideology and Islam. But little can be said to
commend his description of terrorists’ motives: he wants the American public
to believe that we are being attacked because we are free, because of who we
are, and what we represent, when in fact transnational Jihadis have always
had a practical set of goals relating to concrete foreign policies relating to the

as the corruption of civilizations.4 Huntington famously predicted
in 1993 that the primary source of conflict in the world we now
inhabit would be cultural differences: “The fault lines between
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future,” he warned;
“[t]he great divisions among humankind and the dominating
source of conflict will be cultural.”5 It quickly became fashionable
to believe that we would inevitably generate conflict just by being
ourselves and staying true to our own values. In reality, however,
the diverse set of conflicts relating to terrorism world-wide have
been spurred by actors who dishonor their own civilizational
commitments. Leaders on both sides distinguish themselves not
by being true to their civilizations, but by attempting to corrupt
their civilizations.
The underlying values and tactics among both camps are
fundamentally similar in their violation of foundational social
mores and legal norms. The Bush administration and Al Qaeda6
employ unlawful modes of warfare—preemptive warfare and
terrorism are violations of fundamental customary and treaty
prohibitions in international law. Each denies civilized treatment
to its captives—indefinite detention without charges, torture, and
beheadings all contravene sacred norms of due process and
civilized treatment.7 And yet, each camp proclaims itself the
Palestinian people, the U.S. military presence in Muslim lands, and so on.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN AFF.,
Summer 1993, at 22. See also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1998).
5. The Clash of Civilizations, supra note 4, at 454.
6. By referring to Al Qaeda by name, I do not mean to exclude other
transnational jihadis. There are of course multiple groups of doctrinaire
jihadis, such as the Islamic Group, Islamic Jihad, and al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad.
FAWAZ A. GERGES, THE FAR ENEMY: WHY JIHAD WENT GLOBAL 1 (2005).
7. It is in fact remarkable that the United States continues, post
invasion of Afghanistan, to apply a war paradigm in the first place. At the
time of the World Trade Center bombings, there was a legal presumption
that terrorism was not an act of war. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1012 (2d Cir. 1974) (“The cases
establish that war is a course of hostility engaged in by entities that have at
least significant attributes of sovereignty. Under international law war is
waged by states or state-like entities.”). In a trial that ensued after 1993, a
federal court of appeals upheld the conviction of a terrorist acting on U.S. soil
for conspiracy to levy war against the United States. United States v.
Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) (“To support a conviction for
seditious conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 2384, the Government must
demonstrate that: (1) in a State, or Territory, or place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, (2) two or more persons conspired to ‘levy

guardian of sacred values—those of Western freedom on the one
hand and Islamic faith on the other—while simultaneously
employing tactics that can only be described as the gravemen of
those same values. Just as the great majority of Muslims decry Al
Qaeda8 (never mind suicide bombing and the beheading of
hostages), the majority of Americans disapprove of the Bush
Administration9 (never mind the use of torture and preemptive
warfare).
The underlying similarity between both sides’ derogations
reveals another crucial clarification: the only clash to be seen is
one between extremists on both sides, our extremists and their
extremists. And upon closer examination, it may not be so much
of a clash as a symbiosis. Each side proclaims to its respective
constituencies that its actions undermine the enemy, while in
reality each camp enthrones the other. The attacks of September
11th have triggered a new era of fear and executive power, giving
President Bush and his neoconservative handlers the opportunity
they needed to invade Iraq and weaken the American commitment
to rights. The invasion of Iraq has succeeded in creating a strong
war against’ or ‘oppose by force the authority of’ the United States
government, and (3) that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy.”).
Despite using the word “war,” this is a criminal charge. The Government
pressed criminal charges against those responsible, fighting terrorists in the
United States in the Article III courts, not by employing the laws of war on
its own territory. See Stacie D. Gorman, In the Wake of Tragedy: The Citizens
Cry Out for War, but Can the United States Legally Declare War on
Terrorism?, 21 PENN ST. INT'L. L. REV. 669, 676 (2003) (“the fact that the
terrorists were tried in the court system--not fought on the battlefield-indicates that terrorists are criminals, and not soldiers of war. Although the
charge against them was conspiracy to levy war against the United States,
this was a criminal charge, punishable with jail time, not an act of warfare to
be retaliated against with missiles.”). One might compare our shift in policy
with Spain’s staying the course, prosecuting in civilian courts those
responsible for Al Qaeda’s bombing of a Madrid train station. Some people
were actually acquitted, but many were sentenced to long prison terms. But
they held these trials under conditions of the rule of law.
8. GERGES, supra note 6, at 270 (“[T]he dominant response to Al Qaeda
in the Muslim world was very hostile, and few activists, let alone ordinary
Muslims, embraced its global jihad . . . [Moreover,] a broad representative
spectrum of Arab and Muslim opinion makers and Islamists utterly rejected
bin Laden and Zawahiri’s justification for their attacks on America and
debunked their religious and ideological rationale.”).
9. In the most recent New York Times/CBS News poll, for example, only
28% of Americans approved of the job that President Bush is doing. David
Leonhardt & Marjorie Connelly, 81% in Poll Say Nation is Headed on Wrong
Track, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, at A1.

terrorist base where before there was none and elevated
recruitment levels world-wide.10
Meanwhile, the American
violation of civil and human rights has weakened core alliances
and sympathies,11 playing directly into the hands of the terrorists.
Al Qaeda and the Bush administration have established a sort of
dialectic, a dialectic of extremism, in which each camp legitimates
and strengthens the other. And this is to say nothing of the
operational and financial linkages between jihadis and Americans
in Afghanistan during the 1980s, a theater of war where jihadis
acquired “practical experience in combat, politics, and
organizational matters.”12
II. OUR TRADITION

As this conflict escalates—the more we torture detainees and
drop bombs that kill civilians, the more they send their operatives
to our shores—hatred and fear will increasingly well up in our
guts, and we, the collective human “we,” will come to forget who
we are and what we stand for.13 It is imperative to remember and
to repeat the observation that most fairly characterizes this new
era: our extremists and their extremists undermine the core
values that define Western and Islamic civilizations. Here, I
mean only to comment on our fidelity to our own mores, not their
fidelity to their own.
The treatment of prisoners makes inroads to certain mores.
We might bristle at our mind-boggling rate of incarceration. We

10.
11.

See GERGES, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See JOSEPH NYE, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS, x (2004).
12. See GERGES, supra note 6, at 12, 14 (“Despite subsequent denials by
both jihadis and American officials, the two camps were in a marriage of
convenience, united in opposition to godless Communism.”). Symbiosis
indeed. Jihadis and American hawks exhibit a classic case: “a relationship
between two people in which each person is dependent upon and receives
reinforcement, whether beneficial or detrimental, from the other.” RANDOM
HOUSE COMPACT UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1926 (Special 2d ed. 1996).
13. I do not believe it is coincidental, for example, that citizens of
countries facing frequent terrorist attacks are far more tolerant of torture
than citizens of countries that rarely face terrorist attacks. In a recent
survey, Israelis and Iraqis were far more tolerant of torture as official policy
(42-43% approving) than were citizens of the other twenty-three other
countries polled (29% on average supporting some torture). See One-Third
Support ‘Some Torture,’ B.B.C. NEWS, Oct. 19, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/6063386.stm#table.

are home to only 5% of the global population, but almost a quarter
of the global prison population.14 But America never promised not
to lock a lot of people up. This after all can partly be attributed to
a democratic tradition of electing judges and prosecutors at the
state level. “Law and order” remains a strong cultural value
But our law and order culture is tempered by a
here.15
commitment to rights that spans domestic and international law:
due process, the prohibition on unlawful searches and seizures,
equal protection, the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, adherence to the Geneva Conventions, the Torture
Convention, the Civil and Political Rights convention, and so on.
Although it is true that we did not promise not to lock them up, we
have promised due process and civilized treatment.
Bring any great voice of our tradition to Abu Graib and
Guantanamo Bay and each of us would hear expressed the
civilizational agony we feel in our guts. Although on foreign
ground, these are our prisons and Dostoyevsky said that it was
here that “the degree of civilization in a society is revealed.”16
Even complex figures faced with the responsibilities of power beg
us to consider the linkage between civil liberties and civil society,
civilized treatment and civilization. As Chief Justice Burger put
it, “the way a society treats those who have transgressed against
it is evidence of the essential character of that society.”17
Churchill gives the point more of what is due to it:
A calm and dispassionate recognition of the rights of the
accused against the state, and even of convicted criminals
against the state, a constant heart-searching by all
14. Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/
23/us/23prison.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
15. See, e.g., MARSHALL SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE 278-79 (2003)
(discussing the tensions between law and order culture and the notion,
expressed in police misconduct actions, that nobody is above the law).
16. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD 76 (Constance
Garnett trans., 1923). Winston S. Churchill said precisely the same thing:
“[T]he mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and
criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country.”
See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY 215 n.4 (1990).
17. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984) (“The continuing
guarantee of these substantial rights to prison inmates is testimony to a
belief that the way a society treats those who have transgressed against it is
evidence of the essential character of that society.”)

charged with the duty of punishment, a desire and
eagerness to rehabilitate . . ., and an unfaltering faith
that there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the
heart of every man, these are the symbols which in the
treatment of crime and criminals mark and measure the
stored-up strength of a nation, and are the sign and proof
of the living virtue in it. 18
We should hope that our unconscionable treatment of
prisoners abroad indicates the sort of decline in strength and
virtue that Churchill warned of, and not an abandonment of
strength and virtue altogether.
Yet, the Administration’s efforts to legitimate indefinite
detention, change the definition of torture, and manufacture a
doctrine embracing illegal warfare suggest the worst of these two
scenarios. This would seem an effort to redefine strength—
strength in power, strength in brutality, strength in shock and
awe—and an effort to reshape virtue, now the vehemence of one’s
self protection and the zealousness of one’s pursuit of national
interest. And so aggression becomes strength, and single-minded
pursuit of security and particular advantages reshapes the
contours of virtue.
At one point, there was strength in reasoned restraint and
virtue in the rare form of compassion one might feel for an enemy.
Like many hard-won traditions of conscience, these meanings and
the courage to pursue them are located not solely within one
nation, but rather within a community of nations that has derived
shared lessons from history. These lessons, too civilizational in
scope to be proprietary, are forward looking. Their application is
surely the great labor of civilizational belonging, surely a great
benefit of civilizational belonging as well, for it is in living up to
these lessons that we do what we know to be right and avoid the
entanglements that flow, inevitably, from misdeed.
The basic ethics of the long-standing, but threatened,
civilizational project in which Americans claim membership are
special in substance, not function.
Functionally, one is
deontological and the other is consequentialist. The first tells us
that the means matter; the second tells us that the ends do too.
18. Winston S. Churchill, Address to the House of Commons (July 20,
1910), in 2 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at
1589, 1598 (Robert Rhodes James ed. 1974).

But the moral value, the substance, at the heart of our
deontological ethic is nothing less than human dignity, and the
goods that our consequentialism seeks to maximize are nothing
less than peace, stability, and prosperity. Perhaps all traditions
are the same when viewed at this high level of abstraction,
varying only in how dignity and stability are defined, so let me be
more specific: indefinite detention without charges, torture, and
aggressive warfare violate both of our civilizational ethics. This
becomes a gentle reminder that we consider such means wrong
per se and that we already know that the ends professed for such
means will remain elusive. This much our tradition has learned
already at tremendous costs; this much we ignore only at the sake
of losing ourselves and having to begin anew in a state of
savagery.
Our deontological project of rights against the government is
indeed civilizational in scope and importance. In our tradition,
the protection of human dignity has undergone two separate
revolutions—one American (1776), the other international
(1945)—but its evolution began before either and has continued
after both. The Supreme Court has said so quite clearly:19
“[O]wing to the progressive development of legal ideas and
institutions in England, the words of Magna Charta stood for very
different things at the time of the separation of the American
colonies from what they represented originally.”20 And since the
conclusion of the American Revolution, we have been improving
upon our “ancient liberties,” for these have been rooted in the
“forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time, new
expression and greater effect to modern ideas of selfgovernment.”21
Our project of self-government of course began with the

19. The foregoing quotations and legal standards have evolved through
the Court’s cruel and unusual punishment and due process jurisprudence—
constitutional protections transplanted from the English Declaration of
Rights of 1688 and the Magna Carta.
20. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884).
21. Id. at 530 (“[I]t is better not to go too far back into antiquity for the
best securities for our ‘ancient liberties.’ It is more consonant to the true
philosophy of our historical legal institutions to say that the spirit of personal
liberty and individual right, which they embodied, was preserved and
developed by a progressive growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances
and situations of the forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time,
new expression and greater effect to modern ideas of self-government.”).

declaration of seemingly insincere ideas. How could we profess
“unalienable” rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
while holding slaves? How could we declare consent of the
governed the legitimizing feature of any government while
considering a large portion of the population to be mere property,
by nature ineligible for rights and self-authorship?22 Where were
the political equality and popular sovereignty we professed?
Because the Declaration of Independence was believed by the
colonists to be compatible with slavery, we must recall its words at
present. The improvement in our ancient liberties, this process
that has given new expression and greater effect to our ideals,
defines our civilizational commitment to rights as hard-won, as a
series of lessons learned. We considered inhuman and unworthy
of rights an entire class of human beings while simultaneously
holding up human freedom as our master value, our claim to
legitimacy and respect. It was not until the slaves were free that
America could even begin to live up to her principles. This
evolution of rights reunited us with our conscience and our
tradition. Indeed, the tradition of rights in this country has all
the makings of an identity, a politically and philosophically
genealogical feature that connects America with a tradition that is
at once of her and beyond her.
The Supreme Court has proven itself an astute genealogist in
these regards. It has described those due process rights valid
against the states as “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,”
and part of the “very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.”23
Due process rights are those that stand between a human being
and indefinite detention without charges or trials without
procedural guarantees. To abolish such rights, the Court has said
is to “violate a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”24
Justice Cardozo famously noted that a “fair and enlightened
system of justice would be impossible without [such rights].”25

22. And for many years after the Declaration of Independence, we might
note that its principles posed no obstacle to treating Native Americans as a
savage feature of the land that we were free to eradicate, another category of
non-persons in which rights could not fully vest.
23. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
24. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
25. Id. Justice Cardozo died the next year. Palko is one testament to his
judicial philosophy, one relevant aspect of which he gave to us in these words:

Eighth Amendment jurisprudence reflects a similar
preoccupation with the civilizational pedigree, indeed identityconstituting importance, of fundamental rights. In explaining
why expatriation is cruel and unusual, a plurality of the Court
observed that “[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment
for crime.”26 A majority of the Court affirmed this comparative
law method of analysis in 2005,27 as well as the following
progression of meanings. Underlying and flowing through the
Eighth Amendment, the Court has found “the principle of civilized
treatment”28 and a process of “evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.”29 Hearing these
phrases alerts us that it is this clause in our Bill of Rights that
prohibits torture and connects us with a notable trajectory from
savagery to civilization. The Court contextualizes our tradition of
Eighth Amendment protection within the “affirmation of certain
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples;”30 this, the
Court believes, “simply underscores the centrality of those same
rights within our own heritage of freedom.”31 These words ring of
deep cultural and civilizational significance. All of this, in turn,
can be grounded upon a transcendental source that would seem to
explain cross-border similarities and complicate derogation: “The
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man.”32

“The great generalities of the Constitution have a content and a significance
that vary from age to age. The method of free decision sees through the
transitory particulars and reaches what is permanent behind them.”
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (Yale U.
Press 1921).
26. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (emphasis added).
27. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The opinion of the
world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected
and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”).
28. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99 (italics added).
29. Id. at 100; accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002).
Also of note are references to “our Anglo-American heritage.” See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-32 (1988).
30. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
31. Id.
32. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100; accord Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12. I
understand perfectly well, and doubt very much that this will be lost on
readers, that as a formalistic matter the extraterritorial application of the
Bill of Rights is generally dubious. I feel, however, that as a civilizational
matter, and as a self-definitional matter, that the seriousness of the values

The dignity of man perhaps never received such a blow as
during World War II. Retooled as human dignity, this basic
concept came to underlie the United Nations Charter and the
international revolution it codified.33 The dropping of two atomic
bombs within a month and a half after the signing of the Charter
renders facile any descriptive claim of human dignity’s triumph,34
but its assent is, at least, normatively clear. “We the Peoples of
the United Nations [are] Determined . . . to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person,” the preamble explains.35 Responding to the ways in
which human dignity and peace were compromised, the Charter
prohibits aggressive force (i.e., preemptive war). Another body of
law—including the Geneva Conventions and their protocols, the
Hague Conventions, and customary law—regulates the conduct of
warfare, requiring, inter alia, civilized treatment of detainees and
minimization of civilian casualties.36 Also responding to the
causes of World War II, the Charter establishes international
collaboration in promoting human rights.37
And then, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which itself was labeled “the common standard of achievement for

and the depth of the tradition cannot be so easily waved by a technicality
which, importantly, is mostly rectified by our membership in human rights
treaties and the Geneva Conventions.
33. It would also be fair to say that human dignity, together with
pragmatic concern over Hitler’s expansion, motivated U.S. involvement in
World War II.
34. The Charter was signed on June 26, 1945, and ratified on October 24.
August 6 and 9 of the same year stand as that moment in history when
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were sacrificed to cause Japan’s surrender. For
commentary on these events, see Barton J. Bernstein, Introducing the
Interpretive Problems of Japan’s 1945 Surrender: A Historiographical Essay
on Recent Literature in the West, in THE END OF THE PACIFIC WAR:
REAPPRAISALS 36-37 (Tsuyoshi Hasegawa ed., 2007).
35. U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153,
entered into force Oct. 24, 1945.
36. Regarding the jus ad bellum, see U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, art. 51;
regarding the jus in bello, see, for example, Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, and Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
37. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1 (“The Purposes of the United Nations
are: . . . To achieve international co-operation . . . promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”).

all peoples and all nations,” there came a further solemn
proclamation: “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”38 The
Declaration admonishes governments that human rights are the
entitlement of “[e]veryone . . . without distinction of any kind,
such as race . . . religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status,” and that “no
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to
which a person belongs . . . or under any other limitation of
The International Convention on Civil and
sovereignty.”39
Political Rights (ICCPR), one of the foundational human rights
treaties, reasserts the basic deontological thrust of human rights
and connects up with the Eighth Amendment: “these rights derive
from the inherent dignity of the human person.”40
Through entangled treaty law and customary law that makes
good on these precepts, the international revolution has
established that governments are not free to treat people in their
control however they please. This is the crucial limitation on
sovereignty established in law by the human rights movement.
The prohibition on torture, in fact, has been elevated to the status
of a jus cogens norm, a rare international law designation holding
derogation to be impermissible under any circumstance, including
war.41 Indeed, if human dignity is inherent, then certain rights
are inalienable, and accordingly some things simply cannot be
38. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st Plen. Mtg., U.S. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
39. Id. at Art. 2.
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/
instree/b3ccpr.htm.
41. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53, U.N.
Doc.A/Conf.39/27. 1155 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www1.umn.edu.edu/
humanrt/instree/b3ccpr.htm (“a peremptory norm of general international
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.”). On the jus cogens status of the prohibition on
torture, see, for example, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n; Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992) (“while not all customary
international law carries with it the force of a jus cogens norm, the
prohibition against official torture has attained that status.”)

done. Sole, despotic dominion of territory and persons thereon is
thus rescinded from states. The international revolution is an
evolutionary leap in the “standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”42 How could our prerogatives to
protect the dignity of man and make good on our own heritage of
freedom be taken seriously if states were free to pursue genocidal
policies or conquer each other at will? It follows in an essentially
evolutionary way that new rules and structures had to be
established to protect human dignity in an interdependent
community of states.
And so respect for fundamental rights is part of the
longstanding civilizational project in which we claim membership.
From the Magna Carta to the United Nations Charter, the
protection of human dignity through fundamental rights has
figured in our heritage and best efforts at producing a just society.
The rescinding of civil liberties at home, indefinite detention
without trial and torture abroad—from waterboarding to
extraordinary rendition—and the waging of preemptive warfare in
Iraq all speak to an abandonment of our own heritage of freedom;
the principle of civilized treatment forgotten, the principles of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people now
uprooted, plucked. Civilization forsaken. Our authority, freed
from civilizational constraints, knows no bounds—we are not
constrained by human dignity any longer, not limited by
constitutional law, perhaps not even aware of international law.
What hubris! Our extremists have reclaimed the right of conquest
over foreign lands and the ability to revoke the personhood of
those who threaten us. They have returned to savagery and the
country cannot long remain autonomous from the flavor of its
official acts. The rights of adverse possession will soon flow to
those who just recently began as unlawful occupiers of the
American tradition. Granted, these disseisors’ occupation of our
tradition has not always been obvious; indeed, secrecy has
abounded. Nevertheless, the occupation has been notorious,
hostile and brazen; our land has been altered. We must claim
trespass, less we acquiesce and cede title.
But perhaps the neoconservatives are right: in an era of
terrorism, we cannot afford to maintain naïve principles, these
42. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002).

inconvenient traditions, this outmoded quality of conscience, for it
is the first duty of government—they remind us—to protect the
homeland. Once all terrorist groups of global reach are defeated,
then we can return to Eden. Here we come to the consequentialist
ethic at the heart of our civilizational project: the search for the
good ends of stability and peace. I suspect most of us might come
around to this ethic eventually if it were not so empirically
unsound when applied to torture and wars of aggression. General
David Petraeus, Commanding General of Iraq, has refuted the
argument made by our extremists:
“Some may argue that we would be more effective if we
sanctioned torture or other expedient methods to obtain
information from the enemy. That would be wrong.
Beyond the basic fact that such actions are illegal, history
shows that they also are frequently neither useful nor
necessary. Certainly, extreme physical action can make
someone ‘talk;’ however, what the individual says may be
of questionable value.”43
Indeed, the U.S. Army’s own field manual contains a longstanding prohibition on torture.44
Besides producing bad intelligence, torture produces more
terrorists. Fawaz Gerges, in his authoritative study of how
doctrinaire jihadis turned their sights from local targets to the
West and its allies, notes that “Arab/Muslim prisons, particularly
their torture chambers, have served as incubators for generations
of jihadis.”45 He links this “bloody history of official torture” with
a “culture of victimhood and desire for revenge [that] enables the
movement to mobilize young recruits and constantly renew

43. Letter from General David A. Petraeus, (May 10, 2007)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/petraeus_values_05
1007.pdf.
44. See FM 34-52, Ch. 1, Department of the U.S. Army, Washington, DC,
May 8, 1987, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/policy/
army/fm/fm34-52/chapter1.htm (“PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF
FORCE[:] The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to
unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is
neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experience
indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of
sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it
yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can
induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear.”)
45. GERGES, supra note 6, at 9.

itself.”46
Preemptive
war
has
also
proved
spectacularly
counterproductive for the goal of increased security. Gerges
recounts study after study—including the findings of the director
of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Saudi Arabia’s interior
minister, and virtually all American, European, and Arab analysts
to have considered the matter—that report an iron-clad
consensus: U.S. policy pursuant to the war on terrorism, including
the invasion and occupation of Iraq, “radicalizes Arab public
opinion,” “fuel[s] Islamic resentment,” provides recruiting tools
and a recruiting ground, and “play[s] directly into the hands of Al
Qaeda and other militants.”47 Admittedly, the security issue
would be a more complicated one had Saddam Hussein indeed
been tied to Al Qaeda or capable of threatening the United States,
which of course he was not. The many spurious rationales for
invading Iraq continue to produce distrust and sometimes
animosity in those who value truth.
Beyond tilting public opinion in the Muslim world closer to Al
Qaeda, U.S. policy has caused sizable changes in global public
opinion. Respect for the United States has declined steeply since
the invasion of Iraq, and not just in Muslim countries. For
example, the number of people in Britain, France, and Germany
holding favorable views of the United States has decreased by 2030% between 2002 and 2007.48 Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the
world’s largest Muslim country, the percentage of citizens holding
favorable views went from 61% in 2002 to 29% in the same time
span.49
This does not surprise Joseph Nye. In his book, Soft Power:
46. Id.
47. Id. at 264-76. See also Peter Margulies, Making “Regime Change”
Multilateral: The War on Terror and Transitions to Democracy, 32 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 389, 396 (2004) (“Unfortunately, the preemptive style, rooted
in coercion and legal sanctions, does little to dislodge the processes of social
identity construction and social comparison that create a fertile ground for
asymmetric violence. Because of this negligible impact on underlying
processes, the Administration's approach to disrupting the social capital of
groups practicing asymmetric violence is ineffective. Indeed, the punitive
approach in some ways enhances the social capital available for asymmetric
violence, by sharpening the social comparisons that serve as the best
recruiting tools for those committed to extremism.”)
48. Meg Bortin, U.S. Faces More Distrust From World, Poll Shows, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2007, at A12.
49. Id.

The Means to Success in World Politics,50 Nye cites the
“plummeting” popularity of the United States and explains the
growing practical problem of securing help from Islamic countries
in locating and eliminating terrorists.51 This is a two-sided
problem. As seen with Iraq, hard power policies increase the very
problem with which we need the help of foreign leaders. Nye
compares U.S. power to that of the Roman Empire and cautions
that “Rome did not succumb to the rise of another empire, but to
the onslaught of waves of barbarians. Modern high-tech terrorists
are the new barbarians.”52 Relying on reports from American
intelligence and law enforcement officials, Nye confirms Gerges’s
findings, locating in the Iraq War a source of Al Qaeda’s growth:
“Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups intensified their recruitment
on three continents by ‘tapping into rising anger about the
American campaign for war in Iraq.’”53 But, thanks to the second
part of the problem, declining U.S. popularity makes it politically
unpopular for foreign leaders to collaborate. Beyond aggravating
the problem of terrorism, the careless use of force and the
savagery of torture are quickly destroying our good name.
Nye writes that soft power is “the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”54 He
specifies that this source of power emanates from “culture (in
places where it is attractive to others), [ ] political values (when [a
state] lives up to them at home and abroad), and [ ] foreign
policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral
authority).”55
Indefinite detention, torture, and preemptive
warfare have made short work of these last two sources of soft
power. Our political values do not merely include rights and the
rule of law; they reside in them. And yet, our extremists have
been quick to discard them both at home and abroad. A foreign
policy that includes aggressive warfare, extraordinary rendition,
and indefinite detention is per se illegitimate and strategically
50. NYE, supra note 11.
51. Id. at xi. See also id. at 129 ([T]he United States cannot meet the
new threat identified in the national security strategy without the
cooperation of other countries. They will cooperate up to a point out of mere
self-interest, but their degree of cooperation is also affected by the
attractiveness of the United States.”).
52. NYE, supra note 11, at x.
53. Id. at 29.
54. Id. at x.
55. Id. at 11.

disastrous.
It is to a nation’s moral authority what the
molestation of children by priests is to a church’s moral authority,
but perhaps worse since the imputed actions are for the most part
orders from high in the chain of command. Even those whose eyes
are fixed in precisely the right direction will have trouble seeing
that beacon of freedom said to originate in the United States; even
her greatest admirers now begin to doubt U.S. claims about
representing lauded values; even lovers of this country become
estranged.
War has this effect and an unlawful war of aggression doubles
it. Love is lost. Claims fail to touch upon truth. Freedom
becomes just an end, its extinction our daily bread. War, lawful or
not, falls on the extreme end of the hard power spectrum—
coercion through violence, payments in blood. Understandably,
Nye counsels us to employ tools from the soft power spectrum
more frequently to achieve the balance between attraction and
coercion that he calls “smart power;”56 however, we cannot even
begin to do this until we hold true to our political values at home
and abroad, and end our illegitimate and immoral foreign policies.
Perhaps then we can begin to think about eliminating the causes
of terrorism, instead of adding to them; perhaps then we can begin
to think about defeating our radical adversaries instead of
continuing to radicalize our moderate allies.
III. STAYING TRUE

Having examined the threat posed to the two ethics of our
civilizational project by our own extremists, let us consider how to
stay true to high-minded traditions in moments when we feel
threatened. Ronald Dworkin understands the tensions inherent
in upholding rights and political values in trying times. He
supplies guidance for avoiding derogations that, like those we
have seen, constitute a rescinding of the institution of rights itself.
Through a few of his quotations, I hope to illustrate a few
guideposts for how to re-adhere to our tradition—that is, to take
rights seriously again. “The concept of rights,” says Dworkin, “has
56. See, e.g., the statement of the former Secretary General of NATO,
Jaap De Hoop Scheffer: “There is no final military answer for Afghanistan.
Afghanistan needs development, needs reconstruction, needs nationbuilding.” Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, Press Point at
Informal Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers (Feb. 8, 2007),
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070208e.html.

its most natural use when a political society is divided, and
appeals to co-operation or a common goal are pointless.”57 Rights
provide the ground rules for liberal democracy itself and for the
discourse, stability, and values of civility and restraint that
characterize it. Even if the political community driving U.S.
policy is divided on how to combat terrorism, we ought to be able
to find among the vast majority of the population common ground
where rights lie. Taking rights seriously means taking the rule of
law seriously and nobody, except extremists, believes this should
be easily discarded.
But how do we interpret rights? We may assume that, in a
democracy, a government’s action and inaction alike flow from
popular opinion and the pursuit of general utility. Rights place
certain courses of action off the table and require others. Our
government may not, for example, inflict cruel and unusual
punishment, while it must provide certain procedural protections
at trial. In this way, rights circumscribe a government’s realms of
action and passivity, and, thus, constitute a restraint on politically
dominant preferences. Again, moderates in the United States,
which is to say the great majority of the population, ought to be
able to find common ground in twin convictions implied above and
embraced by Dworkin: rights that can be overruled in light of
shifting opinion are not rights at all; and rights that the majority
can revoke at will in the interest of its general utility are similarly
vacuous. Each situation, if taken as justifying the revocation of
rights, reveals the institution of rights to be a sham.58
But what if the political community is threatened? Surely
57. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1978). Although
this book addresses the rights of citizens against their government, we have
seen that this institution transcends U.S. borders.
It must as an
instrumental matter, Nye would tell us, in order for our values and foreign
policy to generate soft power, but we know that it does as a formalistic
matter, given the international revolution.
58. Id. at 191 (“normally it is a sufficient justification . . . that the act [of
the Government] is calculated to increase . . . general utility [but] [w]hen
individual citizens are said to have rights against the Government . . . that
must mean that this sort of justification is not enough.”) See also id. at 193
(“There would be no point in the boast that we respect individual rights
unless that involved some sacrifice, and the sacrifice in question must be that
we give up whatever marginal benefits our country would receive from
overriding these rights when they prove inconvenient”) and 194 (“A right
against the Government must be a right to do something even when the
majority thinks it would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would
be worse off for having it done.”).

this is the reason we have given for discarding rights during our
war on terrorism. There is a chance that someone released from
Guantanamo was wrongly deemed innocent. This person will then
rejoin the enemy and perhaps perpetrate a great attack against
us. Even with Jose Padilla and Hamdi, the two American citizens
famously denied for years any semblance of due process rights, the
government’s claims boiled down to these two individuals being
tied to terrorists and that no chances should be taken in dealing
with them. Dworkin is cautious. He writes that “There would be
no point in the boast that we respect individual rights unless that
involved some sacrifice, and the sacrifice in question must be that
we give up whatever marginal benefits our country would receive
from overriding these rights when they prove inconvenient.”59
This is to say that general utility justifications for rights
violations fall short. “Yes,” we might respond, “but what if we are
speaking not of marginal benefits but avoiding catastrophic
harm?”
Dworkin concedes that a genuine emergency, one of “clear and
present danger . . . of magnitude,” may justify a curtailment of
rights.60 International law also conditions derogation on an
emergency of certain magnitude. Consider the ICCPR derogation
clause: “In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the
States Parties . . . may take measures derogating from their
obligations . . . to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation.”61 But this clause is subject to a sizable limitation:
The ICCPR prohibits derogation from, inter alia, those articles
concerning torture and cruel treatment, the right to life, and
personhood.62 This may be the first difference between Dworkin
and the international standard: the latter places some derogations
off of the table, irregardless of magnitude. The second difference
concerns magnitude itself. The ICCPR would seem to require the
highest possible level of danger, perhaps beyond the reach of

59. DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 193.
60. Id. at 195. Dworkin also recognizes that preserving the rights of
some may also justify the violation of the rights of others. See id. at 194 (“In
order to save [rights], we must recognize as competing rights only the rights
of other members of the society as individuals.”).
61. Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. art. 4, 1966, 14668
U.N.T.S. 174, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm.
62. See id. at arts. 6-8, 11, 15, 16, and 18.

many 9/11s and in the realm of war against an enemy that could
actually defeat the state. Let us be realistic, however, and
concede that most states will not risk such outcomes.
So let us focus on the criteria most attune to the dilemmas of
a permanent war on terrorism: clear and present danger as
supplied by Dworkin—i.e., the certainty of the threat—and the
notion of all derogations being permissible only to the extent
strictly required by the situation. The latter requires that
infringements on rights be narrowly tailored to accomplish a
necessary objective. It immediately invalidates torture and the
War in Iraq, since these derogations only aggravate terrorism.
Rather than strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
such unreliable, costly, and counterproductive policies ought to be
strictly prohibited by the exigencies of the situation.
But this logic would also eliminate the criterion of certainty,
because it would view even an impending terrorist attack as
irrelevant to a government interest in employing torture. Some in
the administration, on the other hand, must be convinced that
waterboarding and extraordinary rendition do provide some
benefit; otherwise they would not permit these practices. For
example, President Bush recently vetoed a bill that would have
required the CIA to limit its interrogation tactics to those
authorized by the Army Field Manual.63 “Because the danger
remains, we need to ensure our intelligence officials have all the
tools they need to stop the terrorists,” the President remarked.64
And to credit this foolishness further, surely a policy of indefinite
detention would, assuming even a 1:1,000,000 ratio of terrorists to
innocent bystanders in detention, provide some marginal benefit
to immediate security interests. Support for torture is indeed an
extreme view, even descriptively speaking, as seen in a recent
BBC study. When asked whether they would support torture if it
could provide information that would save innocent lives, only 36%
of Americans said “yes.”65
Because there is some chance that indefinite detention would
prevent a loss or that torture would perhaps occasionally yield
useful information, should we not therefore rescind the prohibition
63. Steven Lee Myers, Bush Vetoes Bill on C.I.A. Tactics, Affirming
Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at A1.
64. See id. at 1.
65. One-Third Support ‘Some Torture,’ B.B.C. News, Oct. 19, 2006,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/6063386.stm#table.

on torture and the right to due process?
impatient:

Dworkin grows

[T]his argument ignores the primitive distinction between
what may happen and what will happen. If we allow
speculation to support the justification of emergency or
decisive benefit, then, again, we have annihilated rights.
We must, as Learned Hand said, discount the gravity of
the evil threatened by the likelihood of reaching that
evil.66
For Bush, it is not just about clinging to torture; it is also
about clinging to unfettered executive power to judge what is
necessary in any given situation. The power to define the
situation itself, though, must not be ceded. This is the power to
define a state of constant emergency through speculation. If we
are truly under grave and imminent threat, then a strong
executive must do what he deems necessary to protect us. So let
us turn to the criterion of certainty, clear and present danger.
This is the guidepost to hold dear. Because this war on terrorism
has no known endpoint, the constant threat of terrorism must not
be taken as sufficient justification for overriding rights. Consider
President Bush’s introduction of the war on terror to a joint
session of Congress:
Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not
end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated . . .
Our response involves far more than instant retaliation
and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one
battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have
ever seen.67
If we are not to be in a permanent era of torture, indefinite
detention, and revocation of the rule against aggressive warfare,
then we must insist on a higher degree of certainty of harm before
bowing to bald assertions of constant threat.
And, given the depth of our tradition of rights and its value to
us and the world, something must be said about the type of harm
grave enough to warrant casting aside our identity and
66. DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 195.
67. 147 CONG. REC. 107, 123 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2001) (statement of
President George W. Bush).

civilizational membership. Dworkin provides a test for
determining whether a right can be defined narrowly in a
particular case, to avoid its application in that case, without
revealing as a sham the initial recognition of the right. First is
the marginal situation where the values protected by the original
right are not at stake or only partly at stake.68 Surely our
extremists have argued along these lines in maintaining
Guantanamo Bay to be a legal blackhole where no law applies,
and in insisting that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to
unlawful combatants. Second is a situation where extension of
the right would abridge some competing right.69
This is
important for the right to life of U.S. citizens, for all manner of
rights really, that would be extinguished by a direct terrorist
attack. But this returns us to the problem of certainty and
exigency already discussed—can we be so sure that an attack is
forthcoming and that torture and indefinite detention would do
anything to prevent it? Third is a situation in which extending
the right would occasion a cost to society “of a degree far beyond
the cost paid to grant the original right.”70 I read this to require a
weighing of the historical struggles that culminated in our
tradition of fundamental rights. Depending on the right in
question, these might include the Revolutionary War, the
movement to abolish slavery, the civil rights movement, the cost of
World War II and the human rights movement, and all manner of
wars over centuries that led to the jus in bello legal framework.
These costs should give us pause, a reason to reflect on just
how precious the institution of rights is and how only the gravest
of costs could justify derogation. Literally, only a traitor would
hold that a marginal increase in the possibility of a terrorist
attack justifies rescinding our tradition of rights. If clear and
present danger of the first magnitude, coupled with a reasonable
expectation of avoidance through derogation, then perhaps. But
only then, lest we reveal ourselves to be imposters holding out a
venerable tradition as our own.
Still one matter attends us, yet it is beset by nationalism and
provincialism. Dworkin’s guidance was given with regard to the
rights of citizens. I took it broadly and applied it to citizens

68.
69.
70.

DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 200.
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(Padilla, et. al) and non-citizens (Guantanamo, Abu Graib,
extraordinary rendition, and etc.) alike. In the late 1940s, our
tradition began to embrace human rights, not just U.S.
constitutional rights. This much is formalistically clear from our
membership in various treaties and the world community more
generally, pursuant to which we have accepted the premise that
human dignity matters, not just the dignity of Americans. But we
must also recognize it to be pragmatically important, given that
terrorist recruitment thrives on our abandonment of our own
values and on the reasonable perceptions of U.S. foreign relations
impropriety that follow. As we have seen, rights are part of the
currency of soft power, a badge of belonging in the community of
civilized nations, and a requirement for securing international
collaboration to combat terrorism. Dworkin reminds us that:
[I}f rights make sense at all, then the invasion of a
relatively important right [such as due process or freedom
from cruel treatment] must be a very serious matter. It
means treating a man as less than a man, or as less
worthy of concern than other men. The institution of
rights rests on the conviction that this is a grave injustice
. . . ”71
We must take this to heart with regard to all human beings if we
wish to address terrorism and if, in the process, we wish to retain
what is good in our identities and heritage, and what is
indispensable for a desirable future.
In the end, we must consider whether the juxtaposition
between human rights and national security is false. Perhaps the
way to achieve freedom and security is via human rights. Perhaps
the deontological and consequentialist ethics of our tradition have
been improperly separated. Perhaps rights, rightly understood,
are the foundation of both human dignity and peace. But for those
who do not accept such a premise, which is implied in Jefferson’s
hope for our shining city on the hill and specified outright by
Wilsonian idealists, my hope is that they will at least value their
tradition enough to not trade it in for scrap.
Though inconvenient at times, rights are part of who we are
and our adherence to them gives us pride about who we are
becoming. It is, after all, in each of our actions that civilization
71.

Id. at 199.

lives or dies. Some would say that we know this by virtue of
universal moral traits: “in the soul of man,” said Emerson, “there
is a justice whose retributions are instant and entire. He who
does a good deed, is instantly ennobled himself. He who does a
mean deed, is by the action itself contracted.”72 Others would add
that we know this by virtue of the consequences of our actions.
The Arab poet Adonis sums these up when, referring to our
infamous foreign policy actions, he cites an “anguish which
transcends private passion and pain.”73 This, he says, “creates
civilizational agony for man and humanity.”74 I would say that we
know it through both means—deontology and pragmatism—and,
thus confirmed twice over, it becomes our task as citizens in a
democracy to produce something better than a war on terrorism.
In the beginning of this essay, I conceded that the prospect of
our tradition’s demise at our own hands was a conceit. This is
important to admit, because our piecemeal abandonment of a
tradition should not be confused with that tradition’s demise, and
much less with the demise of the principles on which that
tradition was based. Walt Whitman said this about liberty, the
organizing principle of our tradition:
Nothing has precedence of it and nothing can warp or
degrade it. Liberty relies upon itself, invites no one,
promises nothing, sits in calmness and light, is positive
and composed, and knows no discouragement. The battle
rages with many a loud alarm and frequent advance and
retreat . . . the enemy triumphs . . . the prison, the
handcuffs, the iron necklace and anklet, the scaffold,
garrote and leadballs do their work . . . the cause is asleep
. . . the strong throats are choked with their own blood . . .
the young men drop their eyelashes toward the ground
when they pass each other . . . and is liberty gone out of
that place? No never. When liberty goes it is not the first
to go nor the second or third to go . . . it waits for all the
rest to go . . . it is the last . . . When . . . the laws of the
free are grudgingly permitted and laws for informers and

72. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Divinity School Address (1838) in LAWRENCE
BUELL, THE AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISTS 131 (2006).
73. GERGES, supra note 6, at 271 (quoting Adonis, Beyond History,
Without Future, AL HAYAT, Dec. 4, 2003).
74. Id.

blood-money are sweet to the taste of the people. . .when
the soul retires in the cool communion of the night and
surveys its experience and has much extasy over the word
and deed that put back a helpless innocent person into
the gripe of the gripers . . . when the swarms of cringers,
suckers, doughfaces, lice of politics, planners of sly
involutions for their own preferment . . . obtain a
response of love and natural deference from the people . .
. or rather when all life and all the souls of men and
women are discharged from any part of the earth—then
only shall the instinct of liberty be discharged from that
part of the earth.75
It is with Whitman’s words that I close, because he is
remarkably clear on a point that we, apparently, are not. Our
sacred principles are above and beyond us, and yet by doing what
we know to be right we connect with them, becoming of them and
them of us, and it is in this connection that we and our country
have shown notable, if yet inconstant, greatness. Greatness arises
from challenges being met, especially that constant challenge of
living up to one’s principles. Slavery presented such a challenge,
as did the subjugation of women and most recently homosexuals,
and continued attention remains necessary on these fronts. The
War on Terrorism presents a new front on which we are called to
live up to our principles, and if we look carefully we see
intertwined with these principles our own identities, fates, and
legacies. And so it may be true that liberty, dignity, equality, and
peace are beyond us, but we should not assume that we—in any
form cognizable to us—are beyond them.

75. WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS (1855) in WALT WHITMAN:
COMPLETE POETRY AND COLLECTED PROSE 17-18 (Library of America, 1982).

Muslim-Americans’ Charitable Giving
Dilemma: What About a Centralized
Terror-Free Donor Advised Fund?
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INTRODUCTION

Islam and Judaism share numerous common beliefs and
traditions. Like Judaism, some Islamic traditions and rituals can
be traced to the Hebrew prophet Abraham (Ibrahim).1 The Torah
and the Qur’an both honor Abraham (Ibrahim) for his devotion
and willingness to submit to, and sacrifice for, God.2 One such
shared form of religious sacrifice and spiritual tradition is
obligatory charitable giving. Religious laws obligate Jews to give
tzedakah.3 One of the five pillars of Islam is the imperative of
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1. See Mona Siddiqui, IbrahimThe Muslim View of Abraham, BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/ibrahim.shtml (last
visited Sept. 13, 2007).
2. See id.
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Judaism/Tzedaka.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). The Talmud instructs:
“Tzedakah is equal to all the other commandments combined.” TALMUD,
Bava Batra 9b, quoted in Jewish Virtual Library, Tzedaka, http://www.
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/Tzedaka.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2008). The Torah provides that Jews tithe ten % of their earnings to the poor
every third year and annually give an additional percentage of their income.
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zakat.4
Both Islam and Judaism also have been the inspiration for
long-standing intellectual heritages. Each religion claims learned
and esteemed philosophers who have attempted to unite religion,
knowledge, and faith.5 The most influential Jewish philosopher of
the Middle Ages was Moses Maimonides.6 Among the themes on
which he expressed profound sentiments was the giving of charity.
He articulated eight degrees of worthiness in unselfish charitable
giving, the second highest degree of which is giving to an unknown
recipient who does not know the benefactor’s identity.7 The value
of this proposition has long been debated in religious and nonreligious fora, but since 9/11 such discussions have adopted a more
anxious tenor. Maimonides, however, actually accompanied his

Deuteronomy 26:12.
4. See BBC, Religion & Ethics - Five Pillars of Islam, http://www
.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/practices/fivepillars.shtml (last visited Feb.
28, 2008). The other four pillars, or tenets, of Islam are shahadah (reciting
the basic statement of the Islamic faith), salat (performing the ritual prayer
five times daily), sawm (fasting during daylight during the holy month of
Ramadan), and hajj (making pilgrimage to Mecca). See id. These pillars are
considered compulsory and not merely voluntary acts. See id. Indeed, the
word “Islam” is Arabic for “submission,” and the pillars are submissions to
the deity, Allah. See James D. Davis, Five Pillars Are Key to Keeping Faith:
Responsibility, Prayer, Charity and Forgiveness Are Among Elements of
Islam, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 24, 2006, at 1J. The term
“zakat” has its roots in the Arab word for “purification.”
See Neil
MacFarquhar, Fears of Inquiry Dampen Giving by U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2006, at A1.
5. See, e.g., Muslim Philosophy, The Philosophers, http://www.muslim
philosophy.com/#people (last visited Feb. 28, 2008); Ibrahim Bayyumi
Madkour, The Study of Islamic Philosophy, AL TAWHID (1983), available at
http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/study-philosophy.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2008); Radical Academy, Jewish Philosophy, http://www.radicalacademy.com/
adiphiljewishindex.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
6. See MileChai.com, Judaism, http://www.milechai.com/judaism/ram
bam.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). Reflecting the Jewish sentiment that
the greatness of Maimonides was like that of Moses, Maimonides’ grave is
inscribed with “From Moses to Moses, there were none like Moses.” See Ilil
Arbel, From Moses to Moses There Were None Like Moses: Prophesy of
Maimonides’ Birth, ENCYCLOPEDIA MYTHICA, http://www.pantheon.org/
areas/featured/maimonides/mm-1.html (last viewed Feb. 28, 2008).
7. See C.G. MONTEFIORE & H. LOEWE, A RABBINIC ANTHOLOGY 670 n.30
(1974); JACOB S. MINKIN, THE WORLD OF MOSES MAIMONIDES WITH SELECTIONS
FROM HIS WRITINGS 370 (1957). Maimonides articulated the highest degree of
almsgiving as helping a hurt fellow Jew by giving him a gift or loan, entering
into a partnership with him, or finding work for him so that he can be selfdependent. See id. at 369.

first opinion with a less remembered and less frequently discussed
comment: “Related to this [second highest] degree is the giving to
the [public] alms-chest. One should not give to the alms-chest
unless he knows that the officer in charge is reliable, wise,
[scrupulous] and a capable administrator.”8
Since September 11, 2001, Maimonides’ wisdom rings
particularly true, especially for Muslim-Americans who seek to
fulfill their Quranic duty of charitable giving. In the post-9/11
national security oriented environment, many Muslim-Americans
face the dilemma of how to satisfy their zakat obligation.
Muslims’ stake in satisfying their duty of zakat cannot be
overstated. They consider zakat a form of spiritual self
purification and growth achievable by annually tithing at least
2.5% of their wealth to the needy.9 There is no substitute for
zakat,10 and practicing zakat is essential for one’s prayers to be
accepted by Allah.11
The Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which in the 2007
calendar year began on September 13, is an especially important
time for Muslim charitable giving. Muslims believe that they gain
greater heavenly rewards for zakat contributed during
Ramadan,12 so many who have not fulfilled their zakat duty
completely during the year will give the balance during
Ramadan.13 Moreover, during Ramadan, a time when Muslims
fast during daylight,14 they usually monetarily fulfill their
8. MINKIN, supra note 7, at 370.
9. See Davis, supra note 4; Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The
Government’s War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its Implications for
Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004) [hereinafter Crimm, High Alert]. Shia
Muslims are obligated to tithe twenty percent of their income beyond living
expenses. See KHALIL JASSEMM, ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON CHARITY 19 (2006).
10. See JASSEMM, supra note 9, at 78–79.
11. See Alex Cohen, Day to Day Show: Muslims Concerned About
Donations, Interview of Imam Sayed Moustafa Al-Qazwini (Nat’l Pub. Radio
broadcast July 26, 2007) [hereinafter Interview of Imam Sayed Moustafa AlQazwini].
12. See Teresa Watanabe, U.S. Muslims Temper Ramadan Giving with
Caution, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at B2 (stating that “the blessings of all
donations [during Ramadan] are multiplied 70 times in the book of God”).
13. Robert King, Beneficence Built on Faith; Hoosiers Bestow the Bulk of
Giving on Churches, Religious Charities, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 21,
2004, at 1A. One report states that humanitarian charities can collect 40%50% of annual donations during Ramadan. JASSEMM, supra note 9, at 27.
14. BBC, Religion & EthicsFive Pillars of Islam, supra note 4.

additional special benevolent obligation, zakat al-fitr. Zakat alfitr is the duty of every Muslim, whether rich or poor, to feed a
needy family during the three days of Eid, a celebration that
marks the end of, and immediately follows, Ramadan.15
The Qur’an enumerates seven categories of people religiously
sanctified and thus entitled to receive zakat: the poor, the
deprived, the destitute, the homeless, the sick, the wayfarer, and
others who are in need of help.16 There is widespread belief
among Muslims that, according to the prophet Muhammad, the
world’s neediest Muslims, rather than persons of non-Islamic
faiths, must be the recipients of obligatory zakat contributions.17
Potential Muslim recipients around the world have immeasurable
stakes in receiving Muslim-Americans’ zakat; without those
donations they might suffer innumerable spiritual and physical
deprivations, some life threatening.
In addition to zakat, many Muslims give sadaqah to aid the
poor, to assist the incapacitated, to support social services, and to
help other worthy recipients and causes.18 Sadaqah is voluntary
and, in accordance with the Qur’an, should be given discreetly.19

15. JASSEMM, supra note 9, at 81; Aziz Junejo, Eid al Fitr Celebrates End
of Ramadan Fasting, Gift of Self-Control, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at
B5; Watanabe, supra note 12, at B2 (stating that failure to pay zakat al-fitr
means to many Muslims that “their spiritual benefits gained from fasting
and praying [during Ramadan] will be forfeited.”).
16. See Interview of Imam Sayed Moustafa Al-Qazwini, supra note 11;
MacFarquhar, supra note 4. Islam teaches that these seven categories of
qualified recipients actually have a right or an entitlement to receive zakat.
See JASSEMM, supra note 9, at 77.
17. See Damien Henderson, Shaking the Pillars of Islam, HERALD
(Glasgow), Dec. 7, 2004, at 12. Many Muslims believe that Muslims need not
be the recipients of non-obligatory charitable giving, known as sadaqah. Id.;
Timur Kuran, The Provision of Public Goods Under Islamic Law: Origin,
Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 841, 859
(2001) (stating that freed slaves could be waqf beneficiaries); see also Kathryn
A. Ruff, Scared To Donate: An Examination of the Effects of Designating
Muslim Charities as Terrorist Organizations on the First Amendment Rights
of Muslim Donors, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 472 (2005).
18. See Imam Ghazaali, SadaqahGiving in Charity, http://www.uwt.
org/Sadaqah.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2008); Azim Nanji, Charitable Giving
in Islam, 5 ALLIANCE 1 (2000), available at http://www.islam.co.za/awqafsa/
sorce/library/Article%209.htm (last viewed Jan. 2, 2008).
19. See Nanji, supra note 18. The belief that sadaqah should be given
anonymously and without publicity parallels Maimonides’ opinion that
unselfish, anonymous charitable giving to an unknown recipient signifies
true charitable intentions. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

For these reasons, it is considered true charity,20 and its monetary
value eludes calculation.21
Nonetheless, Muslim teachings,
traditions, and culture, which regard the importance of sadaqah
as “[o]n every bone of the fingers charity is incumbent every
day,”22 suggest its possible magnitude.
Prior to 9/11, Muslim-Americans often transmitted their
philanthropy by private channels or informal means, such as
hawalas,23 and sometimes through U.S.-based Islamic charities
and mosques. Since 9/11, Muslim-Americans have been reluctant
to make contributions through those intermediaries for fear that
they might be subjected to surveillance, or, even worse, harassed,
implicated, arrested, or prosecuted because of links to charities
that the U.S. government currently deems, or in the future may
consider, illegal providers of “material support” to terrorists and
terrorist organizations.24 Therefore, the ability to direct zakat—to
20. See id.
21. Sadaqah includes pecuniary as well as non-monetary charity, such as
performing good deeds. See Ghazaali, supra note 18. Thus, just as a
voluntary donation of currency to a needy individual or institution is
sadaqah, so too is a visit to a sick person, physical assistance given a frail
individual, or recitation of a prayer for a dying person. See id.
22. MULANA MUHAMMAD ALI, A MANUAL OF HADITH ch. 16, available at
http://aaiil.org/text/had/manhad/manhad.shtml (last visited Jan. 2, 2008).
23. See Raja Kamal & Rosanne Model, The Need for Smart Muslim
Charities, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 2004, at C31. The hawala system is an informal
paperless networked transfer money system ("hawala" means "trust") used by
Muslims throughout the world, including the United States. Alan Lambert,
Underground Banking and Financing of Terrorism, in Organized Crime,
Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the Americas, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 3, 9,
14-15 (2002). A party pays cash to another person who immediately or later
advances the equivalent funds to, or on behalf of, another designated party
for a specified use abroad. Id. at 14-15. Thus, no official bank records are
maintained, and the funds cannot be tracked by governmental authorities.
Id. Some Muslim-Americans have thought that cash is harder to trace and
thus more difficult to be tied to allegedly lending material support to a
terrorist organization. Kim Vo, Season of Charity: A Time of Scrutiny for
U.S. Muslims, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (CA), Oct. 13, 2007, at 1B.
24. See, e.g., Greg Krupa, Muslims Seek “Safe” Charities for Giving,
DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 5, 2007, at 1A; Audrey Hudson, CAIR Concedes
Membership Down; Blames U.S. for Linking It to Charity on Trial for
Terrorist Ties, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2007, at A1; MacFarquhar, supra note
4; Alan Cooperman, Muslim Charities Say Fear Is Damming Flow of Money,
WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2006, at A3; Talk of the Nation: Arab Americans
Hesitant to Donate to Lebanese Charities (Nat’l Pub. Radio broadcast Aug. 9,
2006); Caroline Preston, Donations Trickle in to Charities Providing Middle
East Aid, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, July 27, 2006, available at
http://philanthropy.com/free/update/2006/07/2006072701.htm; Alex Cohen,

whom and by what means they choose—can protect MuslimAmericans against not only religious deprivations and spiritual
disgraces but also long-term or permanent stains on their personal
and business reputations, and even criminal prosecution.25
This paper addresses the existing inhospitable philanthropic
environment for Muslim-Americans. Part I reviews relevant
demographic information on Muslim-Americans. It shows that
Muslim-Americans’ financial resources for, and interest in,
diaspora philanthropy certainly support an exploration of possible
devices to help them accomplish their charitable giving obligations
and goals. Part II focuses on reasons for Muslim-Americans’ fears
of charitable giving through existing channels. It briefly discusses
legislation, regulatory projects, and governmental agencies’ post9/11 initiatives aimed at combating terrorism. It concludes that
Muslim-Americans’ fears of being linked to terrorists and terrorist
activities when engaging in charitable giving are not unfounded.
Part III addresses the chilled philanthropic climate by suggesting
that it might be moderated through the creation of a centralized
terror-free donor advised fund (DAF) aimed specifically at
enabling Muslim-Americans to direct their zakat and voluntary
contributions to needy Muslims in a few targeted regions and
communities abroad.
This part presents the essential
requirements for a “terror-free” DAF, including two checklists.
Part III also sets forth a brief commentary on the financial
feasibility of the proposed endeavor. The Conclusion suggests that
the benefits of a terror-free DAF would inure not only to MuslimMarketplace: Giving to Muslim Charities (Minn. Pub. Radio broadcast Oct. 4,
2005); Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1349 n.16 (listing numerous 20012004 news articles reporting donors’ fears).
Since 9/11, Muslim-Americans have been encouraged to give not only
voluntary contributions but also their obligatory zakat domestically rather
than overseas. See Jane Lampman, U.S. Muslims in a Quandary over
Charities, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 17, 2004, at 11. Some MuslimAmericans have followed this suggested approach. See id.; see also Laurie
Goodstein, Since 9/11, Muslims Look Closer to Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2004, at F1. This does not resolve, however, the tension most feel as a result
of the Islamic beliefs that Muslims must give zakat to the neediest, with
priority to Muslims, and that these people reside in developing and
underdeveloped countries abroad. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
25. See Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1349. With readily available
internet archives, accusations against individuals, whether true or not, can
permanently sully reputations. These harmful stains become non-removable
because internet searches can produce recent and age-old, long-buried
information that may be accurate, wrong, incomplete, or outdated.

Americans and the neediest Muslims abroad, but also to the
American public.
I. DEMOGRAPHICS OF MUSLIM-AMERICANS

A definitive population count of Muslim-Americans has
proved elusive, but estimates currently range from 2.35 million to
seven million.26 Nonetheless, a 2007 task force report for the
Chicago Council on Global Affairs portrays the Muslim-American
population as growing in number and diversity, representing
many “ethnic, linguistic, ideological, social, economic, and
religious groups.”27 According to a 2007 survey by The Pew
Research Center, 65% of Muslim-Americans are first generation
immigrants to the United States, and another 7% are individuals
whose parents are first generation immigrants.28 Thus, fully 72%
of Muslim-Americans are “foreign-born or have roots abroad.”29
Nonetheless, The Pew Research Center found that MuslimAmericans are “highly assimilated into American Society.”30
Most foreign-born Muslim-Americans have arrived in the
United States since the beginning of the 1990s. Thirty-three
percent immigrated to the United States in the 1990s, while 28%

26. See THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS, TASK FORCE SERIES,
STRENGTHENING AMERICA: THE CIVIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF MUSLIM
AMERICANS 23 (2007) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING AMERICA], available at
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/taskforce_details.php?taskforce_id=8; PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY
MAINSTREAM 10 (2007) [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM
AMERICANS], available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?Rep
ortID=329. One reason for the difficulty in accurately estimating the number
of Muslim-Americans is that neither the Census Bureau nor the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services collects information on religious
affiliation. STRENGTHENING AMERICA, supra, at 26. Another reason is that
studies have relied on telephone calls to households that have landline
service. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra, at 26. There has
been no way to include in the studies those households that have no
telephone service or only cell phone service, which includes an estimated
13.5% of the public. Id. Finally, language skills of Muslims have proved
challenging for researchers. See id. at 12–13. The 2.35 million estimate is
that of the Pew Research Center. Id. at 10. The 7 million estimate is the
result of a 2001 survey by the Hartford Institute for Religious Research. See
id. at 13.
27. STRENGTHENING AMERICA, supra note 26, at 23.
28. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 15.
29. Id. at 10.
30. Id. at Report Summary.

came in the current millennium.31 Twenty-three percent of
foreign-born Muslim-Americans arrived in the 1980s and only 16%
came earlier.32 Most settled in large metropolitan areas, with the
largest concentrations living in Los Angeles, New York, Detroit,
Washington, D.C. and Chicago.33
According to The Pew Research Center survey, these
immigrants are ethnically diverse. They are from at least sixtyeight different countries, with more than 37% arriving from the
“Arab region” and a large proportion from South Asia.34
Reflective of this profile, the largest percentage of foreign-born
Muslim-Americans who emigrated from one country came from
Iran (12%) and Pakistan (12%).35 Thirty-two percent arrived from
Bangladesh (5%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (4%), India (7%), Iraq
(4%), Lebanon (6%), and Yemen (6%) combined.36
The educations and household incomes of foreign-born and
native-born Muslim-Americans are comparable to those of the
U.S. population as a whole.37 Approximately 10% of MuslimAmericans have attended graduate schools, and 14% have earned
college degrees.38 Forty-one percent of Muslim-Americans report
household incomes of at least $50,000, and the percentages
making $25,000 and $75,000 annually are approximately
proportional to the same percentages for the U.S. population as a
whole.39 Nearly mirroring the sentiment of the general populace,
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 15.
Id.
LEWIS MUMFORD CENTER FOR COMPARATIVE URBAN AND REGIONAL
RESEARCH, UNIV. AT ALBANY, TOTAL MUSLIM POPULATION: METROPOLITAN
REGIONS (2000), available at http://mumford.albany.edu/census/data.html.
34. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 15.
The Arab region is based on a UNDP classification, which defines the region
as including twenty-two Middle Eastern and North African countries. Id.
The United States Department of State also has published demographic
information on Muslim-Americans, with estimates fairly similar to those of
the Pew Research Center survey. U.S. Department of State, Varieties of
Worship, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/muslimlife/demograp.htm (last
visited Sept. 5, 2007). By comparison, the Council on American-Islamic
Relations (CAIR) estimates that 29% of Muslim-Americans immigrants are
from Arab states. CAIR, U.S. Immigrants from Muslim Populated Regions,
http://www.cair.com/asp/populationstats.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
35. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 15.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 18.
38. Id.
39. Id. Sixteen percent of Muslim-Americans indicate household incomes
of at least $100,000; 10% report incomes of between $75,000 and $99,999;

almost one-half of Muslim-Americans perceive their personal
financial situations to be good or excellent despite the fact that a
lower percentage reports full-time employment than the general
U.S. population.40
Like Americans of other religious beliefs, Muslim-Americans’
religious devotion to Islam ranges from “very orthodox to
moderate to secular.”41 The largest portion of Muslim-Americans,
about half, identify themselves as Sunni, the largest Muslim
tradition worldwide.42 Only 16% identify with Shia Islam, the
second largest Muslim tradition across the world.43 Twenty-two
percent report they are Muslim without identifying a particular
sect with which they are affiliated.44
Muslim-Americans regard the role of Islam in their lives as
significant. Eighty-six percent of all Muslim-Americans regard
the Qur’an as the word of Allah, and 50% consider that the Qur’an
must be read “literally, word for word.”45 At least 90% report that
religion is either a “very important” part of their lives (72%) or a
“somewhat important” part of their lives (18%).46 Nearly onequarter have a high religious commitment.47 Not surprisingly,
76% consider their duty of zakat “very important.”48 Nonetheless,
many Muslim-Americans, slightly more than three-quarters, are
concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism worldwide and
disapprove of terrorists and their tactics.49
From these demographics alone, it certainly is predictable
15% specified incomes of between $50,000 and $69,999. Id. Fifty-nine
percent of Muslim-Americans report household incomes of less than $50,000.
Id. Muslim-Americans from South Asia, especially India and Pakistan, tend
to have a higher socio-economic profile, and perhaps are more “privileged,”
than other Muslim-Americans. See ADIL NAJAM, PORTRAIT OF A GIVING
COMMUNITY: PHILANTHROPY BY THE PAKISTANI-AMERICAN DIASPORA 32-34
(2006); Karen Leonard, American Muslims, Before and After September 11,
2001, 35 EC. & POL. WEEKLY 2293, 2293 (2002).
40. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 18-19.
41. STRENGTHENING AMERICA, supra note 26, at 23.
42. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 21.
43. Id. These Shia are expected to tithe more zakat than Sunnis. See
supra note 9.
44. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 23.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 24.
47. Id. at 25. This includes attendance at mosque at least weekly and
praying all five salahs daily. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 49.

that Muslim-Americans worry about how to fulfill their zakat and
zakat al-fitr obligations, as well as how to give sadaqah. It is
impossible to estimate the monetary value of sadaqah donated
and zakat required of, and given by,50 Muslim-Americans. Despite
the lack of actual data, anecdotal evidence suggests that the
greatest portion of donated funds before 9/11 may have been
directed overseas.51 This pattern would be consistent with the
widespread belief that zakat must go to the neediest Muslims
across the world.52 Moreover, nearly 40% of Muslim-Americans
emigrated from abroad only during the past two decades.53 Many
of the immigrants are educated, a significant proportion of these
consider themselves financially secure, and most are quite
religious.54 They have special desires to satisfy their obligatory
and voluntary philanthropy by sending money to help individuals
in their countries of origin, many of which are war-torn,
impoverished, and perceived as home to the neediest Muslims.55
As a result of their post-9/11 heightened awareness of the
operations of terrorists and terrorist organizations, these foreignborn Muslim-Americans have become increasingly hesitant to
undertake diaspora philanthropy.56
Likewise, native-born
Muslim-Americans have become wary of directing their sadaqah,
zakat, and zakat al-fitr contributions abroad to help cure Muslims’
deprivations, even deprivations that may give rise to or exacerbate
50. One researcher suggests that “if each of America’s estimated six
million Muslims were to donate at the rate of the average American, their
total giving would exceed $5.3 billion annually.” JASSEMM, supra note 9, at
25. It is impossible, however, to determine whether American-Muslims
donate at the average rate of all Americans, or to rely upon a population
estimate of six million American-Muslims.
See supra note 26 and
accompanying text (indicating that population estimates range between 2.35
million and seven million).
51. See Goodstein, supra note 24, at F1. But see JASSEMM, supra note 9,
at 31 (stating that at their peak before 9/11, Muslim-American charities
annually directed less than $23 million overseas, representing a small
portion of Muslim-American donations).
52. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
53. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 26, at 1.
54. Id. at 2, 18-26.
55. See, e.g., Lampman, supra note 24, at 11; Goodstein, supra note 24, at
F1; see Ruff, supra note 17, at 471. One researcher suggests that often
diaspora donors prefer to give to needy individuals rather than to causes
because of a low level of trust of government and institutions, including
nonprofits. Adil Najam, Diaspora Philanthropy to Asia 119, 142-43, in
BARBARA J. MERZ,= ET AL., DIASPORAS AND DEVELOPMENT (2007).
56. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

terrorism, such as poverty.57 Consequently, many of these wellintentioned people cautiously have sought legitimate, safe, and
accessible channels for their charitable giving. Some have turned
to wiring money to people or villages through relatives;58 others
have searched for more formal channels but have encountered
significant frustrations and challenges.59
II. CONCERNS OF MUSLIM-AMERICANS ARE NOT UNFOUNDED

Keen on preventing further acts of terrorism after 9/11, the
U.S. government expanded the scope and reach of legislation,
regulatory projects, administrative enforcement initiatives, civil
and criminal sanctions, and diplomatic efforts aimed at enhancing
national security. These laws and programs have tremendously
affected all Americans, but perhaps their greatest impacts have
been on Muslim-Americans.
In response to the 9/11 attacks, on September 23, 2001,
President George W. Bush issued an Executive Order60 in which
he declared a national emergency to deal with the threat of future
terrorism. Although the sources of the financial resources of the
9/11 attackers were not then known,61 he surmised that they were
expansive
and
included
individuals,
nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and other entities.62 He provided for the
57. See Lampman, supra note 24, at 11; Goodstein, supra note 24. See
also supra note 24 (commenting on the tension in giving domestically rather
than abroad).
58. See Tom Pope, Charity as a Duty, NONPROFIT TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at
1(5).
59. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Some Muslim-Americans
have transmitted funds to zakat committees in the Middle East, but this
approach is dangerous. Despite the U.S. government indirectly having
transmitted humanitarian financial aid to Palestinian occupied territories in
the Middle East through zakat committees, it alleges that such committees
have ties to terrorist organizations, including Hamas. See MacFarquhar, As
Muslim Group Goes on Trial, Other Charities Watch Warily, N.Y. TIMES, July
17, 2007, at A14.
60. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). For
further discussion of Executive Order 13,224 and the authorizations it
conferred, see Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1364-94.
61. The 9/11 Commission Report, issued in 2004, reported that
investigations revealed that al Qaeda primarily financed the attacks through
funds raised by individuals and charitable organizations in Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf nations. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 172
(2004).
62. 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079.

application of future financial sanctions because he considered
“dual organizations”63—those having both military and charity
operations—and other NGOs to be attractive targets for terrorists’
exploitation, and subsequently capable of funding terrorists.64
The perceived susceptibility of charities results from their (1)
public aura of trustworthiness combined with unwitting donors,
(2) engagement in some legitimate charitable activities, (3)
potential access to considerable financial resources, (4) cashintensiveness, (5) possible global presence, (6) limited
governmental oversight, especially abroad, and (7) typically onedirectional transferal of donations and other funds.65 Thus,
pursuant to presidential powers under the International
Emergency and Economic Powers Act, President Bush froze assets
of individuals and groups on an annexed list of designated foreign
persons,66 persons acting on behalf of those on the list, and
persons who have committed, or are significant risks for
committing, terrorist acts.67 The entire annexed list contained the
names of twenty-seven Muslim and Arab persons, known as
specially designated global terrorists (SDGTs) and specially
designated nationals (SDNs), twelve individuals and fifteen
groups, including three NGOs.68 Moreover, the Executive Order
authorized government officials to identify more SDNs and SDGTs
63. Such “dual organizations” include the well-established groups of
Hamas and Hezbollah. Dual organizations can operate hospitals, schools,
and religious institutions, and can provide public services and relief, but can
also be fertile grounds to recruit extremists for terrorist activities. See
Violent Islamist Extremism, Government Efforts to Defeat It: Hearing of the S.
Homeland Security Comm. (May 10, 2007) [hereinafter Testimony of Chip
Poncy] (testimony of Chip Poncy, Director of Strategic Policy, Treasury
Department’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes), available
at Federal News Service, LEXIS.
64. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Freezes
Terrorists’ Assets (Sept. 24, 2001), available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html; Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support
Terrorism: Message from the President of the United States, 147 CONG. REC.
H5964 (Sept. 24, 2001).
65. See Islamic Extremism:
Hearing Before the Committee on S.
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (May 10, 2007) [hereinafter
Statement of Chip Poncy] (statement of Chip Poncy, Director of Strategic
Policy, Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial
Crimes), available at CQ Congressional Testimony, LEXIS.
66. The term “person” includes individuals, groups, and entities.
67. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079.
68. Annex, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,083.

and to freeze the assets of any foreign or domestic person
associated with SDNs and SDGTs or “determined to assist in,
sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support
for, or financial or other services to or in support of” terrorism.69
Congress quickly followed by enacting the USA Patriot Act
(Act) on October 26, 2001, to enlarge the president’s authority and
the ability of government agencies to engage in an unconventional
“war on terrorism.”70 The Act permits the government to monitor,
identify, investigate, regulate, disrupt, and dismantle not only
terrorist operatives and their operations, but also their
supporters.71 It enables the government to freeze and confiscate
assets it perceives as destined to support terrorism.72 Individuals,
as well as traditional and nontraditional structures, such as §
501(c)(3) charitable organizations, are subject to these laws, which
provide civil and criminal sanctions.73 Although later questioned
by scholars and courts,74 Congress purportedly intended to protect
innocent, well-intentioned donors by predicating an individual
donor’s violation of the laws upon actual or constructive
knowledge75 that the funds might be used for the support of
terrorism, but without requiring a specific evil intent to facilitate
terrorism.76 Since 2001, Congress has extended antiterrorism
69. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079.
70. Uniting and Strengthening America by Proving Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act),
Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title I, § 106, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
71. 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1) (2007), as amended by the USA Patriot Act.
The USA Patriot Act expanded the authority of the President under the
International Emergency and Economic Powers Act to regulate and impose
sanctions with respect to a wide range of transactions.
72. Id.
73. For a broader discussion of the various laws, penalties, and their
applications see Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1354-1437.
74. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: TerrorismSupport Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 61–71
(2005); Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1410–14.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B requires “knowledge” for violation, but legislative
history reveals the government standard of “knowledge” as including actual
knowledge or situations in which a person “should have known.”
Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary 107th Cong. 3–12 (2001) (statement of John
Ashcroft, Att’y Gen, of the United States), available at http://www
.house.gov/judiciary.
76. Courts and scholars have suggested that a specific intent
requirement for violation of the laws could permit persons to avoid liability.
See Chesney, supra note 74, at 12–18, 61–71; Crimm, High Alert, supra note

laws,77 some aimed directly at financing,78 and government
agencies have expanded their programs and initiatives to combat
terrorism.79
By September 11, 2007, implementation of counterterrorism
plans by the Department of Treasury and other agencies had
produced notable impacts. The government had designated fortyfive Islamic-related charitable organizations, all of which have
engaged in some charitable services or financial assistance to the
needy, as proscribed SDNs or SDGTs.80 Of these, eight currently
have or formerly had offices in the United States.81 Additionally,
the government had designated eight entities as potential
fundraising front organizations.82 As part of its enforcement
efforts, the government had seized and frozen the assets of several
designated charitable organizations,83 suspended the tax-exempt
status of some Muslim-American charities without providing these
entities any opportunity for prior challenge,84 caused a number of
9, at 1410-14.
77. USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-177 (Mar. 9, 2006).
78. Id. §§ 401-410.
79. See, e.g., Testimony of Chip Poncy, supra note 63.
80. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Protecting Charitable
Organizations, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting
/fto.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2007). Some are considered al-Queda related;
a few are listed as Hamas-related; several are designated as Hezbollahrelated; and one is listed as Palestinian Islamic Jihad-related. Id. See
Statement of Chip Poncy, supra note 65.
81. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Protecting Charitable
Organizations, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting
/fto.shtml.
82. Id.
83. In July 2007, the government designated Goodwill Charitable
Organizations as an SDN and froze its assets, asserting that the organization
was a fundraising arm for the Martyrs Foundation, which allegedly funnels
money to Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. See Paul
Egan, Feds Raid Charity Suspected of Aiding Hezbollah, DETROIT NEWS, July
25, 2007, online edition, available at LEXIS; Suzanne Perry, Federal
Authorities Raid Two Mich. Muslim Charities, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 9,
2007, at 26. Prior to July 2007, the government froze assets of numerous
other Muslim nonprofits. See, e.g., U.S. Freezes Assets of Hezbollah Unit,
Donations to Militant Group Banned, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2006, at A13.
84. See IRS Suspends Tax-Exempt Status of Michigan Charity for
Terrorist Activities, DAILY TAX REP., July 31, 2007. 26 U.S.C. § 501(p), added
by the Military Tax Family Relief Act of 2003, permits the I.R.S. to suspend
the tax-exempt status of designated terrorist organizations. Pub. L. No. 108121, § 108, 117 Stat. 1335, 1339 (2003). Suspension of tax-exempt status
does not preclude the entity from continuing operations. For further

Muslim-American nonprofit organizations to close,85 prosecuted a
few charities,86 and in a federal district court case named as
unindicted co-conspirators more than three hundred Muslim
organizations not on the government’s SDN and SDGT lists.87
In this same six-year period after 9/11, the U.S. government
placed thousands of individuals, most with Muslim names, on its
lists of SDNs and SDGTs.88
The Department of Justice tried and won cases against
Muslim individuals in federal courts for material support of
terrorism and other related terrorism charges.89 In some early

discussion of this statute, see Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1424–26.
85. See Robert Barnes, Case Against Islamic Charity Opens; NowShuttered Organization Funneled Money to Militants, Prosecutors Say, WASH.
POST, July 25, 2007, at A6; Muslim Public Affairs Council, Muslim Groups
Form National Council of American Muslim Non-Profits (Mar. 30, 2005),
http://www.mpac.org/article.php?id=74 (commenting that as of 2005, the
government had shut down twenty-five Muslim-American nonprofit
organizations).
86. Most recently, the trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development, accused of indirectly aiding Hamas by sending millions of
dollars to zakat committees—none of which has been placed on our
government’s lists of SDNs and SDGTs—opened in Texas on July 16, 2007.
See Neil MacFarquahar, As Muslim Group Goes on Trial, Other Charities
Watch Warily, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2007, at A14; Leslie Eaton, Prosecutors
Say a Charity Aided Terrorists Indirectly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at A20;
Jack Douglas, Jr., Scrutinized for Years, Foundation Faces Trial, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAPH, July 15, 2007, available at LEXIS.
87. See Neil MacFarquhar, Muslim Groups Oppose a List of CoConspirators, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at A18 (reporting that the
Department of Justice named as co-conspirators in the Texas trial of Holy
Land Foundation for Relief and Development foreign and U.S.-based
organizations, including the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Islamic
Society of North America, and the North American Islamic Trust).
88. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Specially Designated Nationals
List (SDN), http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/ (last visited
Sept. 19, 2007). The Terrorist Screening Center, a multi-agency organization
administered by the F.B.I., compiles a terrorist watchlist by consolidating
domestic and international terrorist information from various governmental
sources, including border patrols, visa reviewers, and other front-line law
enforcement authorities. AUDIT DIV., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 07-41 1, iii (Sept. 2007). Presumably the
compilation of more than 700,000 names, which a recent audit by the Office
of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice reveals is faulty,
contains many who are non-Muslim. See id. at xxi; Philip Shenon, Inspection
Notes Errors in Terror List, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at A24.
89. See Bob Fernandez, 31 Wins, 6 Losses & 1 Tie, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2007,
at 24. In the trial of Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, five
men are accused of illegally sending millions of dollars to Hamas through the

cases, court decisions left the impression that, despite the
requisite “should have known” statutory intent,90 even innocent
donors can be prosecuted for supporting terrorism.91 Moreover,
the government subjected mosques to surveillance, wiretapped
phones, fingerprinted and registered more than eighty thousand
Arab and non-national residents, identified eight thousand for
questioning, and arrested or detained approximately five
thousand.92
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“F.B.I.”) and Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration added to uncertainties
in the philanthropic environment. The F.B.I. contributed to the
attitude that Middle Easterners and South Asians, some of whom
are Muslims, are a population without certain legal rights and
protections. It issued well over one hundred thousand secret
warrantless demands, known as national security letters, to
financial institutions, telecommunications companies, and other
businesses to obtain data on unknowing targeted individuals,
some of whom are likely Muslims, and networks of people with
whom the targets purportedly had connections.93 The Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration discredited the
completeness of the government’s official master list of terrorists.

organization, and those five defendants argue that they only wished to ease
the deprivations of children and families in their Middle East homeland. See
Jason Trahan, Holy Land Case Starts with Focus on Intent: Dallas Lawyers
Insist 5 Strived To Ease Suffering; Prosecutors Say Goal Was To Fund Terror,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 25, 2007, at B1.
90. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133–35
(9th Cir. 2000), aff’d in part and rev’d in part Humanitarian Law Project v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003).
92. STRENGTHENING AMERICA, supra note 26, at 28.
93. Editorial, The Wrong Balance on Civil Liberties, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16,
2007, § 4, at 9 (indicating contents of a March 2007 report from the
Department of Justice). See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Data Mining Reached
Beyond Initial Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at A1 (commenting on the
scope of the people impacted by the data mining resulting from issuance of
national security letters); Eric Lichtblau & Mark Mazzetti, Military Expands
Intelligence Role in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at A1 (stating that
according to a Department of Justice study, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (F.B.I.) issued more than 9,000 national security letters in 2005
alone).
On September 6, 2007, Judge Victor Marrero declared
unconstitutional revisions enacted in 2006 to the USA Patriot Act that
expanded the F.B.I.’s power to use national security letters and the 1986 law
that authorized the F.B.I. to issue the exigent letters without a warrant. Doe
v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

During summer 2007, he released a report that indicated the
processes for compiling the government’s list of terrorists are
deficient, and likely fail to identify all persons and groups whose
names should be on the list.94 This revelation further stimulated
fears of donors and charitable organizations that, even if they
consulted the list, they nevertheless might direct funds to persons
who support terrorist activities. The resulting recommendations
of the Treasury Inspector General suggested that the government
considerably ramp up its efforts. This suggestion led to greater
insecurity among donors unsure of what steps the government
might take next.95
These government actions have received substantial media
coverage, which both Muslim and non-Muslim Americans have
followed closely. The series of acts has been a strategically
powerful means of repeatedly alarming many people, perhaps
with escalating effect. While initial governmental measures
created a significantly chilled philanthropic climate for wellintentioned Americans, especially Muslim-Americans, the
unfriendliness of the environment seemed to increase as the
government disclosed new actions and recommendations for
changes. This climate of fear begs for us to explore whether there
might be a feasible means of resolving the Muslim-Americans’
poignant charitable giving dilemma.
III. CAN THE CHILL BE MODERATED, AND IF SO, HOW?

The U.S. government recently signaled some attempt to
reverse the inhospitable philanthropic environment. It created
and implemented various educational and community outreach
programs targeted to Muslim-Americans, including initiatives
aimed directly at assisting charitable organizations.96 But those
projects have received limited widespread press. In response to a

94. TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, SCREENING
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS’ FILING INFORMATION PROVIDES MINIMAL
ASSURANCE THAT POTENTIAL TERRORIST-RELATED ACTIVITIES ARE IDENTIFIED,
May 21, 2007, available at http://www.tigta.gov.
95. Id.
96. See Testimony of Chip Poncy, supra note 63 (outreach programs
include discussions of the government’s counterterrorism policies,
development of relationships with communities to develop guidance on means
to promote charitable giving, and discussions with the nonprofit sector about
developing mechanisms for delivering aid to places of need).

request by Muslim-American charities,97 the Department of
Treasury since 2002 has issued two iterations of “Anti-Terrorist
Financing Guidelines”98 (“Guidelines”) to assist U.S.-based
charities in avoiding ties to terrorist organizations and “abuse” or
“exploitation”99 by terrorists. The Guidelines present broad
governing, fiscal, and programmatic principles aimed at
enhancing charities’ accountability and transparency. Although
supportive of those goals, commentators in the nonprofit sector,
practitioners, and academics have criticized the Guidelines as
excessively burdensome and beyond the abilities of most charities,
inappropriately discouraging of international charitable activities
by U.S.-based nonprofits, unlikely to have a preventive impact on
terrorist financing, taking an untenable one-size fits all approach
in several important areas, suggesting principles irrelevant to the
goal of preventing diversion of funds to terrorists, overlapping in
certain respects with existing state and federal regulation of
charities, and failing to assure protection against potential
liability even when followed.100 In March 2007, the Department
97. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, PO-30607: Response
to Inquiries from Arab American and American Muslim Communities for
Guidance on Charitable Best Practices (Nov. 7, 2002), http://www.treas.gov
/press/releases/po3607.htm.
98. The Department of Treasury released its first version in November
2002. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES:
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES (2002). Thereafter, it
requested comments from the charitable sector, responded, and revised the
Guidelines, and finally released a revised third version on September 29,
2006. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES:
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES (2006), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/keyissues/protecting/docs/guideli
nes_charities.pdf; see U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Updates
Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines for Charitable Sector, http://www.
treas.gov/press/releases/hp122.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
99. The term exploitation is seen to include the employment of
“charitable services and activities to radicalize vulnerable populations and
cultivate support for terrorist organizations and activities.” ANNEX TO
GUIDELINES, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING
GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES (2006),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protect
ing/docs/guidelines_charities.pdf.
Examples given involve such “dual”
militaristic and humanitarian organizations as Hezbollah, Hamas and
others. Id.
100. See, e.g., Press Release, OMB Watch, Treasury Releases Third
Version of Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, http://www.ombwatch.org/
article/articleview/3614/1/84/?TopicID=2 (commenting that the fundamental
problems in the Guidelines’ first version remain in the third version); Barnett

of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released a
“Risk Matrix for the Charitable Sector” (Matrix) based largely on
the Guidelines. The Matrix attempts to help charities identify
and categorize hazard susceptibilities connected with their
processes of collecting and disbursing funds, including
disbursement to high-risk areas abroad. OFAC intends that the
Matrix assist charities in formulating risk-based approaches,
compliant with U.S. laws and the Guidelines, for tackling their
vulnerabilities to possible exploitation or abuse by terrorists.101
The Matrix may prove somewhat helpful to charities, but it
neither guarantees protection against terrorist abuse of charitable
organizations102 nor shields against criminal or civil liability for
violation of any law or regulation.103
The nonprofit sector, including nonprofit organizations
specifically aimed at Muslim-Americans, has offered some limited
ideas intended to improve the charitable giving climate. Muslim
Advocates, a Muslim advocacy organization in the U.S., drafted
guidance aimed at assisting Muslim-American donors in selecting
reputable and effective charitable organizations that can direct
The proffered
donations to intended charitable causes.104
suggestions highlight considerations to which donors should be
attentive, but they are quite general and cannot give donors real
comfort that ultimately their contributions will be protected from

F. Baron, The Treasury Guidelines Have Had Little Impact Overall on U.S.
International Philanthropy, But They Have Had a Chilling Impact on USBased Muslim Charities, 25 PACE L. REV. 308-10 (2004) (criticizing the first
iteration of the Guidelines); Crimm, High Alert, supra note 9, at 1440–47
(commenting on criticisms of the first version of the Guidelines).
101. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Risk Matrix for the Charitable Sector, www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/
ofac/policy/charity_risk_matrix.pdf.
102. See Naomi Munk & Suzanne E. Coffman, Blocking Terrorist Funding:
Treasury’s Risk Matrix for the Charitable Sector, Aug. 2007, http://www.
guidestar.org/DisplayArticle.do?articleId=1153.
The process utilized by
OFAC in producing the Risk Matrix has been criticized for failing to solicit
input from the nonprofit sector. See Kay Guinane, Treasury Posts Risk
Matrix for Charities, Meant To Help Avoid Financing Terrorism, April 10,
2007, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/blogs/entry/3138/36.
103. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Risk Matrix for the Charitable Sector, at n. 3, www.ustreas.gov/offices
/enforcement/ofac/policy/charity_risk_matrix.pdf.
104. Muslim Advocates, Guidance on Charitable Giving for Muslim
American Donors, www.muslimadvocates.org/docs/Donor-Guidance101106
.pdf.

ties to terrorism. The National Council of American-Muslim
Nonprofits, an umbrella organization, announced in 2005 that it
would create guidelines to assist charities to protect against
terrorist exploitation,105 but they have not been produced. To
date, Muslim-American charities have been unable to coordinate
efforts to enable Muslim-Americans to give money lawfully to an
acceptable menu of legitimate projects abroad.106 Although
Muslim-Americans and others have suggested that the
Department of Treasury develop a “white list” of acceptable
Muslim charities in compliance with its Guidelines,107 the
government has not done so.
Thus far, there is no safe and accessible giving vehicle that
assures Muslim-Americans protections against surveillance,
harassment, arrest, or prosecution by the government. Although
some states have adopted terror-free investment policies to ensure
that they do not invest tax dollars in a manner that could aid
terrorism,108 there is currently no terror-free channel constructed
specifically for, and aimed at facilitating, Muslim-Americans in
directing their charity discreetly to needy Muslims in specific
regions and communities abroad.
Crafting such a mechanism could go a long way to moderating
the current frosty charitable giving climate for MuslimAmericans. To ensure Muslim-Americans a safe mechanism for
105. Cohen, supra note 24.
106. One newspaper account suggests that the failure to orchestrate such
a project is the result of isolated Muslim charities that do not have
sophisticated management expertise and the fear of foreign governments and
policymakers in empowering civil society through legislation or policymaking
that could assist organized philanthropy. Kamal & Model, supra note 23.
Additionally, it appears that there is not a profusion of domestic Islamic
“friends of” charities, which would permit donor contributions to be redirected
to specific projects abroad that the domestic “friends of” charities support.
107. See, e.g., Ruff, supra note 17, at 499.
108. For example, Ohio and Missouri have such a terror-free investment
policy. See Richard Cordray, Ohio Treasurer of State, Terror-Free Investment
Policy (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.tos.ohio.gov/content/view/285/39/; Press
Release, Richard Cordray, Ohio Treasurer of State, Treasurer Cordray
Announces New Terror-Free Investment Policy for State Treasury (Apr. 18,
2007), http://www.tos.ohio.gov/content/view/286/41/; Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs’ Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and
Trade and the H. Comm. on Financial Services’ Subcomm. on Domestic and
International Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology (Apr. 18, 2007)
(statement
of
Sarah
Steelman,
Missouri
State
Treasurer),
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/ste041807.htm; Sarah Steelman, TerrorFree Investing, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2006, at A21.

giving and directing zakat contributions to the neediest Muslims
abroad, a terror-free donor advised fund (DAF) could be developed
specifically for Muslim-Americans, as explained below. At least
initially, it might be wise to create one centralized, but accessible,
terror-free DAF, and, depending on its success, others could
follow.
A DAF is essentially a low cost, flexible alternative to a
private foundation. A DAF operates as a charitable giving vehicle
by enabling donors to contribute cash or assets to an intermediary
entity, known as a sponsoring organization,109 which redistributes
the donors’ contributions, without divulging the donors’ identities,
to qualified targeted recipients.110
The ultimate qualified
recipients are generally organizations, either domestic or foreign,

109. The sponsoring organization is essentially a nongovernmental entity,
other than a private foundation, that would be treated as a tax-exempt
religious, charitable, or educational organization under Internal Revenue
Code § 501(c)(3). 26 U.S.C. § 4966(d)(1)(A)–(C) (2007). Interestingly, the
sponsoring organization can be either a domestic or foreign entity. 26 U.S.C.
§ 4966(d)(1)(A).
110. More technically under U.S. tax laws, a DAF is a pool of donated
assets with three features. First, the assets contributed by the donor are
owned and controlled by a sponsoring organization. Id. § 4966(d)(2)(A)
(2007).
Second, the DAF is composed of separate accounts identified by reference
to a donor’s completed contributions but with respect to which the donor or
the donor’s appointee retains the privilege of providing nonbinding advice to
the sponsoring organization of preferred organization-beneficiaries able to
utilize the funds consistent with the donor’s intended charitable purposes.
Id. § 4966(d)(2)(A), as added by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-280. To avoid excise taxes, distributions generally must be made to a
qualified organization (1) that meets the requirements of 26 U.S.C. §
170(b)(1)(A), (2) that satisfies the conditions of 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B), or (3)
for which the sponsoring organization fulfills the expenditure responsibility
requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 4945(h). Id. § 4966(c)(1)–(2). Basically, such
recipient cannot be a natural person, and unless it is a domestic entity that
qualifies for tax-exempt status as a § 501(c)(3), the sponsoring organization is
obligated to undertake certain due diligence of the nongovernmental foreign
organization-recipient. Id. § 4966(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B)(ii) referring to the
expenditure responsibility rule of 26 U.S.C. § 4945(h). See Nina J. Crimm,
Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles of Federal
Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private
Foundations and Their Donors, 23 VA. TAX REV. 1, 72-86 (2003) [hereinafter
Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass] (discussing the
expenditure responsibility rule of 26 U.S.C. § 4945(h). For a discussion of the
expenditure responsibility rule, see infra note 130 and accompanying text.
Third, the assets are not distributable to a single organization or
governmental entity. Id. § 4966(d)(2)(B)(i) (2007).

that must use the contributions for charitable purposes. The
sponsoring organization is an intermediary for the specific
purposes of receiving contributions, taking nonbinding advice
from donors of preferred recipients for their donations,111
investing and managing contributed funds,112 and undertaking all
of the necessary legal, accounting, and philanthropic functions to
ensure that assets reach their intended recipients. Because the
Internal
Revenue
Service
considers
these
sponsoring
organizations to be public charities, donors are entitled to
charitable contribution deductions for their gifted assets, and
their contributions can accrete in value without further
taxation.113
There are considerable expenses associated with creating and
maintaining DAFs.114 Because of the risks associated with giving
abroad and the protective due diligence that would be needed on
an ongoing basis, a DAF that could serve as a vehicle for diaspora
philanthropy would be more costly than one targeted only for
Donors today initially can contribute
domestic giving.115
relatively low sums and thereafter can add reasonable donations
to DAF accounts where the ultimate recipients are located in this
country.116 Whether low contributions to a terror-free DAF

111. Research has shown that diaspora donors like “hands on”
involvement in their philanthropic endeavors. See Najam, supra note 55, at
125. The advisory role that a donor to a DAF could exercise might serve to
advance this aspiration.
112. A donor can plan to have the funds managed as either an
endowment, which is invested to permit the funds’ growth and to enable
them to be distributed annually in perpetuity, or a non-endowment, which is
invested to permit sufficient growth for annual distributions to occur over a
short or long period. See Elfrena Foord, Philanthropy 101: Donor Advised
Funds, J. FIN. PLAN., Nov. 2003, available at http://www.fpanet
.org/journal/articles/2003_Issues/jfp1103-art8.cfm.
113. Because the DAF is tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3), the income
generated by its gifted holdings is not subjected to income taxation.
114. These expenses can include annual administrative, investment and
management fees. Typically a sponsoring organization charges between .45%
to 2.75% in fees for a $100,000 account and less if the account is worth more.
See Foord, supra note 112.
115. Discussions with several DAF administrators and private foundation
officials revealed that actual costs would be quite high, but exact amounts are
impossible to calculate because they depend on many variables.
116. Donor advised funds (DAFs) traditionally have been viewed as
financially advantageous alternatives to private foundations. Because DAFs
are less expensive to establish and maintain than private foundations, the
initial funding of their donors’ accounts can be significantly lower. A number

targeted abroad would be feasible is beyond the scope of this
article.
The lower the initial and subsequent contribution
thresholds and the ease by which Muslim-Americans can donate
to a targeted terror-free DAF—perhaps by payroll deductions117—
the greater the potential to attract more Muslim-Americans to use
such DAF as their charitable giving vehicle of choice.
From a funding perspective, forming one centralized terrorfree DAF could be a financially viable endeavor. All Muslims have
zakat obligations to tithe at a minimum 2.5% of their incomes and
other wealth; many also contribute financial aid as sadaqah.118
Between 2.35 and seven million Muslims live in the U.S., 41% of
whom live in households with incomes exceeding $50,000.119 As
touched on briefly above, financial feasibility will also depend on
the cost effectiveness of the DAF. From the perspective of limiting
costs by targeting localities of collective interest to MuslimAmericans to receive redistributions, there are high degrees of
concentration of Muslim-Americans who emigrated from the Arab
region (37%) and from south Asia, with large proportions from
specific countries, such as Iran and Pakistan. Consequently, even
if only a portion of all Muslim-Americans contribute to one

of “commercial” DAFs, created by commercial financial businesses, as well as
some community foundations and educational institutions that have formed
charitable corporations for the principal purpose of offering DAFs, have been
successful in establishing low expense DAFs. See, e.g., Fidelity Charitable
Gift Fund, http://www.charitablegift.org. Some commercial DAFs require
only an initial contribution of $5,000. Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, The Gift
Account Minimums and Fees, http://www.charitablegift.org/charity-givingprograms/daf/fees.shtml (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). Additionally, because
the Internal Revenue Service has treated DAFs as charities, they have
offered donors higher charitable contribution deductions than those available
to donors of private foundations. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2007). The Internal
Revenue Service currently is studying whether, as a result of the advisory
privilege that a donor can retain, the donor advised fund vehicle should
continue to qualify for the currently available income, gift, and estate tax
charitable contribution deductions, and if so, the appropriate level for the
deductions. See Notice 2007-21, 2007-9 I.R.B. 611. It also is studying
whether, like private foundations, donor advised funds should be required to
distribute a specified amount for charitable purposes. See id.
117. See Noelle Barton & Peter Parepento, A Surge in Assets; DonorAdvised Funds Are Growing Exponentially, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
http://philanthropy.com/premium/articles/v19/i14/14000701.htm (referring to
DAFs established by the Renaissance Charitable Foundation for three
companies).
118. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 26, 39 and accompanying text.

centralized terror-free DAF, demographics appear to support its
creation and potential sustainability, especially if donors’
contributions are aggregated in one DAF account for
redistribution to a highly limited number of foreign recipients.120
DAFs characteristically have the potential not only to
distribute funds to qualified recipients but also to invest the
accounts’ corpus to produce income.121 Under Islamic law,
however, giving or receiving interest is prohibited.122 Thus, even
though the donated funds would be owned by the sponsoring
organization, Muslim-American donors would likely want to honor
the restriction. Muslim recipients also might not want to receive
money derived as interest. Therefore, to accommodate this
Muslim belief, the DAF funds simply would need to be devoted to
accreting investments, such as stock, that do not produce interest,
a manageable hurdle.
There appear to be more significant challenges, however, to
the establishment of a terror-free DAF. First, a sponsoring
organization would need to be formed. This task should not be
underestimated. The risks related to investment, administration,
and management responsibilities are enormous. Those who
undertake the necessary due diligence for the DAF, described
below, cannot fully protect themselves from civil or criminal
liability.
There are several possible methods for forming a sponsoring
organization. A commercial financial institution could form a
charitable corporation to serve as the sponsoring organization.123
120. See infra note 123 (discussing author’s telephone conversation with
Drew Hastings on this matter and explaining DAFs) and supra notes 109-17
and accompanying text (explaining the structure of DAFs).
Currently there are several U.S.-based Pakistani-American charities
connected to specific projects in Pakistan. See, e.g., SOS-Children’s Village
USA, Inc., http://www.sos-childrensvillages.org (providing youth homes,
schools, medical centers, and vocational centers) (last visited Feb. 29, 2008);
The Human Development Foundation of North America, Project Pakistan,
http://www.yespakistan.com/hdf/whatwedo/projectpakistan-exsummary.asp
(establishing human development initiatives in Pakistan’s underprivileged
communities) (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). The Muslim Pakistani-American
population may not be as underserved as other Muslim-Americans in having
a safe means for their charitable giving.
121. See supra note 112 (explaining DAFs that operate as endowments
and those that operate as non-endowments).
122. See Sheryl Jean, Beliefs and Banking, USINFO, http://usinfo.state.go
v/products/pubs/muslimlife/bank.htm.
123. Such commercial for-profit financial entities include The Vanguard

This might be the most plausible approach because several forprofit financial institutions now offer DAFs and have experience
in their operation.124 Such an arrangement would not preclude
advice and input from Muslim-American and secular nonprofits.
Moreover, as discussed below, there are considerable costs
associated with due diligence efforts that will be required of the
sponsoring organization, and a commercial financial institution
might be capable of the greatest efficiency, have the expertise in
place, and have the deepest pockets.
Although Muslim-Americans appear hesitant to give charity
through Muslim-American nonprofit organizations,125 another
possible arrangement is the creation of a sponsoring organization
by an alliance of Muslim-American and highly respected secular
U.S.-based nonprofit organizations.126 An alternative but perhaps
less viable approach in the current environment would be the
formation of a sponsoring organization by a publicly respected
Muslim-American umbrella organization or other large nonprofit
that has the broad trust, and represents the interests, of many
Muslim-American nonprofit entities and the Muslim-American

Group (Vanguard Charitable Endowment Fund), Fidelity Investments
(Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund), Charles Schwab (Schwab Fund for
Charitable Giving), and T. Rowe Price (T. Rowe Price Program for Charitable
Giving) all of which have a number of years of experience in developing
DAFs. A nonprofit organization with some experience as a sponsoring
organization for grant making overseas is the National Philanthropic Trust
(NPT). It has established DAFs for giving to select foreign organizations in
several countries, such as India, Turkey, Israel, and Japan. Telephone
interview with Drew Hastings, V.P., NPT (Oct. 4, 2007) [hereinafter
Telephone Conversation]. To do so, it was required to undertake the
necessary due diligence to ensure that the redistributed funds would not
support terrorists or terrorist organizations.
Id.; see also National
Philanthropic Trust, http://www.nptrust.org.
124. See supra note 123.
125. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. If Muslim-Americans
were inclined to contribute humanitarian aid to needy areas in homelands
through non-Muslim U.S.-based charities, established vehicles do exist. For
example, the American Red Cross has affiliates in many countries, including
regions from which many Muslim-Americans emigrated.
126. For example, United Way and Grantmakers Without Borders might
be explored as possible secular U.S.-based nonprofits. Some possibilities of
Muslim-American nonprofits for exploration might include the National
Council of American Muslim Non-Profits, Islamic Circle of North America,
Islamic Society of North America, Islamic Relief-USA, Council of Islamic
Organizations of Greater Chicago, and the Muslim Public Affairs Council.

population.127
Finally, although also not entirely viable, a
coalition of nonprofit Muslim-American organizations, including
community foundations and highly respected nonprofits, might
form a sponsoring organization. With respect to any of these three
possible alternative arrangements, the management and
administrative, operational, and technical support could be
outsourced to an experienced third-party nonprofit or for-profit
administrator.128
The ability of a sponsoring organization to design a DAF that
would qualify as terror-free is likely the most momentous hurdle.
Because a purpose of creating such a DAF is to enable charitable
contributions to fund legitimate charitable projects targeting the
neediest Muslims abroad, appropriate foreign nongovernmental
organizations (FNOs) must be recipients for, and re-distributors
of, the DAF’s distributions.129 Advice and suggestions from
Muslim-American and secular domestic private foundations and
charities, as well as knowledgeable Muslim-Americans and other
Americans who have worked or are working overseas, might help
to solve this problem. Identifying suitable FNOs may not be an
easy task, and the sponsoring organization’s chore of performing
adequate due diligence will be the most difficult and crucial
challenge.
There are two components of due diligence currently

127. See id. (suggesting some potential Muslim-American nonprofit
organizations).
128. See, e.g., Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors (http://www.rockpa.org/
services/donor-advised-funds/) and NPT (http://www.nptrust.org).
Both
organizations are nonprofit. See Telephone Conversation, supra note 123.
NPT has limited experience as a third-party administrator for DAFs
established for charitable giving to select foreign organizations abroad. Id.
NPT’s role has included the due diligence necessary to ensure that
redistributions are protected from supporting terrorists and terrorist
organizations. Id. A for-profit entity, Microedge (http://www.microedge.com),
is also a third-party administrator.
129. Alternatively, the DAF could distribute funds to a domestic “friends
of” organization, determined by the I.R.S. as a qualified charity under 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), which would redistribute the money to a foreign
organization that it supports. That chain would not remove or avoid the due
diligence requirements from the organizational chain because the domestic
“friends of” organization would be responsible under I.R.S. pronouncements.
See Rev. Rul. 56-304, 1956-2 C.B. 306; Rev. Rul. 68-489, 1968-2 C.B. 210;
Rev. Rul. 71-460, 1971-2 C.B. 231; I.R.S. Announcement 2003-29, 2003-1 C.B.
928.
See also Marcus S. Owens, Legal Framework of International
Philanthropy: The Potential for Change, 25 PACE L. REV. 193, 197-200 (2005).

necessary. The first is compliance with the federal tax rule of
expenditure responsibility,130 which is required if, as is most
likely, the FNO is not recognized by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) as a public charity under U.S. tax laws.131 The expenditure
responsibility rule predates 9/11,132 and it is not specifically an
antiterrorism measure. Its application was extended to DAFs in
2006.133 The focus of the expenditure responsibility requirement
is to determine whether each FNO is capable of utilizing the funds
in a manner consistent with the charitable purposes for which the
funds were intended, and whether the FNO does so in fact.134 The
expenditure responsibility rule mainly requires extensive
paperwork documenting due diligence both before and after the
DAF makes distributions to an FNO; this requirement prevents
misuse of funds and promotes good business practices.135
130. 26 U.S.C. § 4945(h) (2007); Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-6 (2007). For a
discussion of the expenditure responsibility requirements, see Crimm,
Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass, supra note 110, at 81-86
(discussing the expenditure responsibility requirements in the context of
private foundations).
131. 26 U.S.C. § 4966(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2007). Failure to comply with the
expenditure responsibility rule would subject the sponsoring organization
and fund manager to excise taxes. Id. § 4966(a)(1)-(2) (2007).
The foreign nongovernmental organization (FNO) can obtain a
determination letter from the I.R.S. stating that it qualifies as a public
charity under I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3) and 509(a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3). Treas. Reg. §
53.4945-5(a)(3) (2007); I.R.C. § 508(a), (b); Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1 (2007). Few
such non-governmental foreign organizations obtain such determination
letters because the process of acquiring, as well as the requirements for
maintaining, § 501(c)(3) status is time-consuming, costly, and
administratively burdensome.
See EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS COMMITTEE,
SECTION OF TAXATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, [DRAFT] REPORT OF TASK
FORCE ON REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF RULES APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE
FOUNDATIONS ("GALLAGHER-FERGUSON WHITE PAPER"), reprinted in 36 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 262, 271–72 (May 2002).
An alternative to obtaining an I.R.S. determination letter is for the
sponsoring organization to make a “good faith determination” that the foreign
organization is equivalent to a § 501(c)(3) public charity. Treas. Reg. §
53.4942(a)-(3)(a)(6) (2007). This process is costly and can be administratively
burdensome. See Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass,
supra, note 110, at 75-81.
132. It was originally enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-172 (1969) and applied only to private foundations.
133. 26 U.S.C. § 4966(c)(1)(ii), added by the Pension Protection Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1231 (2006).
134. See Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass, supra note
110, at 83.
135. See id. at 82-87.

Basically the sponsoring organization would need to comply with
the following checklist:136
• The sponsoring organization must undertake a predistribution inquiry to determine that the FNO is capable
of fulfilling the distribution’s charitable purposes through
the use of the funds.137
• The sponsoring organization must enter into a predistribution written agreement with the FNO.138
• The FNO should separate the funds according to the
charitable purposes for which they were given, and must
repay any portion not appropriately used.
• The sponsoring organization must obtain within a
reasonable period annual reports from the FNO on how
136. Treasury regulations §§ 53.4945-5(b), -5(c), -5(d), -6(c) provide the
specific expenditure responsibility requirements for private foundations. The
checklist here is adapted for purposes of a sponsoring organization of a DAF.
137. The scope of the inquiry should depend on the size of the
distributions, the purpose of the distributions, the distribution period, and
prior experience with the FNO. Regardless, the inquiry should: (1) identify
the FNO and its managers; (2) determine the history of the FNO and the
experience of its management; and (3) focus on knowledge that the
sponsoring organization possesses or can readily obtain from available
information concerning the FNO’s activities, practices, and management.
138. The written agreement must specify (1) the charitable purpose of the
distributions and the FNO’s agreement to repay the funds if not so utilized;
(2) the FNO’s agreement to provide annual reports; (3) the FNO’s willingness
to maintain books and records and to make them available to inspection by
the domestic sponsoring organization at reasonable times; (4) the FNO’s
agreement to refrain from carrying on propaganda or otherwise influencing
legislation, influencing the outcome of any specific public election or carrying
on voter registration drives directly or indirectly, and undertaking any
activity for a non-charitable purpose to the extent that such use of the funds
would be considered a taxable expenditure. The agreement must prohibit the
initial FNO from re-distributing the funds to another organization
(“secondary FNO”), unless the secondary FNO complies with restrictions on
distributions substantially equivalent to the restrictions imposed on a
sponsoring organization. If the secondary distribution is to an organization
that is not a public charity or treated as a public charity under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3), compliance with the expenditure responsibility requirements of
I.R.C. § 4945(h) is required by the first FNO. These restrictions can be
phrased in the agreement in appropriate terms under foreign law or custom,
and they will ordinarily be considered sufficient if accompanied by an
affidavit or opinion of counsel stating that the restrictions are substantially
equivalent to restrictions that would be imposed on a sponsoring
organization.

the FNO used the distributed funds.139
• The sponsoring organization must determine that the
FNO maintains adequate books and records and reviews
those books and records as appropriate.
• During the taxable year in which the FNO gives
distributions subject to the expenditure responsibility
rule, the sponsoring organization must notify the I.R.S. of
these distributions.
Compliance with the expenditure responsibility rule requires
ongoing effort and can be expensive; therefore, for the creation of a
terror-free DAF for Muslim-Americans’ gifts abroad to be sensible
and warranted, the sponsoring organization will need sufficient
Moreover, the rules can be
DAF contributions.140
administratively burdensome, and compliance is more difficult
where there are no sponsoring organization employees working in
the field abroad.
There may be capacity, however, to reduce some of these
challenges. This could be accomplished with respect to the predistribution inquiry of FNOs identified by the sponsoring
organization with which private foundations and charities have
had dealings in the past. If those entities are willing to share
their experiences and information, and if the sponsoring
organization comfortably can rely on that which is shared, the
sponsoring organization can more easily satisfy its expenditure
responsibility duties. Further possible support for accomplishing
the expenditure responsibility requirements may be forthcoming.
In July 2007, Information Age Associates released a status report
on the feasibility of creating a centralized repository of
information on non-U.S. based NGOs.141 The status report
139. The reports also must indicate that the FNO complied with the terms
of its agreement and show the FNO’s progress toward achievement of the
purpose of the distributions. A final report, similar in nature to annual
reports, must be made in the year that the funds are fully and finally
expended or the distributions are otherwise terminated.
140. Drew Hastings, V.P. of NPT, has suggested that for any
redistributions abroad to a single FNO, the administrative, management,
investment, operational, and due diligence costs likely require a minimum of
$100,000 in a DAF account. See Telephone Conversation, supra note 123.
One DAF account can have multiple contributors, who collectively could
contribute the $100,000 aggregate amount. Id.
141. INFORMATION AGE ASSOCIATES, POTENTIAL OF CREATING A CENTRALIZED

indicated a high level of support among grant-makers and
nonprofit organizations’ leaders for the creation of such a
project.142 Information from others can be helpful only if it
applies to the specific FNOs identified by the DAF’s sponsoring
organization. This constraint may limit the usefulness of a
centralized repository because Muslim-American donors may want
to direct their charitable giving to regions where there has not
been broad and ongoing experience with FNOs, or to FNOs
without connections to traditional domestic grant-makers and
charities.
Assuming that the expenditure responsibility rule is not an
insurmountable impediment, the sponsoring organization also
must attempt to prevent the DAF from providing inadvertent
financial support to terrorists and terrorist organizations. As
discussed previously, there are numerous governmentrecommended antiterrorist measures, several of which overlap
with the expenditure responsibility requirements, that must
continually inform the charitable giving and redistribution cycles.
They include the following cumulative checklist:
When selecting each FNO, the sponsoring organization
should:
•

Collect “basic information” about each FNO.
o

•

Collect

Name (in language of origin and English),
acronyms used, jurisdiction(s) of physical
presence, historical information, governing
instruments, public filings, addresses and
phone numbers, statement of principal
purpose, names and postal, e-mail, and
URL addresses of organizations that
receive funding or support from the FNO,
names and addresses of subcontracting
organizations, public filings or releases by
the FNO, and FNO’s sources of income.
information

about

each

FNO’s

key

REPOSITORY OF INFORMATION ON NON-U.S. BASED NGOS: PROJECT STATUS
REPORT (July 2007), http://www.iaa.com/NGORepositoryFeasibilityStudy
Report.html.
142. Id.

employees,
board
members,
management at all locations.
o

•

and

senior

Name, nationality, citizenship, country of
residence, place and date of birth.

Search publicly available information
to
determine whether each FNO, or one of its key
employees, is suspected of activity relating to
terrorism.
o

OFAC Master List of SDNs143


o

o

OFAC Country Sanctions Programs144


http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enf
orcement/ofac/programs/



No FNO should be “otherwise
subject to OFAC sanctions.”145

United Nations Terrorist List


o

http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enf
orcement/ofac/sdn/index.shtm

http://www.un.org/sc/committees/12
67/consolist.shtml

European Union Terrorist List


http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/

143. This OFAC master list includes the State Department’s Foreign
Terrorist List, which can be found separately at http://www.state.gov
/s/ct/rls/fs/2004/32678.htm. This master list has been criticized as deficient.
See supra note 88.
144. This lists countries and regions, but names of organizations
previously listed in the executive orders for a country/region are now
incorporated into the OFAC SDN master list.
145. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES:
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES 10 (2006), available at.
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/keyissues/protecting/docs/guideli
nes_charities.pdf

site/en/oj/2005/l_314/l_3142005113
0en00410045.pdf
o

Terror lists maintained by other countries


United Kingdom’s List of
Proscribed Terrorist Groups
•



Canada’s Terrorist List
•



http://www.nationalsecurity
.gov.au/ (select “Terrorist
Organisations” from “Quick
links” drop box).

Russia’s Terrorist List146
•



http://www.publicsafety.gc.c
a/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp

Australia’s List of Terrorist
Organizations
•



http://www.homeoffice.gov.u
k/security/terrorism-andthe-law/terrorismact/proscribed-groups

http://www.cdi.org/russia/jo
hnson/2007-102-42.cfm

China’s Terrorist List
•

http://english.peopledaily.co
m.cn/200312/15/eng2003121
5_130432.shtml147

146. The Russian terrorist list apparently is updated annually and
authorization is required to access the updated information.
147. Although the list that appears at this web site is dated 2003, the U.S.
Department of State also has no information available on its web site as to a
subsequently compiled Chinese terrorist list. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM (2005), available at http://www.state.gov



South Asia Terrorism Portal148
•



http://www.satp.org/satporg
tp/satp/index.html

Saudi Arabia’s Most Wanted List
•

http://www.saudiembassy.n
et/Issues/Terrorism/IssuesT
er.asp

Before supplying resources to any FNO, the sponsoring
organization should:
•

Verify each FNO’s ability to (1) accomplish the
charitable purpose and (2) protect the resources
from diversion.

•

Obtain references on each FNO from trusted
sources.

•

Reduce terms of the disbursement to a written
agreement.

When disbursing funds, the sponsoring organization
should:
•

Disburse funds in small increments as needed for
specific projects or expenditures.

•

Disburse funds via check or wire transfer, and by
cash only if necessary.

•

Maintain
detailed
disbursements.

•

Require each FNO to use a reliable banking

internal

records

of

/s/ct/rls/crt/c17689.htm.
148. This web site is not an official government web site. It contains,
however, lists for Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka, perhaps assembled by the nongovernmental organization and based
on government lists.

system or other regulated financial channels for
transferring funds.
After disbursing the DAF funds to an FNO, the
sponsoring organization should:
•

Require periodic reports, preferably annually,
from the FNO on all uses of the disbursed funds.
With the periodic reports, require the FNO to
provide specific documentation of the use of the
funds.
o

E.g.,
receipts,
video,
photographs,
testimonies, and written records.

•

Require the FNO to take reasonable steps to
ensure that funds have neither been distributed to
terrorists nor used for activities that support
terrorism. The FNO should apprise the sponsoring
organization of the steps taken.

•

Engage in ongoing monitoring of the FNO for the
term of the distributions.

•

Perform regular, periodic on-site audits of the
FNO to the extent permissible by personnel and
other constraints.

•

Correct misuse of resources quickly and terminate
relationship if misuse continues.

•

Make appropriate reports to the U.S. government,
including, but not limited to, filings with the
Internal Revenue Service.

Although this list of tasks is perhaps daunting to the point of
being overwhelming, the above checklist may be achievable by one
entity formed proactively by Muslim-Americans to serve as the
sponsoring organization as their sole dedicated and centralized
terror-free DAF. Additionally, if a centralized repository of
information on non-U.S. based NGOs were formed, the sponsoring
organization could have streamlined access to otherwise scattered
information. Nonetheless, such a repository would not relieve the

sponsoring organization from much of the due diligence required,
such as obtaining periodic reports, checking the reliability of the
reports, monitoring each FNO, undertaking audits, and making
appropriate governmental filings. Therefore, targeting a very few
FNOs abroad in one or two regions or communities of common
interest to Muslim-Americans might be important, at least
initially, to the financial viability of the project.
CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, even if well-intentioned, philanthropically
minded Muslim-Americans created and used an appropriate
terror-free DAF, there are no guarantees that these MuslimAmericans would be protected with absolute certainty against
unwanted surveillance, inaccurate accusations, and worse.
Nonetheless, a terror-free DAF could be strategically powerful for
Muslim-Americans, inuring to their benefit in numerous ways. It
could contribute to a more hospitable philanthropic environment
by reducing fears of Muslim-Americans with the desire and
religious obligation to help the neediest Muslims worldwide.
Drawing on the thoughts of Moses Maimonides, the terror-free
DAF structure would enable Muslim Americans to give to the
alms-chest, knowing that the “officer in charge is reliable, wise,
[scrupulous], and a capable administrator.”149 And, by directing
charitable giving through such a reputable manager, the intended
recipients—those Muslims who are most needy and who live
abroad—would gain financial support.
Moreover, benefits from a terror-free DAF could inure to the
general American public. Giving charity through a terror-free
DAF could reduce mistrust of Muslim-Americans by non-Muslims,
and thus bolster public perceptions of them. Facilitating open and
legitimate charitable giving by well-intentioned MuslimAmericans could send an unambiguous message that such people
are not radical extremists, they neither espouse nor support
terrorism, and they desire to contribute to U.S. national
security.150

149. See supra note 8, and accompanying text.
150. According to recommendations of the Chicago Council of Global
Affairs task force, expanding and recognizing Muslim-American contributions
to national security could be greatly beneficial to Muslim Americans.
STRENGTHENING AMERICA, supra note 26, at 9-11.

Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies,
and the Myth of Swain v. Pressley
Stephen I. Vladeck*

I. INTRODUCTION

The current debate over judicial review of the detention of
“enemy combatants” is dominated by the question of whether the
Constitution’s Suspension Clause1 applies to non-citizens detained
outside the territorial United States, including those held at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.2 But an equally important question is
lurking just beneath the surface in Boumediene v. Bush, the lead
case currently3 before the Supreme Court: If the Suspension
* Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law. This
essay was prepared in conjunction with the Roger Williams University School
of Law’s November 2007 Symposium, “Legal Dilemmas in a Dangerous
World: Law, Terrorism, and National Security,” for my participation in which
I owe thanks to Peter Margulies. Thanks also to Emily Pasternak for
research assistance.
1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.”).
2.
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196). For two differing
academic takes on the question, compare J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and
Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463 (2007), with
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 275 (2008). See generally Paul Halliday & G. Edward White,
The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Context, and American
Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575 (2008).
3.
As this article went to print, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Boumediene, holding that the Suspension Clause does apply to the
Guantánamo detainees, and that the substitute for habeas corpus provided
by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of
2006 is an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus. See Boumediene v. Bush,
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). For Justice Kennedy’s analysis of the latter issue, see
id. at 2262–74, unquestionably merits a discussion that is simply not possible
here. For now, though, it suffices to note the Boumediene majority’s
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Clause does protect the right to habeas corpus for non-citizens
held abroad (or at least at Guantánamo),4 is the jurisdictionstripping provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA)5 actually inconsistent therewith?
The prevailing assumption is that this question necessarily
reduces to whether the MCA, along with the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (DTA),6 provides an “adequate” and “effective”
substitute for the remedy provided by the writ of habeas corpus.
And the reason why that appears to be the ultimate question is
the Supreme Court’s oft-cited—but seldom read—1977 decision in
Swain v. Pressley (Pressley).7 Pressley, a case arising indirectly out
of the 1970 reorganization of the D.C. judicial system, is
commonly invoked for the proposition that the Suspension Clause
is not implicated unless the relevant remedial scheme provides no
adequate or effective substitute for habeas corpus.8
As significant as Pressley figures in current debates, very
little has been written about the case itself, or the rule for which it
has since become the standard citation.9 Thus, in attempting to
conclusion that “[t]he present cases . . . test the limits of the Suspension
Clause in ways that Hayman and Swain did not,” id. at 2266, for many of the
same reasons articulated in more detail herein.
4.
Indeed, much of the focus of the current litigation is whether
Guantánamo is “different,” i.e., whether there is a colorable argument that
non-citizens held in Cuba might have a stronger claim to constitutional
protections, including those enmeshed with the Suspension Clause, than
those held elsewhere outside the United States. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466, 485–88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Gherebi v.
Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1285–99 (9th Cir. 2003).
5.
Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (2006) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)) (“No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction
to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by
the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or
is awaiting such determination.”).
6.
Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739–44 (2005).
7.
430 U.S. 372 (1977). Although the case is usually referred to in
shorthand as “Swain,” the habeas petitioner was Jasper Pressley, and so I
refer to the case as Pressley throughout this essay.
8.
See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 n.38 (2001) (citing
Pressley for the proposition that “Congress could, without raising any
constitutional questions, provide an adequate substitute through the courts
of appeals”); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1480 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749, 2818 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9.
Even recent academic discussions of the “adequate” and “effective”

analyze whether the remedy provided by the MCA and DTA to
detained “enemy combatants” comports with the Suspension
Clause, courts and commentators have little precedent or
academic discussion to guide them. The animating purpose of this
symposium essay, then, is to reconstruct the Court’s decision in
Pressley so as to understand the implications of its holding, and its
potential relevance both to the current Guantánamo cases and to
other recent legislative attempts to provide a substitute remedy
for habeas corpus.
To reconstruct Pressley, Part II begins with the Supreme
Court’s 1952 decision in United States v. Hayman.10 In Hayman,
the Court vacated a Ninth Circuit decision that had invalidated 28
U.S.C. § 2255, one of Congress’s first attempts to provide a
statutory alternative to habeas corpus. The Court’s unanimous
decision in Hayman nevertheless reserved any question as to the
constitutional implications of such legislation. Thus, when the
Pressley Court considered a statute modeled on § 2255—section
23-110(g) of the D.C. Code—it was resolving a question of first
impression.
As Part II concludes, Pressley did not go much further than
Hayman had, holding only that there is no constitutional defect
with a statute that provides an “adequate” and “effective” means
of challenging detention other than habeas corpus. Pointedly, the
Court in Pressley did not decide whether “inadequate” or
“ineffective” remedies were necessarily unconstitutional, leaving
that question open for later courts.
In Part III, I turn to Pressley’s aftermath, and briefly survey
those contexts wherein Swain v. Pressley has figured prominently
since it was decided. Part III therefore begins with the Supreme
Court’s 1996 decision in Felker v. Turpin,11 in which the Court
upheld the so-called “gatekeeper” provisions of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)12 on the ground
substitute issue have given short shrift to Pressley itself. See, e.g.,
Christopher J. Schatz & Noah A.F. Horst, Will Justice Delayed Be Justice
Denied? Crisis Jurisprudence, the Guantánamo Detainees, and the Imperiled
Role of Habeas Corpus in Curbing Abusive Government Detention, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 539 (2007).
10. 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
11. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
12. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).

that an alternative remedy remained available. Part III next
turns to the context of immigration law, where AEDPA, and later
the REAL ID Act of 2005,13 attempted to preclude immigration
habeas petitions in favor of direct review of administrative
decisions. Finally, Part III concludes with the application of Swain
v. Pressley to the current cases arising out of Guantánamo, and
the question whether the review provided by the DTA and the
MCA constitutes an “adequate” and “effective” substitute for
habeas corpus.
Given that the Supreme Court is due to decide Boumediene
later this year, and will quite likely reach the question of whether
the DTA and MCA provide an “adequate” alternative to habeas
corpus, Part III assiduously avoids handicapping the merits of this
question. Instead, in Part IV, I turn to the “myth” of Swain v.
Pressley—the extent to which the “rule” Pressley enunciates might
actually serve to distort courts’ review of the adequacy of
alternative remedies to habeas corpus. Because of this effect, Part
IV suggests several reasons why Pressley is not nearly as helpful
in defining the limits of Congress’s power to fashion alternative
remedies to habeas corpus as is generally suggested. Whatever the
Court ultimately holds in Boumediene, any discussion of the
constitutional adequacy of the alternative remedy will, in reality,
resolve a question of first impression.
II. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES: FROM HAYMAN TO PRESSLEY

Arguably, the first time Congress ever provided a statutory
substitute for the writ of habeas corpus was in the Judiciary Act of
1789, section 14 of which created a federal statutory cause of
action by the same name:
That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States,
shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas
corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by
statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles
and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the
supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts,
shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the
13. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).

purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.——
Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case
extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in
custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United
States, or are committed for trial before some court of the
same, or are necessary to be brought into court to
testify.14
As Chief Justice Marshall would explain less than two
decades later, although federal courts could resort to the common
law for the “meaning” of “habeas corpus,” they were only
empowered to exercise that jurisdiction conferred by statute.15
Thus, at least in the federal courts, the federal “statutory” writ
became a complete substitute for the “common-law” (or what is
sometimes referred to as the “constitutional”) writ of habeas
corpus.16
Notwithstanding Bollman’s elimination of common-law
habeas in the federal courts, questions about the substantive
sufficiency of the federal statutory writ did not arise until well
into the twentieth century.17 Thus, Part II begins with Congress’s
first attempt to provide a substitute remedy for the statutory writ
of habeas corpus, before moving onto Swain v. Pressley and its
implications.
A. Hayman and 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Perhaps ironically, the Supreme Court itself was largely
responsible for the first concerted effort on Congress’s part to
provide a substitute remedy for the federal statutory writ of
habeas corpus. At the heart of the problem were a series of
decisions during the 1940s that seemingly opened the door to
potential abuses of the writ by prisoners.

14. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000)).
15. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93–94 (1807).
16. On the constitutional origins of habeas corpus, see generally
WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980); and
Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605
(1970).
17. For a discussion of why Bollman’s preclusion of federal common-law
habeas did not raise more serious Suspension Clause problems, see Vladeck,
supra note 2.

In Waley v. Johnston, for example, the Court for the first time
allowed federal prisoners to contest their convictions even where
the trial record itself was unassailable—a holding that necessarily
contemplated review of facts dehors the record.18 In Walker v.
Johnston, the Court held that in certain circumstances, habeas
petitioners were entitled to a full evidentiary hearing in the
habeas court.19 And in Ahrens v. Clark, the Court concluded that
habeas petitions must be filed in the district of the prisoner’s
confinement.20
Taken together, Ahrens, Waley, and Walker created a
logistical nightmare; at the time, most federal prisoners were held
somewhere other than the district in which they were convicted.
Between 1942 and 1948, for example, 63% of federal prisoners
were held in just five districts.21 Thus, district courts considering
(the growing number of) post-conviction habeas petitions brought
by federal prisoners were beset by serious administrative
problems, including the routine unavailability of the trial court
record and of key witnesses.22
In response to the problems posed by these decisions
(combined with growing abuse of the writ by federal prisoners
unintentionally emboldened by them), the Judicial Conference of
the United States proposed legislation to create a statutory
remedy for those in custody pursuant to a federal conviction. Such
a motion for post-conviction relief would be filed in the district of
conviction and sentence, rather than in the district of
confinement.23 Although there was little movement on the
proposal between 1942 and 1948,24 Ahrens apparently rekindled
the momentum for such a measure, so that when the Judicial
Code was re-codified in June 1948, it included new 28 U.S.C. §

18.
316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) (per curiam).
19.
312 U.S. 275 (1941).
20.
335 U.S. 188 (1948).
21. See William H. Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 OHIO
ST. L.J. 337 (1949). In Hayman, the Court relied heavily upon Speck’s article.
See, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 n.14, 214 n.18 (1952).
22. For an overview of the problems motivating § 2255, see John J.
Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949); Louis E.
Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313 (1948).
23. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 210–19 & nn.13–14, 17–19, 23, 25
(summarizing the evolution of what became § 2255).
24. See id.

2255.25
Critically, while creating a statutory post-conviction remedy
in the district of conviction, § 2255 also precluded post-conviction
habeas corpus in the district of confinement:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion
pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it
appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief,
by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such
court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that
the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention.26
Thus, for the first time, Congress displaced the statutory writ
of habeas corpus unless “the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of [the petitioner’s] detention.” The
statute was silent, though, on the criteria by which “adequacy” or
“effectiveness” was to be measured.
The constitutionality of the preclusion of habeas corpus
quickly came before the courts. Although the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits explicitly upheld § 2255 against constitutional
challenge,27 the Ninth Circuit, in a controversial and divided
opinion, disagreed.28
At the heart of the complicated series of five opinions from the
three judges in the Ninth Circuit was the argument that § 2255
was not in fact an adequate alternative to habeas corpus in the
case before the court (an appeal of the denial of a § 2255 motion).29
On the majority’s view, the district court correctly denied
Hayman’s § 2255 motion because, inter alia, it lacked the
authority to produce Hayman as a witness. But such a denial
would prejudice (if not formally preclude) his ability to challenge

25. See id. at 218.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2000).
27. See Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1950); Martin v.
Hiatt, 174 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1949).
28. See Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1950), vacated,
342 U.S. 205 (1951).
29. The defendant, Herman Hayman, was convicted on six counts and
sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment by the United States District Court
for the Central District of California. He was subsequently imprisoned in the
federal prison at McNeil Island, Washington. See id. 457.

the constitutionality of his conviction via habeas corpus. Thus,
because the § 2255 remedy was inadequate, and because habeas
would not effectively be available, the court (eventually) concluded
that § 2255 was unconstitutional.30
On certiorari, the Supreme Court unanimously vacated the
Ninth Circuit’s decision.31 Conceding that “respondent’s motion
states grounds to support a collateral attack on his sentence,”32
the Court read § 2255 as not precluding resort to habeas corpus in
such a case. After exhaustively recounting the background to §
2255, Chief Justice Vinson noted how:
[§ 2255] was passed at the instance of the Judicial
Conference to meet practical difficulties that had arisen
in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do
we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of
collateral attack upon their convictions. On the contrary,
the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties
encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the
same rights in another and more convenient forum.33

30. All three members of the panel filed opinions with respect to the
initial decision: Chief Judge Denman wrote for the court, and held that the
§ 2255 remedy was inadequate on the ground that the defendant was unable
to be a witness at his § 2255 hearing, which prejudiced his ability to assert
his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See id. at 457–66.
Judge Stephens concurred in the result, but went further, reading the § 2255
hearing as having preclusive effect in any subsequent habeas petition, even
if—as in the case sub judice—the § 2255 remedy was “inadequate” or
“ineffective.” Thus, Judge Stephens concluded that the statute was an
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus. See id. at 466–68 (Stephens, J.,
concurring in the result). Finally, Judge Pope dissented, arguing that, as
Hayman had not yet attempted to file a federal habeas petition, resolution of
the constitutional question was premature. Moreover, Judge Pope disagreed
with Chief Judge Denman that the § 2255 remedy was inadequate. See id. at
468–71 (Pope, J., dissenting).
On rehearing, Chief Judge Denman came around to Judge Stephens’s
position, and concluded that § 2255 was unconstitutional. See id. at 471–74
(Denman, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing). Judge Pope reiterated
his dissent. See id. at 474–75 (Pope, J., dissenting).
31. Hayman v. United States, 342 U.S. 205, 224 (1951). Technically, the
vote in support of Chief Justice Vinson’s opinion was 6-0. Justices Black and
Douglas concurred in the result only (without explaining why), see id., and
Justice Minton did not participate. See id.
32. Id. at 210.
33. Id. at 219.

With that admonition in mind, the Court turned to the merits
of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit
that the defendant would not have been able to appear before the
sentencing court,34 the Supreme Court concluded that the district
court “did not proceed in conformity with Section 2255 when it
made findings on controverted issues of fact relating to
[Hayman’s] own knowledge without notice to [him] and without
his being present.”35 In other words, the Ninth Circuit’s
conclusion that the § 2255 remedy was inadequate in Hayman’s
case was correct, but only because the district court had
misconstrued the scope of its authority under that section—not, as
the Ninth Circuit had concluded, because the district court lacked
the requisite authority. There was no need for the Ninth Circuit to
decide that § 2255 was therefore unconstitutional; it needed only
to have remanded the proceedings back to the lower court:
Nothing has been shown to warrant our holding at this
stage of the proceeding that the Section 2255 procedure
will be “inadequate or ineffective” if respondent is present
for a hearing in the District Court on remand of this case.
In a case where the Section 2255 procedure is shown to be
“‘inadequate or ineffective’,” the Section provides that the
habeas corpus remedy shall remain open to afford the
necessary hearing. Under such circumstances, we do not
reach constitutional questions. This Court will not pass
upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress where the
question is properly presented unless such adjudication is
unavoidable, much less anticipate constitutional
questions.36
Hayman thereby endorsed a broad reading of the scope of
review that sentencing courts could undertake pursuant to § 2255,
while reiterating that habeas would be available where the § 2255
proceedings were inadequate or ineffective. The Supreme Court
did nothing to clarify what “inadequate” or “ineffective” might
mean, but its broad construction of the sentencing court’s
authority in entertaining § 2255 motions made that issue much
34. See id. at 220–21, 221 n.33 (noting the sentencing court’s authority
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651).
35. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 220.
36. Id. at 223 (footnotes omitted).

less likely to arise.37
B. Swain v. Pressley and the D.C. Courts
A quarter-century after Hayman, the Court again confronted
the question of whether Congress could provide a substitute
remedy for habeas corpus in the context of section 23-110(g) of the
District of Columbia Code, a provision expressly modeled on 28
U.S.C. § 2255.38
Section 23-110(g) was codified as part of the massive
reorganization of the District of Columbia judicial system in
1970.39 Prior to 1970, the District of Columbia had what was
effectively a unitary court system,40 pursuant to which the courts
of the District of Columbia exercised both local and federal
jurisdiction.41 Indeed, it was because of the unique “hybrid”
nature of the D.C. courts’ jurisdiction that, from 1837 to 1962,
those courts were the only tribunals in the country with the power
to entertain petitions for writs of mandamus against federal
officials.42
37. Indeed, the Court would subsequently characterize Hayman as
“avoid[ing] the constitutional question by holding that § 2255 was as broad as
habeas corpus.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 13 (1963).
38. See Palmore v. Superior Court of D.C., 515 F.2d 1294, 1306 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (en banc).
39. See generally D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473. For cogent summaries, see JEFFREY
BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE
COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 233–35 (2001); Susan Low
Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the
Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 561–63 (2002);
John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical
View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 387–89 (2006).
40. Technically, there were purely “local” courts in the District of
Columbia prior to 1970, but they were courts of extremely limited subjectmatter jurisdiction, and appeals could be taken from their decisions to the
quasi-federal courts.
41. See generally Bloch & Ginsburg, supra note 39; Roberts, supra note
39.
42. In 1813, the Supreme Court held that the lower federal courts
lacked the power to issue such common-law writs. See McIntire v. Wood, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813). Eight years later, the Court held that the state
courts lacked the power to provide such relief against federal officials. See
McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821). The clever solution,
initially theorized by D.C. Circuit Chief Judge William Cranch, was that,
because the D.C. district court was a federal court that could also exercise
local jurisdiction, it alone had the power to issue writs of mandamus against

As part of a package of “home rule” measures (or, according to
some, to curb the influence of the then-left-leaning D.C. Circuit
over criminal law and criminal procedure), Congress bifurcated
the courts into distinctly local and distinctly federal systems, and
apportioned jurisdiction accordingly.43 Along with the criminal
jurisdiction allocated to the new D.C. local courts (and taken away
from the D.C. federal district court), Congress provided for a postconviction remedy mirroring that provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
and one that otherwise appeared to preclude post-conviction
habeas corpus in the federal courts:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion
pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the
Superior Court or by any Federal or State court if it
appears that the applicant has failed to make a motion
for relief under this section or that the Superior Court
has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the
federal officers. See United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall, 5 D.C. (5 Cranch)
163 (1837), aff’d, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). See generally Roberts, supra
note 39, at 380–82 (summarizing the background to the Kendall case).
Finally, in 1962, Congress enacted the Mandamus and Venue Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361, which confers jurisdiction on all federal district courts to entertain
petitions for writs of mandamus against federal officers.
One point that bears mentioning, and that I have never seen discussed
before, is whether the D.C. courts, a fortiori, would also have retained
common-law habeas jurisdiction for federal prisoners during this same time
period. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), only disavowed
common-law habeas corpus in the Article III courts, and Tarble’s Case, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872), only disavowed habeas for federal prisoners in
state courts. Although this is a fun academic question, the 1970
reorganization act appears to have closed this loophole and vitiated any
potential contemporary significance. See D.C. Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. at 560 (codified at D.C.
CODE § 16-1901(b)) (“Petitions for writs directed to Federal officers and
employees shall be filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.”). For more on this curious historical footnote, see Stephen I.
Vladeck, The Riddle of the One-Way Ratchet: Habeas Corpus and the District
of Columbia, 11 GREEN BAG 2d (forthcoming 2008).
43. On the partisan motives behind the bifurcation, see Bloch &
Ginsburg, supra note 39, at 562 n.61; Patricia M. Wald, Ghosts of Judges
Past, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 675, 680–81 (1994). See also Patricia M. Wald,
The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV.
507, 509 (1988) (noting that “it is no secret that a major motivation for [the
Act] was the Nixon Administration’s fierce opposition” to various decisions by
liberal D.C. Circuit judges).

remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of detention.44
Unlike in Hayman, however, the post-conviction remedy
under D.C. law was a motion before local D.C. judges—Article I
judges not subject to Article III’s salary and tenure protections.45
Pressley therefore raised the issue—not considered in Hayman—of
whether a post-conviction remedy could be an “adequate” and
“effective” substitute for habeas corpus if it did not include
consideration by an Article III judge.
Interestingly, that issue was essentially sidestepped by the
D.C. Circuit, which held in Palmore v. Superior Court of the
District of Columbia that section 23-110(g) did not preclude the
district court’s exercise of habeas jurisdiction, but only interposed
a requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies prior to seeking
federal habeas relief.46 Noting that “the district court construed a
statute which created a statutory remedy for post-conviction relief
in the new court system as eliminating by implication a remedy
which the inferior article III courts and the Supreme Court have
exercised for two hundred years,”47 the en banc court found
insufficient indication that Congress meant to force such a
potentially significant constitutional issue.48 Instead, as Judge
Tamm wrote for the court, “we find that Congress never intended
to, nor does section 110 actually, affect the district court’s
jurisdiction to entertain post-conviction habeas petitions from
local prisoners. Instead, we hold that section 110(g) is an
exhaustion of remedies statute, requiring initial submission of
claims to the local courts . . .”49
44. D.C. CODE § 23-110(g) (1970). There is little legislative history that
explains why Congress would be concerned about remedying the same
problem § 2255 was supposed to address. After all, a post-conviction remedy
in the D.C. district court, as opposed to the D.C. Superior Court, would
hardly raise comparable logistical difficulties. That being said, if part of the
purpose for the reorganization of the D.C. courts was to undermine the D.C.
Circuit’s role in shaping constitutional criminal procedure, it would have
made little sense to allow that court to accomplish indirectly (by hearing
habeas appeals of defendants convicted in the local D.C. courts) what the
statute clearly precluded it from doing directly.
45. See generally Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
46. 515 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc).
47. Id. at 1307.
48. See id. at 1308–13.
49. Id. at 1313.

The same day, the en banc D.C. Circuit applied Palmore to
the habeas petition of Jasper Pressley. Pressley was convicted in
April 1971 by the D.C. Superior Court of grand larceny and
larceny from the government. He was sentenced to concurrent
prison sentences to run between twenty and ninety-six months,
and was unsuccessful in two motions under section 23-110(g) for
post-conviction relief.50 After an interlocutory back-and-forth with
the D.C. Circuit, the district court denied Pressley’s habeas
petition on the ground that “it appeared that appellant had not
adequately exhausted his remedies in the local court system.”51
The en banc D.C. Circuit reversed. Relying on Palmore, the
court of appeals held that:
[T]he local courts fully considered the constitutional
claims on the merits. Thus, the local courts “had a full
opportunity to determine the federal constitutional issues
before resort was made to a federal forum, and the
policies served by the exhaustion requirement would not
be furthered by requiring submission of the claims to the
(local) courts.”52
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Pressley and
Palmore and consolidated the cases for argument,53 only to
subsequently vacate and remand Palmore at the Solicitor
General’s request (in light of the Court’s intervening decision in
Stone v. Powell).54 Thus, Pressley became the vehicle for resolving
the meaning—and constitutionality—of section 23-110(g).
On certiorari, the Court emphatically rejected the D.C.
Circuit’s conclusion in Palmore that section 23-110(g) was merely
an exhaustion requirement. First, the majority noted that the
statute expressly covers the exhaustion of local remedies, and
provides that habeas corpus should not be available unless the
local remedy was “inadequate” or “ineffective.”55 Second, as
50. See Pressley v. Swain, 515 F.2d 1290, 1291–92 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
banc) (summarizing the background).
51. Id. at 1292.
52. Id. at 1293 (quoting Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59, 63 (1974)).
53. Super. Ct. of D.C. v. Palmore, 424 U.S. 907 (1976) (mem.).
54. See Super. Ct. of D.C. v. Palmore, 429 U.S. 915 (1976) (mem.) (citing
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)); see also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S.
372, 376 n.7 (1977) (summarizing the facts).
55. See Pressley, 430 U.S. at 377.

Justice Stevens observed, section 23-110(g) was patterned
squarely on 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was meant to preclude
habeas corpus, and not just interpose an exhaustion
requirement.56
Thus, unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court was
squarely faced with the constitutional question of whether section
23-110(g), in divesting Pressley of the ability to pursue habeas
corpus proceedings in the district court, violated the Suspension
Clause. Justice Stevens made fairly quick work of this issue:
We are persuaded that the final clause in § 23-110(g)
avoids any serious question about the constitutionality of
the statute. That clause allows the District Court to
entertain a habeas corpus application if it “appears that
the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of [the applicant’s] detention.” Thus, the only
constitutional question presented is whether the
substitution of a new collateral remedy which is both
adequate and effective should be regarded as a
suspension of the Great Writ within the meaning of the
Constitution.57
That is to say, because section 23-110(g) precluded habeas
unless the post-conviction remedy was “inadequate” and
“ineffective,” the negative implication was that habeas would be
available unless the post-conviction remedy was adequate and
effective to test the legality of the defendant’s detention. And so,
the only question was whether such a substitute for habeas—i.e.,
one that was both adequate and effective in challenging the
legality of the defendant’s detention—violated the Suspension
Clause. That question, according to Justice Stevens, had been
answered in Hayman: “The Court implicitly held in Hayman, as
we hold in this case, that the substitution of a collateral remedy
which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a
person’s detention does not constitute a suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.”58 Thus, in one sentence, the Court in Pressley
enunciated what appeared to be a constitutional rule.
Three points are worth flagging: First, Hayman, as we saw
56.
57.
58.

See id. at 377–78.
Id. at 381 (alteration in original).
Id.

above, held no such thing. Instead, the Court in Hayman
expressly avoided the question whether § 2255 was
constitutional,59 holding that the district court had simply
misconstrued the scope of its authority to fashion post-conviction
relief.60
Second, there is an element of Justice Stevens’s analysis that
seems tautological: under section 23-110(g), a defendant was only
precluded from pursuing a federal habeas petition if his motion for
local post-conviction relief was both “adequate” and “effective” in
testing the legality of his detention. Thus, as a statutory matter, a
defendant was entitled either to habeas, or to an adequate and
effective substitute. So the only constitutional question the
Pressley Court decided was whether Congress can replace habeas
corpus with adequate and effective substitutes (which the Court
answered in the affirmative). The Court said nothing at all about
whether the replacement of habeas corpus with an inadequate or
ineffective substitute would necessarily violate the Suspension
Clause; under section 23-110(g), just as under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
that question simply could not ever arise.
Finally, although the requirement that the substitute remedy
be “adequate” and “effective” came from the D.C. Code, as opposed
to the Suspension Clause, the Court went on reach the question of
D.C. law—whether, in Pressley’s case, the local post-conviction
remedy was in fact an “adequate” and “effective” substitute.
Rejecting the argument that Article I judges, as a general matter,
could not be trusted to decide federal constitutional questions,61

59. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952) (“Under
such circumstances, we do not reach constitutional questions. This Court will
not pass upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress where the question
is properly presented unless such adjudication is unavoidable, much less
anticipate constitutional questions.”) (footnote omitted).
60. See id. at 223–24 (“We conclude that the District Court erred in
determining the factual issues raised by respondent's motion under Section
2255 without notice to respondent and without his presence. We hold that the
required hearing can be afforded respondent under the procedure established
in Section 2255.”).
61. See Pressley, 430 U.S. at 382–83 (citing Palmore v. United States,
411 U.S. 389, 410–22 (1973)). Justice Stevens also noted that defendants in
Pressley’s position still had two opportunities for Article III review—to the
Supreme Court on direct appeal from his conviction, and to the Court again
on appeal of the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief under section
23-110(g). See id. at 382 n.16.

the Court noted that there were no specific allegations of
insufficiency in Pressley itself. Thus:
[W]e have no occasion to consider what kind of showing
would be required to demonstrate that the § 23-110
remedy is inadequate or ineffective in a particular case,
or whether the character of the judge’s tenure might be
relevant to such a showing in a case presenting issues of
extraordinary public concern.62
In short, then, Pressley held that the mere presence of an
Article I judge, by itself, was not enough to render the remedy
provided by section 23-110(g) “inadequate” or “ineffective.” As
such, Pressley was therefore not entitled to pursue habeas relief in
the federal district court.63 The Court said nothing about what
would constitute an “inadequate” or “ineffective” substitute, and it
also did not say that such a substitute would necessarily violate
the Suspension Clause; at the heart of the decision was the
statutory safety valve, i.e., that section 23-110(g) expressly
reserved access to habeas corpus if the post-conviction remedy
proved “inadequate” or “ineffective.”
In that regard, the majority opinion in Pressley is curiously
cursory, for one might assume that those two points are related—
that a court’s analysis of whether a particular remedy is an
“adequate” substitute for habeas corpus might depend to some
degree on whether a negative holding would raise a serious
constitutional question. Because of the language of section 23110(g), however, Pressley did not need to address any of these
weighty questions.
III. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES AFTER PRESSLEY

For two decades, Swain v. Pressley languished in obscurity.
Congress made no new attempts to provide a substitute remedy
for habeas corpus, and the significance (or lack thereof) of the
Court’s discussion of the limitations on such legislation went
62. Id. at 383 n.20.
63. Concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice Burger—joined by
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist—would have upheld section 23-110(g) on
the ground that the Constitution confers no right to habeas corpus to
collaterally attack a criminal conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction.
See id. at 384–86 (Burger, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).

effectively unnoticed in both the courts and the academy. Instead,
the potential significance of Swain v. Pressley did not become
apparent until the enactment of a series of statutes constraining
the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts. First, of course, was
the enactment of “AEDPA”,64 which dramatically reworked the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts both in cases
where prisoners sought to collaterally attack their state-court
convictions and in immigration cases. Also of significance is the
REAL ID Act of 2005,65 which reapportioned jurisdiction between
the Courts of Appeals (on direct review) and habeas proceedings in
the district courts. After surveying the role Swain v. Pressley
played in these sets of cases, Part III turns to the other major area
where Swain v. Pressley has been invoked—the detention of noncitizens as “enemy combatants” as part of the “war on terrorism,”
and Congress’s repeated attempts to constrain their access to the
federal courts.
A. Felker: Alternative Remedies and Habeas Appeals
One of the major changes wrought by AEDPA was the
creation of a “gatekeeper” system for “second or successive” federal
habeas petitions filed by state prisoners seeking to collaterally
attack their conviction.66 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), as added
by AEDPA, a petitioner seeking to file a second or successive
habeas petition challenging a state-court conviction must first
obtain permission from the relevant Court of Appeals.67 If the
court grants permission, the petitioner may proceed to file his
petition in the district court.68 If the court denies permission, the
statute expressly divests the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to
review that denial either as an appeal or via a writ of certiorari.69
In Felker v. Turpin,70 the Court considered whether AEDPA was
64. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)(codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
65. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
66. See generally Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1556–
62 (2000) (discussing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996)).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2001).
68. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
69. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(E).
70. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).

unconstitutional in so precluding the Court’s review.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on the
fact that Congress had not divested all of the Supreme Court’s
possible jurisdiction. Instead, Rehnquist invoked the Court’s socalled “original” habeas jurisdiction, which AEDPA had left
untouched:
Although § 2244(b)(3)(E) precludes us from reviewing, by
appeal or petition for certiorari, a judgment on an
application for leave to file a second habeas petition in
district court, it makes no mention of our authority to
hear habeas petitions filed as original matters in this
Court. As we declined to find a repeal of § 14 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 as applied to this Court by
implication [in Ex parte Yerger71], we decline to find a
similar repeal of § 2241 of Title 28—its descendant—by
implication now.72
Thus, because Felker could have sought habeas relief directly
in the Supreme Court once his application was denied, the Court
concluded that AEDPA’s gatekeeping provision did not violate the
Exceptions Clause of Article III.73
One might also characterize such a holding in Pressley’s
terms—i.e., that an “original” habeas petition in the Supreme
Court was an adequate and effective substitute for an appeal of
the denial of a habeas petition by the circuit court. As part of that
implicit conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the
substantive restrictions contained within AEDPA would not apply
to the Supreme Court’s review of an original habeas petition
(suggesting that there might be a problem if they did).74 Finally,
the Court also rejected Felker’s argument that AEDPA’s
gatekeeping provision violated the Suspension Clause, concluding
that Congress was acting well within its authority in codifying
necessary responses to the “abuse of the writ” by second and
successive petitioners.75
71. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
72. Felker, 518 U.S. at 661 (citations omitted).
73. See id. at 662–63.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 663–64. The majority then considered—and quickly
rejected—whether Felker would be entitled to original habeas relief. See id.
at 664–65.

Although the decision was unanimous, Justice Souter—joined
by Justices Stevens and Breyer—wrote separately “only to add
that if it should later turn out that statutory avenues other than
certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping determination were closed,
the question whether the statute exceeded Congress’s Exceptions
Clause power would be open.”76 In other words, from Justice
Souter’s perspective, if the alternative remedies turned out to be
ineffective, the constitutional question avoided in Felker would be
squarely presented.77
B. The REAL ID Act of 2005: Alternative Remedies and
Immigration Law
The harder questions raised by AEDPA vis-à-vis habeas
corpus went to its constriction of the substantive grounds for relief
in petitions filed by state prisoners,78 and its attempted cabining
of the federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction in immigration cases.79
In INS v. St. Cyr,80 the Supreme Court—following the lead of
virtually all of the circuits—adopted a somewhat counter-textual
interpretation of various provisions in AEDPA and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA)81 in holding that neither statute actually precluded
access to habeas corpus.82 Instead, the Court held that only the
76. Id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring).
77. Indeed, though it might seem perverse to rely on the availability of a
remedy (an “original” habeas petition) that has not been successfully invoked
in over eighty years, the Supreme Court has shown repeated awareness of
the possibility of such relief as a last resort. See, e.g., Padilla v. Hanft, 547
U.S. 1062, 1063 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari);
see also Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1478 (2007) (Stevens and
Kennedy, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting the potential
availability of original relief “[i]f petitioners later seek to establish that the
Government has unreasonably delayed proceedings under the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, or some other and ongoing injury” (citation omitted)).
78. See generally Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 665–70 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Noonan, J., concurring) (summarizing the problematic nature of postAEDPA review).
79. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension
Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555 (2002)
(discussing the background to St. Cyr and the larger constitutional issues).
80. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
81. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 20, 22, 28, 32, 42, 48, and 50 U.S.C.).
82. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299–305.

clearest statement of congressional intent would compel reaching
the serious constitutional questions that would arise if AEDPA
and IIRIRA precluded habeas review.83
Citing Swain v. Pressley, the majority in St. Cyr recognized
Congress’s power to displace habeas by providing adequate
alternative remedies in the courts of appeals.84 Nevertheless, the
Court’s holding suggested that the relevant provisions of AEDPA
and IIRIRA instead cabined the jurisdiction of the courts of
appeals to entertain petitions for review, shifting even more
immigration claims into the habeas jurisdiction of the district
courts (especially where “criminal aliens” were concerned).85 Thus,
in the ensuing years, there was mounting confusion over which
claims had to be pressed on direct review from the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), and which claims could only be
brought via habeas, a distinction that often turned on the very
facts in dispute in individual cases.86
Congress eventually responded through the REAL ID Act of
2005,87 the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of which attempted to
reverse the direction of immigration litigation.88 Thus, the Act
significantly expands the scope of the Courts of Appeals’
jurisdiction over petitions for review, while otherwise purporting
to preclude habeas petitions in any case where an immigrant
seeks to challenge a final order of removal.89 As new 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(D) provides:

83. See, e.g., id. at 301 n.13 (“The fact that this Court would be required
to answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in
and of itself a reason to avoid answering the constitutional questions that
would be raised by concluding that review was barred entirely.”). See also id.
at 326–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority’s rationale as “a
superclear statement, ‘magic words’ requirement”).
84. See id. at 314 n.38 (majority opinion) (“Congress could, without
raising any constitutional questions, provide an adequate substitute through
the courts of appeals.”).
85. Indeed, the same day as St. Cyr, the Court rejected the argument
that the courts of appeals could hear otherwise precluded claims as an
alternative to habeas. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001). See
generally Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the
REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 135 (2006).
86. See, e.g., Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 877–79 (9th Cir.
2003) (citing Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)).
87. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23 (2005).
88. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005).
89. See Neuman, supra note 85, at 136–41.

Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other
provision of this Act (other than this section) which limits
or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as
precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of
law raised upon a petition for review filed with an
appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this
section.90
In other words, the REAL ID Act of 2005 attempts to preclude
the habeas review relied upon in St. Cyr, substituting for it the
administrative review provided by the Courts of Appeals.91 As
Professor Neuman cogently asks:
Will direct review in the courts of appeals, as reframed by
the REAL ID Act, provide an adequate and effective
substitute for the writ of habeas corpus sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the Suspension Clause? The
answer depends on how the statutory structure will be
interpreted, and on what the Suspension Clause
requires.92
Thus, Professor Neuman highlighted as major areas of
concern “the effect of the thirty-day filing period in limiting the
availability of review of removal orders, the fact-finding capacity
of the courts of appeals, and the availability of review for
questions that arise after a removal order has been issued.”93
Professor Neuman was writing shortly after the REAL ID Act
was enacted, and subsequent developments in the courts have not
added too much to his cogent analysis. For the most part, the
courts of appeals have upheld the REAL ID Act against
constitutional challenge, focusing in almost every case on the

90. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (which
provides that such review is exclusive).
91. See, e.g., Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005)
(“These modifications effectively limit all aliens to one bite of the apple with
regard to challenging an order of removal, in an effort to streamline what the
Congress saw as uncertain and piecemeal review of orders of removal, divided
between the district courts (habeas corpus) and the courts of appeals
(petitions for review).”). The Conference Report for the statute even relies
upon Swain v. Pressley. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 175 (2005), 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 300.
92. Neuman, supra note 85, at 142.
93. Id.

REAL ID Act’s expansion of the courts’ jurisdiction to review the
administrative decision on direct appeal.94 Even when the
adequacy of the remedy has been open to some question, courts
have uniformly upheld the congressional displacement of habeas
corpus.95 In Part IV, I will return to the implications of some of
these cases.
Ultimately, though, the REAL ID Act was really just a
preview for the far more serious battle that was to come—the
question of providing a substitute remedy for individuals detained
in conjunction with the war on terrorism.
C. Hamdan: Alternative Remedies and Guantánamo, Part I
The scope of federal habeas jurisdiction has been at the heart
of the United States’ detention of non-citizen “enemy combatants”
at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, since the first detainees were
transferred there early in 2002.96 Although the lower courts
divided over whether the habeas statute extended to petitions
filed by the Guantánamo detainees,97 the Supreme Court, in
Rasul v. Bush, held that it did.98 Shortly after the Rasul decision,
and (arguably) motivated by the Court’s same-day decision in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,99 the government established “Combatant
Status Review Tribunals” (CSRTs) to provide administrative
review of the detainees’ claims that they were not “enemy
combatants” in the first place.100
94. See, e.g., Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2007); Jean-Pierre v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2007); Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen., 501
F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2007); Dalombo Fontes v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2007); De Ping Wang v. D.H.S., 484 F.3d 615 (2d Cir. 2007); Ramadan v.
Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2007); Mohamed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522
(8th Cir. 2007).
95. Indeed, two decisions have expressly invoked Swain v. Pressley. See
Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. D.O.J., 471 F.3d 315, 326 (2d Cir. 2006); Enwonwu v.
Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2006).
96. For an overview, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer,
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120
HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007).
97. Compare Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting
jurisdiction), and Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(same), with Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003) (sustaining
jurisdiction).
98. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
99. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality).
100. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,

But it was not until December 2005, after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld101—which challenged
the legality of the military tribunals established pursuant to
President Bush’s November 13, 2001 Military Order102—that
Congress attempted to cast the CSRTs as an “alternative” to
habeas corpus. Thus, in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,103
Congress attempted to restrict all judicial review of the detainees’
claims to two avenues: an appeal to the D.C. Circuit from the
CSRT,104 and, for certain detainees convicted by military
commission, an appeal to the D.C. Circuit from the final judgment
of conviction.105
Critically, the DTA provided that such review would be
450–51 (D.D.C. 2005).
101. For the grant, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 546 U.S. 1002 (2005)
(mem.). The district court had struck down the commissions, only to be
reversed by the D.C. Circuit. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152
(D.D.C. 2004), rev’d, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
102. Military Order of November 13, 2001—Detention, Treatment, and
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 FED. REG. 57,
833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
103. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005).
104. Under the DTA, the D.C. Circuit could only review:
(i) whether the status determination of the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal with regard to such alien was consistent with the
standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (including the requirement that
the conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of
the evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
Government's evidence); and (ii) to the extent the Constitution and
laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of such
standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. at 2742.
105. Again, the DTA limited the D.C. Circuit’s review to:
(i) whether the final decision was consistent with the standards and
procedures specified in [Military Commission Order No. 1, dated
August 31, 2005]; and (ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of
the United States are applicable, whether the use of such standards
and procedures to reach the final decision is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
Id. § 1005(e)(3)(D), 119 Stat. at 2743. Curiously, such appeals were only as of
right for defendants convicted and sentenced to death or to imprisonment for
10 years or more. For defendants receiving lesser sentences, the statute
provided that the appeal “shall be at the discretion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.” Id. § 1005(e)(3)(B)(ii), 119
Stat. at 2743.

exclusive. The statute otherwise purported to oust the habeas
jurisdiction of the federal courts—including the Supreme Court:
Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider. . .an application for
a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba . . . 106
In Hamdan, the majority sidestepped all questions as to the
constitutionality of the DTA’s exclusive review scheme, holding
that the statutory language was insufficiently clear concerning
whether the jurisdiction-stripping provision should apply to
pending cases (including Hamdan and most of the other petitions
brought by the Guantánamo detainees).107 Thus, the adequacy of
DTA review was irrelevant; on the Hamdan Court’s view, the DTA
did not preclude access to habeas corpus in all cases pending on
the date of the statute’s enactment.
Although the majority therefore did not reach the Swain v.
Pressley question, Justice Scalia—who concluded that the DTA’s
applicability to pending cases was beyond question—did. In his
view, “even if petitioner were fully protected by the [Suspension]
Clause, the DTA would create no suspension problem.”108 In
Justice Scalia’s view:
[T]he “standards and procedures specified in” Order No. 1
include every aspect of the military commissions,
including the fact of their existence and every respect in
which they differ from courts-martial. Petitioner’s claims
that the President lacks legal authority to try him before
a military commission constitute claims that “the use of
such standards and procedures,” as specified in Order No.
1, is “[in]consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States.” The D.C. Circuit thus retains jurisdiction
to consider these claims on postdecision review . . . Thus,
the DTA merely defers our jurisdiction to consider
petitioner’s claims; it does not eliminate that jurisdiction.
It constitutes neither an “inadequate” nor an “ineffective”
106. DTA § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. at 2742.
107. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2762–69 (2006).
108. Id. at 2818 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

substitute for petitioner’s pending habeas application.109
Whether Justice Scalia was correct or not, the DTA’s lack of
clarity ensured that the issue would be left for another day. As it
turned out, that day came rather quickly.
D. Boumediene and Bismullah: Alternative Remedies and
Guantánamo, Part II
In response to Hamdan, Congress enacted the MCA.110 In
addition to providing statutory authority for trials by military
commission and creating both trial-level courts and the Court of
Military Commission Review (CMCR),111 the MCA, in stronger
statutory language, attempted to make the CSRT review scheme
exclusive. Thus, section 7 of the MCA provides that:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States
who has been determined by the United States to have
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination.112
Although the MCA tweaks the appellate review of military
commissions in several significant ways,113 it effectively leaves
the DTA procedure intact with respect to judicial review of CSRT
decisions. Thus, under the DTA/MCA, individuals determined to
109. Id. at 2818–19 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
110. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
111. See id. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2621 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950(f)).
112. Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat at 2635 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)). The
statute further provides that, except as provided by the DTA:
no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider
any other action against the United States or its agents relating to
any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions
of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United
States and has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2).
113. See id. § 9, 120 Stat. at 2636–37. Although these amendments
appear to be technical, they solve several potential problems with the DTA’s
review provisions, including the DTA’s limitation to challenges to the “August
31, 2005” military commission order, its provision for discretionary appeals
for detainees receiving sentences of less than ten years, and its limitation on
applicability to those individuals detained at Guantánamo Bay.

be “enemy combatants” by CSRTs, but not subject to trial by
military commission, have only one appeal to the D.C. Circuit to
test the legality of their detention.114
Understandably, much of the focus on the MCA has been on
the constitutionality of its foreclosure of habeas jurisdiction, which
the D.C. Circuit addressed (and upheld) in Boumediene v. Bush.115
As Judge Randolph wrote for the majority, the Suspension Clause
does not protect non-citizens outside the territorial United States,
and so the MCA could not raise a constitutional question, even if
the substitute remedy it provided were inadequate.116 Judge
Rogers dissented as to the reach of the Suspension Clause,117 and
also concluded that the DTA/MCA remedy was constitutionally
inadequate.118 In her words:
Even if the CSRT protocol were capable of assessing
whether a detainee was unlawfully held and entitled to
be released, it is not an adequate substitute for the
habeas writ because this remedy is not guaranteed. Upon
concluding that detention is unjustified, a habeas court
“can only direct [the prisoner] to be discharged.” But
neither the DTA nor the MCA require this, and a recent
report studying CSRT records shows that when at least
three detainees were found by CSRTs not to be enemy
combatants, they were subjected to a second, and in one
case a third, CSRT proceeding until they were finally
found to be properly classified as enemy combatants.119
As Judge Rogers’s dissent underscores, the question whether
the MCA violates the Suspension Clause (to the extent it
applies)120 simply cannot be decoupled from questions as to the

114. One hard question is whether this provision applies to Ali Saleh
Kahlah Al-Marri, the one non-citizen held as an “enemy combatant” within
the territorial United States. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that it did not, Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160
(4th Cir. 2007), but that decision has since been vacated and is pending
rehearing en banc.
115. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
116. See id. at 988–92.
117. See id. at 995–1004 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 1004–07.
119. Id. at 1006 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
120. On why the Boumediene majority’s argument that the Suspension
Clause simply does not “apply” to Guantánamo is unconvincing, see Vladeck,

scope of review under the DTA/MCA, which a different panel of
the D.C. Circuit has considered in a series of opinions in
Bismullah v. Gates.121
In Bismullah “I,” the first appeal from a CSRT entertained by
the D.C. Circuit, the court rejected the government’s argument
that its review should be limited to the record produced by the
CSRT. Thus, as Chief Judge Ginsburg wrote for the panel:
[T]he record on review consists of all the information a
Tribunal is authorized to obtain and consider, pursuant
to the procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense,
hereinafter referred to as Government Information and
defined by the Secretary of the Navy as “such reasonably
available information in the possession of the U.S.
Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee
meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy
combatant,” which includes any information presented to
the Tribunal by the detainee or his Personal
Representative.122
The court went on to issue a series of orders governing the
means by which that record should be disclosed to counsel for the
detainees.123 The upside of the decision, though, was that review
of a CSRT appeal could include information outside the record.
The court then denied the government’s petition for rehearing in
Bismullah “II,” and a divided court denied rehearing en banc. Lest
there be any doubt about Bismullah’s significance, consider the
Supreme Court’s order granting certiorari in Boumediene: “As it
would be of material assistance to consult any decision in
Bismullah . . . currently pending in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, supplemental
briefing will be scheduled upon issuance of any decision in those
cases.”124
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the adequacy of DTA/MCA
review as a substitute for habeas corpus is perhaps the most
supra note 2.
121. See Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Bismullah v.
Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d
1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (mem.) (denying rehearing en banc).
122. See Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 180.
123. See id. at 189–91.
124. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (mem.).

important issue before the Court in Boumediene. But inasmuch as
the D.C. Circuit’s focus has been on the scope of the factual record
available for the court of appeals to review a CSRT decision, two
hard legal questions remain unanswered as of this writing:
First, does the DTA/MCA review encompass claims
challenging whether the detainee is subject to military detention
in the first place, let alone whether he is an “enemy combatant,”
as defined by applicable regulations (and, now, the MCA)? That is
to say, in challenging the procedures by which the CSRT arrives
at its determination that a detainee is an “enemy combatant,”
does the detainee have the ability to contest his amenability to
military detention (and military jurisdiction) in the first place?
Second, and separately, what is the significance of section 5 of
the MCA, which provides that “[n]o person may invoke the Geneva
Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or
other civil action or proceeding [against the United States or an
officer thereof] . . . as a source of rights in any court of the United
States or its States or territories”?125 If habeas corpus, as a
general matter, encompasses claims that detention is in violation
of a duly-enacted federal treaty,126 section 5 appears to preclude
review of one (important) ground by which the detention of some—
if not many—of the Guantánamo detainees might be unlawful.
One answer might be that Congress has the power to override
(or at least “un-execute”) treaties.127 But if not, then the harder

125. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5, 120
Stat. 2600, 2631.
126. See, e.g., Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887) (recognizing the power
to enforce treaties via the federal habeas statute); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(2008) (providing that habeas is available to prisoners “in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” (emphasis
added)). For an argument that habeas might therefore provide a cause of
action for the enforcement of “non-self-executing” treaties, see Stephen I.
Vladeck, Case Comment, Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Suspension
Clause After St. Cyr, 113 YALE L.J. 2007 (2004).
127. Such an argument might actually have more weight in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct 1346 (2008), which
appears to establish—for the first time—that “non-self-executing” treaties are
not binding federal law. See, e.g., id. at 1356-57 n.2. Even if the MCA was
intended to “un-execute” the Geneva Conventions, the Supreme Court has
traditionally required a clear statement from Congress when it intends to so
provide. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S.
243, 252 (1984); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933). Whatever
else might be said about the MCA, it is hardly “clear” on this point. See

question remains: whether the rule of Swain v. Pressley includes
the ability to press all possible claims that federal detention is
unlawful. Pressley itself, again, is of little help in providing any
answers.
IV. THE MYTH OF SWAIN V. PRESSLEY

Perhaps the most important characteristic of both Swain v.
Pressley and its predecessor, United States v. Hayman, is that the
statutes in question in each case had a habeas “safety-valve.”
Thus, if the alternative remedy provided by § 2255 or D.C. Code
section 23-110(g) proved to be “inadequate” or “ineffective,” the
statutes expressly contemplated the continuing availability of
habeas corpus to test the legality of detention.128 Judges
interpreting whether, in particular cases, the remedy had proven
“adequate” or “effective” to test the legality of the petitioner’s
confinement could therefore err on the side of caution, safe in the
knowledge that their decision had no constitutional implications,
and that habeas remained available in cases where the postconviction remedy was deemed insufficient.
The modern substitutes, in contrast, contain no such safety
valve. They create alternative remedies to habeas corpus, and
then provide that those remedies are exclusive. Thus, statutes
such as the REAL ID Act, the DTA, and the MCA, put judges in
an incredibly difficult position, with enormous pressure to
conclude that the substitute remedy provided by the statute is
“adequate” and “effective,” even when (as in Boumediene, perhaps)
there are considerable arguments to the contrary. Otherwise,
jurists considering such claims would be left to strike down the

Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva
Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 76–92
(2007).
128. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2008) (“An application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by
motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained . . . unless it also
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.”), with D.C. CODE § 23-110(g) (“An application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for
relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the
Superior Court or by any Federal or State court . . . unless it also appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention.”).

statute as violating the Suspension Clause, something the
Supreme Court has never done.129
As a result, in a number of cases arising under the REAL ID
Act, courts have already gone out of their way to conclude that the
restoration of direct review provided by the statute is an
“adequate” and “effective” substitute to habeas corpus, even when
the analysis seems somewhat counterintuitive. Thus, courts either
read into the statute the ability to consider claims that the statute
seems to preclude, or the court concludes that procedural
limitations on direct review do not actually serve to render such
review “inadequate” or “ineffective.”
The “myth” of Swain v. Pressley, then, is that it provides a
meaningful test to apply to circumstances wherein Congress has
attempted to provide an alternative remedy to habeas corpus. At
most, it provides a useful example of how Congress might legislate
responsibly to do so. But where Congress provides that the
alternative remedy is exclusive, even where it might be
inadequate or ineffective, the precedents suggest that Swain v.
Pressley, coupled with the constitutional avoidance canon, actually
distorts the courts’ analysis of the underlying issue.
*

* *

Whatever the merits of the underlying claims in the
Guantánamo cases, one point seems clear: If the Suspension
Clause does “apply to” or otherwise protect the Guantánamo
detainees, the central question before the Supreme Court will be
whether the remedy provided by the DTA/MCA constitutes an
“adequate” and “effective” substitute for habeas corpus. As the
above discussion demonstrates, Swain v. Pressley holds that
Congress has the power to so provide, but does little to elaborate
upon what “adequate” means. Moreover, because of constitutional
avoidance, the Court would be under enormous pressure to
conclude that the remedy is adequate and effective, even if it has
to adopt a strained interpretation to reach such a result.
At the very least, Boumediene provides the Court with an
opportunity to shed light on questions that were avoided in
Hayman, and only cursorily addressed in Pressley. And if the last
decade is any indication, clarification of the limitations on

129. The Court has shied away from even interpreting the Suspension
Clause. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 n.13 (2001).

Congress’s power to fashion alternative remedies to habeas corpus
will have ramifications far afield of Guantánamo and the war on
terrorism.
Given the unquestioned importance of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the Supreme Court’s repeated admonitions that “we
have consistently rejected interpretations of the habeas corpus
statute that would suffocate the writ in stifling formalisms or
hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic
procedural requirements,”130 it is long-past time for greater clarity
in delineating the limits on Congress’s power to displace the writ
with alternative remedies, lest that power become the means by
which Congress further “suffocate[s] the writ.”

130. Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973).

Legislative Reform of the State Secrets
Privilege
Robert M. Chesney*

Few issues more directly implicate the tension between the
rights of the individual and the government’s interest in
preserving national security than the state secrets privilege. This
has long been true, but in recent years the use of the privilege in
connection with high-profile litigation arising out of post-9/11
events and policies—most notably the activities within the United
States of the National Security Agency and the Central
Intelligence Agency’s rendition program—has generated an
unprecedented level of controversy, as reflected in litigation,1 in
the media,2 in the work of interest groups,3 and in legal
scholarship.4
This controversy has spurred interest in the
* Associate Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law. I wish to thank
Peter Margulies, David Logan, and the other symposium participants for
their thought-provoking comments and questions. A modified version of this
essay also appears as written testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in connection with a hearing held on February 13, 2008, titled
“Examining the State Secrets Privilege: Preserving National Security While
Protecting Accountability.”
1. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (denying motion to dismiss suit relating to NSA activity on state
secrets grounds); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007)
(affirming dismissal of rendition lawsuit on state secrets grounds).
2. Various newspapers have criticized the use of the privilege by the
Bush administration. See, e.g., Ben Wizner, Shielded by Secrecy, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2008, at A25; Editorial, Balance of Powers, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 3, 2008,
at E6; Editorial, Secrets and Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at A18.
3. See, e.g., The Constitution Project, Reforming the State Secrets
Privilege (May 31, 2007), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Reforming_
the_State_Secrets_Privilege_Statement.pdf; Robert E. Stein, Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities Association of the Bar of the City of
New York: Report to the House of Delegates, 2007 A.B.A. REVISED REPORT
116A, available at http://fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/aba081307.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National
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prospects for legislative reform of the privilege, culminating
recently in the introduction of the State Secrets Protection Act
(SSPA), a bill that would both codify and reform key aspects of the
privilege.5
The SSPA warrants attention both for narrow reasons
relating to the privilege itself, and broad reasons relating more
generally to the theory and practice of separation of powers. From
the narrow perspective of the state secrets privilege, the SSPA
would introduce a number of significant changes to current
practice, including limitations on the government’s ability to
justify its assertion of the privilege through ex parte submissions
and its ability to obtain dismissal at the pleading stage of suits
implicating state secrets. From the broader perspective of the
constitutional separation of powers, the SSPA raises difficult
questions concerning the power of Congress to legislate
substantive and procedural rules governing the disclosure of
information relating to national security and diplomacy, and the
degree of deference, if any, that judges should give to executive
officials in connection with factual assertions relating to such
topics.
I do not propose to resolve all of these issues in this essay. I
do hope, however, to enrich the ongoing debate by distinguishing
that which should be controversial in the SSPA from that which
should not be, by proposing less problematic solutions in a few
instances, and by highlighting the relationship of these somewhat
technical questions to broad background considerations of
constitutional structure.
I.

A THUMBNAIL SKETCH OF THE PRIVILEGE IN CONTEXT WITH RECENT
DEBATES

The privilege emerged gradually in U.S. jurisprudence during
the 1800s, reaching maturity only after the Supreme Court
acknowledged, elaborated, and applied it in its 1953 decision
Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1249-50 (2007); Carrie
Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2007); Amanda Frost, The
States Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931
(2007); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive
Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85 (2005); LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL
SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 212, 245
(2006).
5. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008).

United States v. Reynolds.6 In its modern form, the privilege
attaches when two conditions are met. It must be asserted with
the requisite formalities,7 and a judge must be persuaded by the
government’s assertion that disclosure of the information at issue
would pose a reasonable risk of harm to national security or
diplomacy.8 In making that determination, the judge typically
considers classified affidavits filed by the government on an ex
parte basis.9 In those cases in which the privilege is asserted with
respect to a particular document or item, the courts often will also
examine that item itself on an ex parte basis (though Reynolds
itself discourages courts from doing this when it can be avoided).10
Notably, the privilege is absolute rather than qualified and thus,
6. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). For an overview of the origins and evolution of the
privilege, see Chesney, supra note 4.
7. The privilege can only be asserted by the head of the executive
department charged with responsibility for the information in question, who
must undertake a personal review of the matter at issue. See Reynolds, 345
U.S. at 7-8.
8. See id. at 8-10. In the petitioner’s brief in Reynolds, the government
had advanced the view that the government official’s invocation of the
privilege should be binding upon the court, citing an array of separation of
powers arguments boiling down to a claim of exclusive executive authority
under Article II with respect to national security and diplomatic matters. See
Brief for the Petitioner at 15-16, Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (No. 21), 1952 WL
82378 (“Our position is that under the doctrine of separation of powers and
under the statute implementing this doctrine the courts have no power to
compel the heads of the executive departments to produce such documents . .
. .”). The court in Reynolds concluded, however, that “[j]udicial control over
the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.”
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10. And while it is true that elsewhere in the opinion
the court stated that the government’s position had “constitutional overtones
which we find it unnecessary to pass upon,” id. at 6, the conclusion the court
actually reached regarding the role of the judge in adjudicating an assertion
of the privilege nonetheless implicitly rejects the claim that judges
constitutionally are bound to accept executive conclusions with respect to the
harm that public disclosure might cause in a given case. See id. at 7-8.
9. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1306.
10. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-11. The Supreme Court in Reynolds was
dealing with a tort suit brought by widows whose husbands had died during
the crash of an Air Force B-29 that had been engaged in a flight to test
classified radar equipment. Id. at 2-3. The privilege issue arose when the
widows sought production of the Air Force’s post-accident investigative
report. Id. at 3. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that there was no need
to review the report itself to reach the conclusion that public disclosure of the
details of the radar equipment would be harmful to national security. See id.
at 10-11. Many years later it was revealed, however, that the report did not
actually contain details relating to the radar equipment in the first place.
See FISHER, supra note 4, passim.

once it attaches, it cannot be overcome.11
In some contexts application of the privilege merely tends to
limit discovery, as occurred in Reynolds itself.12 In such cases, the
significance of the privilege is relatively limited; it functions as a
ground for resisting discovery requests, permitting the suit to
continue on the basis of the non-privileged evidence that may be
available to the parties. In other contexts, however, the privilege
can be fatal to the litigation, as where the “very subject matter” of
the litigation itself constitutes privileged information or litigation
of the case otherwise necessitates disclosure of such information.13
The El-Masri extraordinary rendition lawsuit, for example, was
dismissed on this basis.14
As noted above, post-9/11 invocations of the privilege have
generated considerable controversy.15 By and large, criticisms of
the privilege tend to fall under either or both of two headings.
First, some contend that that the Bush administration elects to
resort to the privilege significantly more frequently than did its
predecessors.16 Framed in its most persuasive terms, this is a
harmful development not just because it forces more individual
litigants to suffer injustice in the name of the greater good, but
also because it tends to shield a greater swath of executive branch
conduct from judicial review and, hence, from democratic
accountability. Second, some contend that apart from numbers,
the Bush administration has used the privilege in a qualitatively
different way than its predecessors, invoking it as grounds for
dismissal at the pleading stage irrespective of whether the
plaintiff ever would require discovery of protected information
from the government in order to maintain his or her suit.17 Again,
the cost is framed in terms both of the burden on individual
litigants and society’s interest in ensuring that the judiciary is
available to check unlawful executive branch conduct.18
I addressed both lines of argument in an earlier article,
reaching conclusions unlikely to please either the administration

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007).
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
See id. at 11 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)).
See, e.g., El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 306.
See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Frost, supra note 4.

or its critics.19 On one hand, I concluded that the quantitative
and qualitative critiques are mistaken insofar as they attribute
the harms associated with the privilege to the Bush
administration in particular.20 Quantitative criticisms—that is,
claims that the Bush administration has misused the privilege by
invoking it with greater frequency than in the past—are
misguided primarily because the number of suits potentially
implicating the privilege vary from year to year, and thus there is
no reason to expect the number of invocations to remain constant,
or even relatively so, over time.21 Qualitative claims—that is,
claims that the Bush administration is attempting to use the
privilege in unprecedented contexts or in search of unprecedented
forms of relief—also do not withstand scrutiny.22 The fact of the
matter is that the privilege has had a similarly harsh impact on
litigants for decades.23
On the other hand, I also recognized that cautious legislative
reform might be possible and appropriate in this area, particularly
in light of the rule of law and democratic accountability issues
bound up in some uses of the privilege.24 “To say that the
privilege has long been with us and has long been harsh is not to
say . . . that it is desirable to continue with the status quo.”25 The
real question, then, is how to craft reforms that will improve the
lot of meritorious litigants and enhance compliance with the rule
of law while simultaneously preserving legitimate national
security and diplomatic interests.
II. THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REFORM THE PRIVILEGE

Before examining the particular ways in which the SSPA
seeks to achieve the aforementioned goals, it is worth pausing to

19. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1301-07.
20. See id. at 1307.
21. We also have no way of knowing with confidence how many privilege
invocations actually occurred in any given year, under this administration or
its predecessors. Many invocations do ultimately result in published judicial
opinions, but not all do so. Numerical claims therefore have to be taken with
a rather large grain of salt. I say that advisedly, having provided in my own
article a table identifying all of the published opinions adjudicating state
secrets claims between 1954 and 2006. See id. at 1315-32.
22. See id. at 1306-07.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 1308.
25. Id.

ask whether there are limits to the power of Congress to reform
the state secrets privilege.
Everyone agrees that there is a state secrets privilege, but
there is sharp disagreement with respect to its actual nature.
Those who favor reform tend to describe it as a mere evidentiary
rule adopted by judges through the common law process, a
conclusion suggesting plenary legislative power to amend or even
eliminate the privilege.26 From this perspective, the question of
legislative authority in this context is merely an extension of the
well-settled principle that Congress has “power under Article I,
Section 8 and Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution to
prescribe regulations concerning the taking of evidence in the
federal courts.”27
Others take the view that the privilege is not mere common
law creation, but instead a constitutionally-required doctrine
emanating from Article II, with the consequence that Congress
either cannot modify the privilege or at least is significantly
constrained in doing so.28 In this account, “the privilege is rooted
in the constitutional authority of the President as Commander in
Chief and representative of the Nation in foreign affairs to protect
the national security of the United States,”29 and “is not merely a
common law evidentiary privilege subject to plenary regulation by
Congress.”30

26. See, e.g., State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing
on Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Kevin S. Bankston) (“The
state secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege . . . well established in the
law of evidence, not in Constitutional law . . . it is well within Congress’s
prerogative to reform the common law of evidence by statute.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
27. State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing on
Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Hon. Patricia M. Wald).
28. See State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing on
Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Patrick F. Philbin).
29. State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing on
Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Hon. Patricia M. Wald).
30. Id.

The best explanation, arguably, incorporates both
perspectives. As a historical matter, there is little doubt that the
privilege emerged as a common law evidentiary rule, very much as
did the attorney-client privilege and similar rules that function to
exclude from litigation otherwise-relevant information in order to
serve a higher public purpose.31 It does not follow, however, that
the privilege has no constitutionally-required aspect. In at least
some circumstances, for example, the state secrets privilege
conceptually overlaps with executive privilege—a doctrine
explicitly derived from constitutional considerations.32
And
although executive privilege is merely a qualified rather than an
absolute privilege in most contexts, the Supreme Court did go out
of its way in United States v. Nixon to raise the possibility that the
answer might differ with respect to an assertion of executive
privilege pertaining to military or diplomatic secrets.33
In any event, let us assume for the sake of argument that the
state secrets privilege serves constitutionally-protected values
relating to the executive branch’s national security and diplomatic
functions.
Would it follow that Congress is disabled from
regulating in this area? It is not obvious that it would. Indeed,
some forms of regulation would seem clearly to remain within the
control of Congress in the exercise of the authorities mentioned
above, even if other forms of legislation might prove more
controversial. The key is to distinguish between legislation
regulating the process by which privilege assertions are to be
adjudicated, and legislation that functions to override or waive the
privilege itself.
31. For an account of the emergence of the privilege, highlighting the role
that influential treatise writers played in constructing and spreading
awareness of the concept in the 1800s, see Chesney, supra note 4, at 1270-80.
For a different perspective, one that emphasizes the British experience with a
comparable doctrine, see William G. Weaver & Danielle Escontrias, Origins
of the State Secrets Privilege (on file with author), available at http://
works.bepress.com/william_weaver/1/.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-13 (1974);
Attorney General Janet Reno, Memorandum for the President: Assertion of
Executive Privilege for Documents Concerning Conduct of Foreign Affairs
with Respect to Haiti (Sep. 20, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov
/olc/haitipot.htm; Morton Rosenberg, CRS Report for Congress: Presidential
Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent
Developments (Sep. 17, 2007), at 1, available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy
/RL30319.pdf.
33. 418 U.S. at 706, 710.

At a minimum, Congress should have authority to regulate
the process through which assertions of the privilege are
adjudicated. This would include, for example, the power to codify
prerequisites to the assertion of the privilege (such as the
Reynolds requirement that the privilege be invoked by the head of
the relevant department based on personal consideration of the
matter)34 or to require particular procedures to be followed by the
court in the course of resolving the government’s invocation.
Whether Congress should be able to override the privilege once it
attaches—for example, by compelling the executive branch to
choose between conceding liability in civil litigation and disclosure
of privileged information in a public setting—is far less clear. That
question may be academic, however, at least so far as the SSPA is
concerned. A close review of the bill suggests that most if not all
of its provisions are best viewed as process regulations.
It does not follow, of course, that all the changes contemplated
in the SSPA are wise. On the contrary, there are at least a few
elements in the bill that go too far in seeking to ameliorate the
impact of the privilege. Congress may have the authority to adopt
these measures notwithstanding the competing constitutional
values involved, but it is advisable to emphasize less-intrusive
reform options whenever possible.
III. THE SSPA IN COMPARISON TO THE STATUS QUO

Perhaps the best way to come to grips with the SSPA is to
compare its provisions to current practices relating to the
privilege, with an eye towards distinguishing that which is mere
codification of the status quo from that which constitutes a
substantial change.
It helps, moreover, to conduct this
comparison in a way that corresponds to the conceptual sequence
of questions a judge must resolve when confronted with an
invocation of the privilege. This approach demonstrates that a
substantial part of the SSPA merely codifies practices that either
are required or at least are common under the status quo, and
should not be objectionable now. That said, there are a few
aspects of the legislation that constitute significant breaks with
current practice.
Those provisions warrant more careful
consideration.
In a few instances, there are alternative
approaches that might strike a better—and more sustainable—
34.

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953).

balance among the competing equities.
A. The Formalities of Invoking the Privilege
The threshold question in any state secrets privilege scenario
is whether the privilege has been invoked with the requisite
formalities. In theory, such requirements serve to reduce the risk
that the privilege will be invoked gratuitously. The SSPA does not
introduce any significant innovations under this heading, but
rather codifies existing practice.
Under the SSPA, “the United States shall provide the court
with an affidavit signed by the head of the executive branch
agency with responsibility for, and control over, the state secrets
involved explaining the factual basis for the claim of privilege.”35
This closely tracks current practice. Reynolds requires a “formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by
that officer.”36 Both the SSPA and current practice, moreover,
limit invocation of the privilege to the United States.37
B. The Substantive Test for Application of the Privilege
The substantive scope of the state secrets privilege is a
function of three variables: subject matter, magnitude of harm
that might follow from public disclosure, and the degree of risk
that such harm might be realized. Though there is room for
disagreement on this point, the best view is that the SSPA does
not depart significantly from the status quo with respect to any of
these three variables.
Consider first the question of subject matter. Under the
SSPA, information must relate to “national defense or foreign
relations” in order to qualify for privilege.38 The status quo at
least arguably encompasses a similar range of topics.39
The next question is whether the SSPA tracks the status quo
with respect to the magnitude of harm that might follow from
35. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. § 4054(b)
(2008).
36. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8.
37. Compare S. 2533, § 4054(a) with Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
38. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4051.
39. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1315-32 (specifying nature of
information at issue in published state secrets adjudications between 1954
and 2006).

public disclosure of the information in question. The SSPA frames
the inquiry in terms of “significant harm.”40
There is no
comparable terminology in Reynolds, nor has any standard
terminology on this question of calibration emerged in that case’s
progeny. Nonetheless, it is difficult to view the “significant harm”
standard as a meaningful change from the status quo. Reynolds
itself admonished that the privilege was “not to be lightly
invoked,”41 implying that de minimus harms should not come
within its scope.
The third issue under this heading concerns the probability
that disclosure of the information actually will precipitate the
feared harm. Under both the status quo and the SSPA, that
variable is framed in terms of “reasonable” risk.42
C. Authority to Decide Whether the Privilege Attaches: The Role
of the Judge and the Question of Deference
In its brief to the Supreme Court in Reynolds, the government
had contended, that “the power of determination is the Secretary’s
alone.”43 That is to say, the government argued that courts
cannot and should not second-guess the determination of the
relevant executive branch official that disclosure of the
information in question would be harmful.44 Among other things,
the government reasoned that executive officials are far better
situated than judges to assess the probable consequences of a
disclosure.45 On the other hand, unchecked authority to assert
the privilege naturally would give rise to assert the privilege in
40. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4051.
41. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
42. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4051 (“[T]he term ‘state
secrets’ refers to any information that, if disclosed publicly, would be
reasonably likely to cause significant harm to the national defense or foreign
relations of the United States.”) (emphasis added). Reynolds actually is vague
with respect to the question of how strong the likelihood of harm from
disclosure must be (most of its discussion of risk concerns the distinct
question of whether and when judges should personally examine allegedly
privileged documents en route to making a decision on the privilege), but
courts nonetheless appear to understand Reynolds to require a reasonablerisk standard. See, e.g., El–Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th
Cir. 2007).
43. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 8, at 47.
44. See id.
45. See id. (stating that the government’s position rests in part “on
reasons of policy arising from the fact that the department head alone is truly
qualified and in a position to make the determination”).

circumstances where the substantive standard is not met, whether
out of an excess of caution or even as a shield for misfeasance.
The Supreme Court ultimately gave greater weight to that
offsetting concern, holding in Reynolds that “[j]udicial control over
the evidence in the case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers,” and insisting that the judge have the final say
with respect to whether the privilege attaches.46
This general principle is no longer seriously contested, but the
relative authority of the judge and the executive branch
nonetheless continues to be a matter of controversy because of
lingering questions regarding how much deference the judge
should give to the executive’s claim, even if the claim is not
strictly binding.47 In El-Masri, for example, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the “court is obliged to accord the ‘utmost
deference’ to the responsibilities of the executive branch” when
determining the harm that might follow from a disclosure.48 Such
deference was owed both “for constitutional reasons” and for
“practical ones: the Executive and the intelligence agencies under
his control occupy a position superior to that of the courts in
evaluating the consequences of a release of sensitive
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit stated in Alinformation.”49
Haramain that it “acknowledge[d] the need to defer to the
Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security and
surely cannot legitimately find ourselves second guessing the
Executive in this arena.”50 In light of such statements, some
might argue that judges have final authority to determine the
applicability of the privilege only in formal terms, while the
mechanism of deference shifts that authority back to the executive
branch in practical terms.
The SSPA codifies the status quo insofar as it plainly
contemplates that the judge shall have the ultimate responsibility
for determining whether the privilege should attach.51 In its
46. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10.
47. See, e.g., El-Marsi v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2007)
(“The Executive bears the burden of satisfying a reviewing court that the
Reynolds reasonable-danger standard is met.”).
48. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
49. Id.
50. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th
Cir. 2007).
51. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. § 4054(e)
(2008) (describing the judge’s role in determining whether the privilege

current form, however, it makes no attempt to regulate the degree
of deference, if any, that judges should give to the executive
branch’s judgment regarding the consequences of a disclosure.
D. The Mechanics of the Judge’s Review: Evidentiary Basis for
the Ruling
1. When Specific Documents Are in Issue
The paradigm state secrets privilege scenario involves an
attempt by a private litigant to obtain a particular item during
discovery, as occurred with respect to the post-accident
investigative report in Reynolds.52 When the government claims
privilege in that context, it typically justifies its assertion with an
explanatory affidavit from the official asserting the privilege.53
But should the judge also review the item in question in the
course of determining whether the privilege should apply?
The SSPA departs from the status quo to a small extent with
respect to this issue. Under the SSPA, judges not only can, but
must review the actual item of evidence.54 Under the status quo,
in contrast, they are expressly admonished in Reynolds to be
reluctant to require such in camera production unless the litigant
has shown great need for the document.55
The SSPA’s requirement of in camera disclosure reflects a
lesson derived from the original Reynolds litigation. Famously,
the plaintiffs in Reynolds had sought production of an Air Force
post-accident investigative report in connection with their tort
suit, prompting the government to invoke the state secrets
privilege on the ground that the report contained details of
classified radar equipment.56 The Supreme Court concluded such
details could not be disclosed publicly, which is a plausible
conclusion under the substantive test described above.57 Although
attaches).
52. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3 (1953).
53. See, e.g., Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1202 (referring to “classified and
unclassified declarations” filed by the Director of National Intelligence and
the Director of the NSA).
54. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(d)(1) (requiring the
United States to submit for the court’s review not only an explanatory
affidavit but also all evidence as to which the privilege has been asserted).
55. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-12.
56. See id. at 3-4.
57. Id. at 12.

it did not follow that the accident report necessarily contained
such details, the court assumed that it did and found the privilege
applicable on that basis.58 Notoriously, it turned out much later
that the report did not contain substantial details about the
radar.59 Thus conventional wisdom holds that the privilege ought
not to have been invoked on that basis, something that almost
certainly would have been revealed by judicial inspection of the
document.60
Reynolds thus has come to stand for an important, commonsense proposition: where the privilege is asserted in connection
with a particular document the government seeks to withhold
from discovery, the judge should ensure that the item in question
actually contains the allegedly-sensitive information said by the
government to warrant application of the privilege.
It is
important to note, however, that this type of mistake does not
seem to occur frequently under the state secret privilege today.
Notwithstanding language in Reynolds cautioning judges not to
conduct in camera inspections unnecessarily, courts today
routinely do examine documents personally in an effort to
determine whether the privilege should attach.61 The change that
would be wrought by the SSPA on this issue, accordingly, is to
remove any question as to whether this should be done.
2.

When Abstract Information Is in Issue

Not every invocation of the privilege arises in connection with
requests for production of specific documents or records capable of
being inspected. The government may also have occasion to
58. Id.
59. See FISHER, supra note 4, 167-68.
60. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-12. But see Examining the State Secrets
Privilege: Protecting National Security While Preserving Accountability, 110th
Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Nichols] (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Carl Nichols, House Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ola/views-letters/110-2/02-26-08-s2449-sunshinelitigation-act.pdf (arguing that the report in privilege invocation in Reynolds
was proper because the report contained technical details relating to the
operations of B-29 bombers, separate and apart from details relating to the
radar equipment); Herring v. United States, No. Civ.A.03-CV-5500-LDD,
2004 WL 2040272, at *5-6, *9 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding that the Air Force had
not committed fraud in Reynolds because the B-29 data justified application
of the privilege), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005).
61. See, e.g., Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203 (“We reviewed the Sealed
Document in camera . . . )”.

invoke the privilege in connection with discovery requests seeking
protected information in the abstract, as with an interrogatory or
a deposition question. In such cases there is no specific document
or item for the court to review, other than the explanation offered
by the government in the form of an affidavit from the official
asserting the privilege. In that respect, the SSPA’s requirement
that such an affidavit be submitted merely codifies the status
quo.62
3. When Pleading Would Require Revelation of Privileged
Information
A similar scenario arises at the pleading stage when the
allegations in a complaint would reveal state secrets if admitted or
denied. Here, however, the SSPA introduces a useful innovation
that functions to put off the question of whether the privilege
properly applies to the information at issue. Under SSPA §
4053(c), the government may simply plead the privilege in
response to such allegations, rather than admitting or denying
them as otherwise required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(b).63 The allegation(s) in question presumably then would be
deemed denied,64 without any need for the judge at that stage to
consider whether the privilege in fact attaches to the information
at issue. Arguably the government could have achieved the same
result under the status quo by objecting on privilege grounds to
particular allegations in a complaint, though it is not clear that
the government ever pursued such a course. In any event, this
aspect of the SSPA at a minimum is a useful clarification, even if
not an outright alteration of what is permitted under current
62. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(b). In that sense,
the SSPA’s adoption of an affidavit requirement is unexceptionable. But
there is a problem with respect to the related requirement that the classified
affidavit be accompanied by an unclassified version for public release: one
might read that provision to preclude the judge from being able to order the
unclassified document to be sealed. As a general proposition, it seems unwise
to deprive (or to risk depriving) judges of discretion to seal any particular
document in this sensitive context.
63. Compare State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4053(c) with FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(b).
64. The text currently provides that “[n]o adverse inference shall be
drawn from a pleading of state secrets in an answer to an item in a
complaint.” State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4053(c). This language
should be amended to more clearly state that a privilege plea should be
treated as a denial for pleading purposes.

practice.
E. The Mechanics of the Judge’s Review: Ex Parte and In
Camera Procedures
When reviewing the government’s invocation of the privilege,
should the judge permit the government to submit some or all of
its explanation on an in camera, ex parte basis? In current
practice, the government routinely submits classified documents
and affidavits on an ex parte basis in the course of asserting the
privilege.65 The court alone reviews these submissions; they are
not made available to opposing counsel.66 As a result, the process
of determining whether the privilege attaches is in an important
sense non-adversarial.
This approach is optimal from the
perspective of ensuring against an improper disclosure of the
information, but it is far from optimal from the perspective of
ensuring against inaccurate determinations by the court.
Both values are substantial. The question, therefore, is
whether there are solutions that would sufficiently preserve the
government’s interest in security while simultaneously reducing
the risk of error by introducing elements of adversariality in the
review process. In a major departure from the status quo, the
SSPA seeks to accomplish precisely this.
1.

Ex Parte Proceedings

The SSPA would break with current practice significantly by
limiting the ability of the government to justify its invocation of
the privilege through ex parte submissions. First, § 4052(a)(3)
recognizes that the judge has discretion as to whether ex parte
submissions will be allowed at all, subject to the “interests of
justice and national security.”67 There is little doubt that judges
in most cases would exercise this authority wisely.68 Even if the
65. See Chesney, supra note 4, at Appendix.
66. See El–Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
67. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4052(a)(3). As an alternative
to precluding ex parte filings, § 4052(a)(2) permits the judge to order the
government to provide the other litigants with a “redacted, unclassified, or
summary substitute” of its ex parte submissions. State Secrets Protection Act,
S. 2533, § 4052(a)(2). This authority in practice may turn out to track status
quo procedures in which the government typically provides both a classified
affidavit justifying its assertion of the privilege and also an unclassified
version that can be made available to opposing parties and to the public.
68. The comparable provision in the Classified Information Procedures

judge decides to permit ex parte filings in the first instance,
however, § 4052(c)(1) appears to ensure that before ruling upon
the government’s invocation of the privilege, the otherwise ex
parte filings will be subject to at least some degree of adversarial
testing:
A Federal court shall, at the request of the United States,
limit participation in hearings conducted under this
chapter, or access to motions or affidavits submitted
under this chapter, to attorneys with appropriate security
clearances, if the court determines that limiting
participation in that manner would serve the interests of
national security. The court may also appoint a guardian
ad litem with the necessary security clearances to
represent any party for the purposes of any hearing
conducted under this chapter.69
There is considerable wisdom in injecting some degree of
adversariality into the ex parte portion of the privilege
adjudication process. The trick, however, is to manage this
without undermining the overriding goal of ensuring that there is
no disclosure of the assertedly-protected information unless and
until the judge determines that it is not in fact protected. Under
the SSPA approach, the parties’ own attorneys might be given
direct access to the government’s most sensitive secrets prior to
determining whether they are in fact privileged. This goes too far,
assuming that there are less intrusive alternatives available that
might also address the accuracy considerations described above.
And, as noted above, § 4052(c)(1) actually contains such a middle
Act (CIPA) permits but does not on its face require the government to submit
its filings ex parte. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 3, § 4 (1980). That said, it
appears that no court has ever barred the government from making its
application ex parte. See DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS § 24.7 (2007) (observing that
“[a]lthough this procedure denies the defendant the ability to make a
meaningful challenge to the government’s arguments, no court in a published
decision has prevented the government from filing its Section 4 application ex
parte and in camera.”). This suggests that judges can be trusted not to act
rashly, but perhaps also that there is little point in providing an option to bar
such filings. CIPA § 6 hearings, in contrast, are required to be in camera but
are not normally ex parte. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(a). Such hearings
arise in a distinguishable context, however, insofar as the defendant in that
scenario already possesses classified information, information that the
government seeks to suppress.
69. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4052(c)(1).

ground alternative, in the form of a guardian ad litem
mechanism.70
The guardian ad litem approach has the virtue of ensuring at
least some degree of adversarial testing, while reducing the risk of
a leak (to the parties themselves or to the public at large) in
comparison to having the party’s own attorneys involved. For this
reason, other countries are experimenting with precisely this
approach in analogous contexts. Canada, for example, recently
adopted a “special advocate” system in which attorneys are
appointed for the specific purpose of contesting otherwise ex parte
information used by the government in connection with removal of
non-citizens from the country.71 The U.K. has a comparable
system, originally designed for comparable immigration
removals.72 Unlike the SSPA’s guardian mechanism, however,
the Canadian system does not allow the court to appoint just any
attorney to this sensitive role, but instead requires the appointee
to be chosen from a pre-determined list of screened and qualified
individuals.73
In order to strike a more reasonable and sustainable balance
between the competing equities at stake in this sensitive context,
§ 4052(c) should be amended to focus attention on the guardian
mechanism as a solution to the adversariality problem (that is to
say, the more extreme alternative of ordering the government to
provide access directly to the parties’ attorneys should be
removed). At the same time, the guardian mechanism should be
amended to create a pre-selected list of attorneys eligible for such
an appointment. Such a list could be created by the Chief Justice
of the United States, for example, and following the Canadian
example might also involve substantial training for the potential
appointees.74 This solution is not ideal from the litigant’s
perspective, but even from that viewpoint it does constitute a
70. See id.
71. See An Act to Amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to
another Act, B. C-3, 39th Parliament, 2nd Sess. (2007) (as reported by Comm.
on Pub. Safety and Nat’l Sec., Dec. 10, 2007) available at http://www2.
parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Bills/392/Government/C-3/C-3_2/C-3_2.PDF.
72. Special Immigration Appeals Act, 1997, c. 68, § 6 (Eng.).
73. See supra note 71, at B, C-3, § 85.
74. See Richard Foot, Lawyers Line Up To Become Special “Terror”
Advocates, NAT. POST., Feb. 17, 2008, available at http://www.nationalpost
.com/news/canada/story.html?id=315669.

substantial improvement over the status quo.75
2.

In Camera Proceedings

Beyond the question of whether filings and arguments will
take place on an ex parte basis is the question of whether and
when privilege litigation should take place in camera, without
public access.76 Under the status quo, judges typically employ a
blend of ordinary and in camera procedures when adjudicating an
assertion of the privilege.77
The impact SSPA § 4052(b)(1) would have on this practice is
unclear but it will likely not constitute a significant departure
from the status quo. This section establishes a default
presumption that hearings concerning the state secrets privilege
will be conducted in camera, and permits public access only “if the
court determines that the hearing relates only to a question of law
and does not present a risk of revealing state secrets.”78
F. The Mechanics of the Judge’s Review: Special Masters
One of the core difficulties associated with judicial review of
the state secrets privilege involves the question of expertise.
Critics of the status quo argue that judges in practice merely
rubber-stamp executive invocations of the privilege because the
judges do not feel confident that they can evaluate the executive’s
claims regarding the impact of disclosure on security or
diplomacy,79 while others draw on the same notions to contend
that judges should in fact be extremely, if not entirely,
deferential.80 And certainly it is true that a federal judge on
average will not be as well-situated in terms of experience and
fact-gathering resources as the Director of National Intelligence or

75. It is worth noting, in that regard, that nothing comparable is
available to criminal defendants—whose very liberty is at stake—in the
analogous context of § 4 proceedings under the CIPA, in which ex parte
review is the rule. See supra note 68.
76. An in camera procedure is not necessarily ex parte, though the two
concepts are conflated often. See, e.g., CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 4, § 6(a).
77. See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d
1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting courts consideration of ex parte
submissions in addition to public filings).
78. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4052(b)(1).
79. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 167-68.
80. See Nichols, supra note 60.

the Secretary of State to assess such impacts.81 At the same time,
Reynolds itself acknowledges that the judge has ultimate
responsibility for ensuring the validity and propriety of privilege
assertions, lest the privilege become a temptation to abuse.82
The tension between these values appears intractable at first
glance, but there are mechanisms for ameliorating the problem.
Some scholars point out, for example, that judges currently have
authority to appoint expert advisers such as special masters under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 and independent experts under
Federal Rule of Evidence 706.83 Section 4052(f) of the SSPA
would clarify that such authorities in fact can be used in
connection with state secrets litigation, an approach that may
prove particularly valuable in cases involving assertion of the
privilege with respect to voluminous materials.84
G. Consequences Once the Privilege Attaches: Substitutions
SSPA § 4054(f) provides that where the privilege attaches,
courts should consider whether it is “possible to craft a nonprivileged substitute” that provides “a substantially equivalent
opportunity to litigate the claim or defense.”85 Drawing on the
model set forth in the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA) § 6,86 the SSPA goes on to specify several options that
might be used in that context, including an unclassified summary,
a redacted version of a particular item of evidence, and a
statement of admitted facts.87 Where the court believes that such
an alternative is available, it may order the United States to
produce it in lieu of the protected information.88 The U.S. must
comply with such an order if the issue arises in a suit to which the

81. See, e.g., Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203 (“[W]e acknowledge the need
to defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security
and surely cannot legitimately find ourselves second guessing the Executive
in this arena.”).
82. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
83. See, e.g., Meredith Fuchs & G. Gregg Webb, Greasing the Wheels of
Justice: Independent Experts in National Security Cases, 28 A.B.A. NAT’L
SECURITY L. REP. 1, 3-5 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/nat
security/nslr/2006/NSL_Report_2006_11.pdf.
84. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4052(f).
85. Id.
86. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. App. 3, § 6.
87. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533m, 110th Cong. § 4052(f) (2008).
88. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(f)(1)-(3).

U.S. is a party (or a U.S. official is a party in his or her official
capacity), or else “the court shall resolve the disputed issue of fact
or law to which the evidence pertains in the non-government
party’s favor.”89
It is not clear that any of these provisions depart from what a
court could order even in the absence of the SSPA. But in any
event, it is certainly advisable to codify the judge’s obligation to
exhaust options that would permit relevant and otherwiseadmissible information to be used without actually compelling
disclosure of that which is subject to the protection of the
privilege.
H. Consequences Once the Privilege Attaches: Ending Litigation
The most controversial aspect of current doctrine may well be
the sometimes fatal impact it has on litigation once the privilege is
found to attach to some item of evidence or information. As
discussed earlier, this phenomenon is not new. The government
has moved to dismiss (or in the alternative for summary
judgment) in these circumstances with some frequency since the
1950s, and such motions frequently have been granted.90 But the
use of this approach in high-profile post-9/11 cases—particularly
those relating to NSA surveillance and to rendition—has proven
especially controversial, drawing attention to the fact that
application of the state secrets privilege can have harsh
consequences for litigants even where the litigants allege unlawful
government conduct.91 Accordingly, one of the most important
questions associated with the SSPA is whether it would limit the
set of circumstances in which application of the privilege proves
fatal to a suit.
1.

When Denial of Discovery Precipitates Summary Judgment

Under current doctrine, application of the privilege can prove
fatal to a suit in more than one way. First, the privilege may
function to deprive a litigant of evidence needed in order to create
89. Id. § 4054(g). No sanction is provided by the SSPA for scenarios in
which the U.S. is merely an intervenor. See id.
90. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1306-07, 1315-32.
91. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (denying motion to dismiss suit relating to NSA activity on state
secrets grounds); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007)
(affirming dismissal of rendition lawsuit on state secrets grounds).

a triable issue of fact, and hence survive a summary judgment
motion.
Let us assume that a judge has denied a discovery request
based on the state secrets privilege. If it so happens that the
plaintiff has no other admissible evidence sufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact with respect to a necessary element of his or
her claim, this discovery ruling necessarily exposes that plaintiff
to summary judgment under Rule 56.92 In that setting, the Rule
56 ruling conceptually is subsequent to the state secrets ruling,
rather than based directly on it. The discovery ruling is no less
fatal to the plaintiff’s case for that, however, and if the motions
happen to be adjudicated simultaneously, it might even appear
that the court has granted summary judgment “on” state secrets
grounds. It does not appear that the SSPA is intended to alter the
outcome in this scenario, though it might be wise to clarify that
this is so in the text of the legislation.
2. When the Government Must Choose Between Disclosing
Protected Information and Presenting a Defense
A second scenario that can prove fatal to a claim under
current doctrine arises when the government would be obliged to
reveal protected information in order to present a defense to a
claim. This scenario differs from the first in that the plaintiff may
be able to survive summary judgment with the evidence it has
assembled. The problem here is not the plaintiff’s efforts to
acquire evidence, then, but the fact that the government must opt
between presenting a defense and maintaining the secrecy of
protected information. In that setting, current doctrine provides
for dismissal on state secrets grounds.
In some senses, the SSPA codifies this result. Under § 4055 a
judge may dismiss a claim on privilege grounds upon a
determination that litigation in the absence of the privileged
information “would substantially impair the ability of a party to
pursue a valid defense,”93 and that there is no viable option for
creating a non-privileged substitute that would provide a
“substantially equivalent opportunity to litigate” the issue.94 But

92. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
93. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4055(3).
94. Id. § 4055(1). For what it is worth, § 4055(2) also requires a finding
that dismissal of the claim or counterclaim “would not harm national

§ 4055 also mandates that the judge first review “all available
evidence, privileged and non-privileged” before determining
whether the “valid defense” standard has been met.95 This
suggests that the judge is not merely to assess the legal
sufficiency of the defense (assuming the truth of the government’s
version of events, in a style akin to adjudication of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion), but instead is to resolve the actual merits of the defense
(including resolution of related factual disputes).96 If that is the
correct interpretation, it would seem to follow that § 4055
contemplates a mini-trial on the merits of the defense.97
The problem with this approach is that the court may or may
not permit the use of ex parte and in camera procedures in this
context.98 Denying either protection (but especially the latter)
would put the government on the horns of a dilemma, forcing it to
choose between waiving a potentially-meritorious defense, and
revealing privileged information to persons other than the judge
even in the face of the judge’s conclusion that the information is
subject to the privilege. This approach is questionable from a
policy perspective insofar as it would force the government to elect
between partial or even complete exposure of concededly protected
information and the loss of a meritorious defense and hence
potential civil liability (including injunctive as well as financial
consequences). And for similar reasons, this approach presumably
will precipitate constitutional objections as well. At a minimum,
therefore, § 4055 should be amended to provide that the judge’s
assessment of the merits of a defense must take place on an in
camera basis. Any move away from ex parte procedures in this
context, moreover, should be limited to the modified guardian-adlitem mechanism recommended above. Beyond that, it might also
be wise to structure the judge’s review of the defense at issue in
terms of a Rule 12(b)(6)-style legal-sufficiency inquiry rather than
as a mini-trial.99

security.” Id.
95. See id. § 4055.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

3. When the Very Subject Matter of the Action Implicates State
Secrets
One scenario remains. Under current doctrine, “some matters
are so pervaded by state secrets as to be incapable of judicial
resolution once the privilege has been invoked.”100 The idea here
is not that certain discovery should be denied to the plaintiff, nor
that the government has a defense it could present if only it were
not necessary to preserve certain secrets. Rather, the notion is
that some types of claims are not actionable as a matter of law
because they inevitably would require disclosure or confirmation
of state secrets in order to be properly adjudicated. Under this
approach, a suit may be dismissed at the pleading stage even if
the plaintiff could have assembled sufficient evidence to create
triable issues of fact on all the necessary elements of a claim, and
even if the government is not prevented by its secrecy obligation
from presenting a defense to that claim. Not surprisingly, this is
the most controversial dismissal scenario in current doctrine.
The SSPA overrides this result in the narrow sense that it
permits suits to survive that under current doctrine would have
been dismissed at the very outset. First, as noted above, the
SSPA permits the government to avoid affirming or denying
sensitive fact allegations by citing the privilege in its responsive
pleading.101 Second, § 4053(b) plainly states that “the state
secrets privilege shall not constitute grounds for dismissal of a
case or claim” unless, as described above, the government has a
“valid defense” it would present but for privilege concerns.102
Taken together, these provisions require cases in what might be
called the “very subject matter”103 category to go forward at least
to the discovery stage.
Ultimately, however, the SSPA will not necessarily spare such
suits from dismissal. During the course of discovery, the privilege
remains wholly functional as a shield against production of
protected documents or information, which may expose the
plaintiff to summary judgment in the end. The SSPA expressly
authorizes the government to use the privilege as a sword,
100. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007).
101. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4053(c).
102. Id. § 4053(b).
103. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (citing Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)).

moreover, enhancing the prospects for dismissal in the “very
subject matter” scenario.104 Specifically, § 4054(a) states that the
government may not only use the privilege to resist discovery, but
also “for preventing the introduction of evidence at trial.”105 Much
turns on the interpretation of this language.
This language appears to allow the government to move to
suppress otherwise-admissible evidence in the plaintiff’s
possession, on state secrets grounds. In that case, a plaintiff who
is otherwise able to assemble sufficient evidence to create a triable
issue of fact without discovery from the government, nonetheless,
may find himself or herself without critical evidence at trial,
necessitating judgment in the government’s favor. The only
question then would be whether the government must await the
plaintiff’s case-in-chief in order to exercise this suppression power,
setting the stage for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule
50(a), or if it, instead, could exercise this option prior to trial and
thus proceed under Rule 56.106 The language of § 4054(a)
suggests the former, but if the option is to be allowed at all it
makes far more sense from an efficiency perspective to permit pretrial resolution.107
Section 4054(a) accordingly should be
amended to say as much.108
The important point is that the “sword” aspect of § 4054(a)109
will likely produce an end result comparable to that under the
current doctrine’s “very subject matter” line of cases.110 The
difference, which is by no means unimportant, is that under the
SSPA the litigation process will proceed through the pleading and
discovery stages, with the privilege being wielded as a scalpel
rather than a bludgeon. Combined with the other procedural
elements of the SSPA—including especially the role of special
104. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(a).
105. Id.
106. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) and 56.
107. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(a).
108. The statute also needs to be amended to ensure that the government
has an adequate opportunity to use the privilege in this fashion, meaning
that some form of notice will have to be given to the government by a party
intended to make use of information that may be subject to the privilege.
This precise dilemma is addressed in the criminal prosecution context by
CIPA § 5, which has been upheld against constitutional challenge on many
occasions. Presumably a comparable procedure can be added to the SSPA.
109. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(a).
110. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (citing Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)).

masters, guardians-ad-litem, and the emphasis on finding
substitutions
when
possible—the
net
effect
of
this
“proceduralization” of the privilege should ensure more careful
tailoring to the facts and evidence in a particular case. This in
turn should reduce the risk of erroneous application (and thus
injustice). Though this benefit will come at the cost of increased
litigation expense and complexity, it is a cost that is most likely
worth bearing. At the very least, the experiment is worth
undertaking.
IV. CONCLUSION

The SSPA will not entirely please either critics or supporters
of the state secrets status quo. By subjecting the privilege to a
more rigorous procedural framework, the SSPA may reduce the
range of cases in which the privilege is found to apply, and in
some respects it may cause marginal increases in the risk that
sensitive information will be disclosed (though with the
amendments proposed above such risks would be significantly
diminished). On the other hand, even under the SSPA, the
privilege will continue to have a harsh impact on litigants who
bring claims that implicate protected information: discovery will
still be denied, complaints will still be dismissed, and summary
judgment will still be granted. Such tradeoffs are inevitable,
however, in crafting legislation designed to reconcile such
important public values as national security, access to justice, and
democratic accountability. The SSPA has its flaws, to be sure, but
subject to the caveats noted above it marks an important step
forward in the ongoing evolution of the state secrets privilege.

Zealous Lawyering Succeeds Against
All Odds: Major Mori and the Legal
Team for David Hicks at Guantánamo
Bay
Ellen Yaroshefsky*

David Hicks, an Australian citizen, was detained in
Afghanistan in December of 2001 and brought to Guantánamo
Bay (Gitmo) in January of 2002. He was denied access to military
and civilian lawyers for nearly two years, but eventually was
permitted to have counsel only because the government believed
that a lawyer would help secure a guilty plea,1 and David agreed
not to discuss the conditions of his captivity.2 Eventually, more
than five years later, and as a consequence of an international
political campaign, he was charged and pleaded guilty to material
support of terrorism for his association with al Qaeda operatives
in Afghanistan. He was the first Guantánamo detainee to have
his case presented to a military commission. He obtained an
agreed-upon lenient sentence, served an additional six months,
and was returned to Australia. He is now out of custody with
restrictions that remain in force for one year from the date of
*
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1. Interview with Joshua Dratel, President, Joshua L. Dratel, P.C., in
N.Y., N.Y. (Jun. 2007).
2. Raymond Bonner, Australian Parents Have New Hope for U.S.Detained Son, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2004, at A8. For a thorough analysis of
the proceedings against Hicks, see LEX LASRY, THE UNITED STATES V. DAVID
MATTHEW HICKS: FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT OBSERVER FOR THE LAW
COUNCIL
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sentence; the most notable restriction is that he will not speak
publicly about the conditions of confinement.
This essay describes the remarkable lawyering on behalf of
David Hicks and demonstrates that zealous and strategic
advocacy in the face of severe constraints can result in a
successful resolution, even in a fundamentally unfair system.
Operating within a structure of ad hoc procedures designed to
produce guilty verdicts (termed a “rigged system” by many
observers3), Hicks’ lawyers engaged in advocacy using a carefully
coordinated legal, political, and media strategy that remained
fine-tuned as the legal and political landscape shifted. Despite
their firm and continual stance that the system was unauthorized
by law and fundamentally unjust, Hicks’s lawyers successfully
maneuvered that system for their client’s benefit. This essay
focuses upon Hicks’s most visible and publicly touted attorney,
Major Michael “Dan” Mori of the Marine Corps.4
Military lawyers are not typically perceived as being among
the “brave band” of lawyers and others who go to the edge of the
law for a “cause.”5 Yet, in this and many other cases, military
lawyers were often at the edge of the law because zealous
representation of their clients demanded such action.6 Their jobs
3. Mary Cheh, Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems? The
Case of the Military Commissions, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 375 (2005).
4. Hicks was represented by a number of military and civilian lawyers
at various stages during the five years of his confinement. U.S. Military
lawyers included Jeffery D. Lippert (2003-2005), and Rebecca Snyder (20062007). Australian attorneys include Steve Kenny (2003-2005), David McLeod
and Michael Griffin (2006-2008). Joshua Dratel, discussed throughout this
essay, was, along with Mori, a principal strategist and zealous advocate
throughout the representation.
5. Lawyers for the Center for Constitutional Rights filed the first legal
challenge to the Guantánamo detentions when it was highly unpopular to do
so. See, e.g., CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 54-55 (Austin Sarat &
Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006); AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
(1998); Adam Liptak & Michael Janofsky, Scrappy Group of Lawyers Shows
Way for Big Firms, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at A14; Philip Shenon, Suit To
Be Filed on Behalf of Three Detainees in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at
A11.
6. Before 2003, military lawyers were summarily fired for refusing to
comply with the conditions imposed upon their representation of
Guantánamo prisoners. See, e.g., James Meek, US Fires Guantánamo
Defence
Team,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Dec.
3,
2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/03/Guantánamo.usa.
See also

forced them to confront profound ethical dilemmas, rarely
confronted by their civilian counterparts. While lawyers in all
terrorism-related cases face significant challenges in their ability
to represent their clients diligently, competently and zealously,
the limitations on representation before military commissions
after 9/11 are unparalleled in United States history.7 Under such
a military commission system, Mori and other military lawyers
were often unable to obtain evidence or share it with their clients.
They were subject to a panoply of other restrictions that would be
unthinkable in a typical court martial or case or courtroom in the
United States.8
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Military Lawyering at the Edge of the Rule of Law in
Guantánamo: Should Lawyers Be Permitted To Violate the Law?, 37 HOFSTRA
L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (discussing representation at Guantánamo by
Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift, Lieutenant Commander Matthew
Diaz, and Major Michael Mori).
7. There is an expanding literature about challenges to ethical
lawyering in terrorism cases in federal courts, courts martial, and military
commissions. See generally Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a
Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism
Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 81 (2003-2004); Joshua L. Dratel,
Sword or Shield? The Government’s Selective Use of Its Declassification
Authority for Tactical Advantage in Criminal Prosecutions, 5 CARDOZO PUB.
L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 171 (2006); Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of
Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist
Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173 (2003); Abbe Smith, The Bounds of Zeal in
Criminal Defense: Some Thoughts on Lynn Stewart, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 31
(2002); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Introduction to Symposium, Secret Evidence and
the Courts in the Age of National Security, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS
J. 1 (2006). See also David Luban, “The Vindication of Michael Mori,”
Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/vindication-ofmajormori.html (April 1, 2007) (last visited May 15, 2008) (discussing the
conflict of interest that arises when military defense lawyers are threatened
with prosecution); Ben Wizner, “A Tailor-Made Guilty Plea,” ACLU Blog,
http://blog.aclu.org/index.php?/archives/159-A-Tailor-Made-Guilty-Plea.html
(March 27, 2007) (last visited May 15, 2008) (discussing Hicks defense
attorney Josh Dratel’s refusal to sign a commitment for compliance with the
Guantánamo Military Commissions’ rules). See also United States v. Reid,
214 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass. 2002) (striking down requirement that defense
lawyers sign onto SAM’s as a precondition for access to their client); Saudi
Convicted in Embassy Bombing Sues, WASH. POST, May 9, 2002 (on the
monitoring of attorney-client communications in over a dozen cases). For a
riveting account of GTMO lawyering, see generally CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH,
EIGHT O’CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN
GUANTÁNAMO BAY (2007).
8. One “glaring condition” of the military commissions noted by the
Supreme Court in its Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision is that “[t]he accused and

These commissions were so fundamentally flawed that in
June 2006 the Supreme Court would find in its landmark
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision that they were both in violation of
the Uniform Military Code of Justice and Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.9 It found that specific flaws of structure and
procedure included the admissibility of hearsay and other
evidence gained through coercion, and the fact that the defendant
could be barred from hearing all evidence against him or even be
barred from his own trial.
The Court found that the
[commissions] were not “regularly constituted courts” as
understood by the Geneva Conventions.10
In 2003, a team of lawyers including Mori believed the
military commissions to be fundamentally flawed, but they could
not be assured of vindication by a court. It would be three years
before the commissions would be struck down by the U.S.
Supreme Court and replaced by yet another roundly criticized
system. The Hicks team had a client to represent with the goal of
his return to his native country.
This essay traces the lawyering of Major Mori and the Hicks
team beginning in 2003, when it was an uphill struggle even to
secure a hearing. It necessarily details, in chronological order, the
defense team’s legal, political, and media strategy in confronting a
government that claimed, as it still does today, that it could

his civilian counsel may be excluded from, and precluded from ever learning
what evidence was presented during, any part of the proceeding that either
the Appointing Authority or the presiding officer decides to ‘close.’” Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577, 614 (2006). See also Reply to Opposition to
Petition for Rehearing app. at iv, Al Odah v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 3067
(2007) (No. 06-1196) [hereinafter Abraham] (Declaration of Stephen
Abraham), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/
Al%20Odah%20reply%206-22-07.pdf.
9. 548 U.S. 577, 577. The ruling states that Hamdan's military
commission “lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures
violate both the [Uniform Code of Military Justice] and the Geneva
Conventions.” Id. at 567.
10. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham, a Judge Advocate General
officer who had submitted a declaration in a previous suit in 2002, stated
that, in [their proceedings], “[w]hat were purported to be specific statements
of fact lacked even the most fundamental earmarks of objectively credible
evidence.” Abraham, supra note 8, at vi. Moreover, Lt. Colonel Abraham
noted that there was pressure from above to reach an “enemy combatant”
verdict in the tribunals, which were often composed of personnel with limited
or no intelligence experience. Id. at vii.

indefinitely hold detainees without access to a hearing or trial;
and it addresses the ethics issues these lawyers confronted in
ultimately securing an extremely favorable resolution for David
Hicks.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

David Hicks, a twenty-four year old Australian national, had
a fairly mundane background and history for a man described by
President George W. Bush’s administration as among “the worst
of the worst.”11 Born and raised in Adelaide, Australia, Hicks
would later be described as a “wanderlust in search of a
purpose.”12 He did poorly in school and got expelled for trouble
with drinking and drugs. He drifted around Australia, working a
number of jobs, including stints as a kangaroo skinner and a hand
on cattle ranches. He tried to join the Australian army but was
rejected. After fathering two children with an aboriginal woman,
he set off to travel the world.13 He went to Japan where he did
very little except watch television. One of the ironies of his
circumstances was that the only English language television
station was CNN International which covered extensively the
Balkan wars between the Serbs and Kosovars. This was the first
time that David Hicks became interested in international affairs
and his own brand of heroism:
I just had something inside that said I had to go and do
that, like a spur of the moment sort of thing. . . . I found
out there was one group . . . training in northern Albania.

11. Katty Kay, No Fast Track at Guantánamo Bay, BBC NEWS, Jan. 11,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2648547.stm (quote attributed
generally to U.S. officials); Some Guantánamo Prisoners Will Be Freed,
Rumsfeld Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at A14; Neil A. Lewis & Eric
Schmitt, Cuba Detentions May Last Years, NYTIMES.COM, Feb. 13, 2004,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A06E5D8113AF930A25751
C0A9629C8B63&scp=1&sq=cuba+detentions+may+last+years&st=nyt). An
admiral quoted in a Defense Department press release said, “They are the
worst of the worst, and if let out in the street, they will go back to the
proclivity of trying to kill Americans and others.” Linda D. Kozaryn, U.S.
Gains Custody of More Detainees, DEFENSELINK, Jan. 28, 2002,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43813.
12. Raymond Bonner, Australia Terrorism Detainee Leaves Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2007, at A7.
13. Id.

They were going into Kosovo and I realised that maybe,
at a wild guess, I could go there and try it and I did it. To
me that was doing the impossible.14
In 1999 Hicks went to Albania, joined the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) and completed their basic military training.15 By the
time Hicks got to Albania, the war was nearly over and he was
sent home when the peace accord was in place. When he returned
to Australia, he began to investigate and later convert to Islam.
He soon left Australia for Pakistan with names of contacts to
travel around Asia.16 Traveling to Afghanistan, he was invited to
attend an Al Qaeda training camp. Beginning in January of 2001,
he trained at various Al Qaeda camps. He spouted anti-U.S.
rhetoric, supporting the Taliban. He claimed he met Osama bin
He left Afghanistan on
Laden more than twenty times.17
September 9, 2001, went to Pakistan to visit a friend, and watched
the 9/11 attacks on television.18 He had no advance knowledge of
the 9/11 attacks.19 He later told the Australian Federal Police,
“It’s not Islam, is it? It’s like the opposite of what I was . . .
wanted to do. Meant to help the people, stop oppression. And
they did the opposite.”20
On September 12, 2001, Hicks decided to return to
Afghanistan.
He later said that he wanted to gather his
belongings. “It might sound stupid, but I’ve got lots of nice Islamic
clothes I’d been saving. There’s lots of money in them with stuff I
could have had home.” Had he not gone back, he says, “I would
have lost my Islam.”21
Once in Afghanistan, Hicks joined Al Qaeda forces in the
Kandahar airport. He was given an automatic rifle and, in
14. Debbie Whitmont, The Case of David Hicks, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP.,
Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2005/s1494795.htm.
15. See LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 6.51 (these facts—stipulated to by the
prosecution and defense—were the basis for David Hicks’s ultimate guilty
plea).
16. David Hicks: Nothing but an Echo, CLARK CMTY NETWORK, Jan. 22,
2007, http://securingamerica.com/ccn/node/10638 [hereinafter Nothing but an
Echo].
17. He later told Australian federal police that he was “just trying to
make himself sound important by boasting.” Id.
18. See LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 9.4.
19. Id.
20. Whitmont, supra note 14.
21. Id.

October 2001, sent to guard a Taliban tank.22 After moving to
other locations with Al Qaeda forces, he decided to leave the
country for Pakistan when the United States closed the borders.
He sold his weapons to pay for a taxi to Pakistan.23 He was
picked up by the Northern Alliance24 which sold him to the United
States for several thousand dollars.25
Hicks was held on a Navy ship and then blindfolded and
taken by chopper to an unknown place for interrogation. He
claimed that he was brutally beaten and tortured.26 In January
2002, he was brought to Guantánamo Bay, where the United
States claimed that he and others could be held indefinitely
without charge.27 His treatment was severe, but less so than
other detainees—David was white, Australian, and spoke
English.28 He became the first plaintiff in what ultimately
became the landmark case of Rasul v. Bush, which established
that Guantánamo detainees had the right to judicial review of
their detention.29
In December, 2003, nearly two years after his capture, Hicks
was referred for a military commission. The authorities believed
that Hicks would plead guilty, thereby legitimating the
commissions.30 They permitted him access to counsel solely for
the purpose of entry of a guilty plea.31

22. LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 6.64.
23. Id.
24. Id. at ¶¶ 46-49.
25. Bonner, supra note 12.
26. “New Evidence” Backs Hicks’s Torture Claim, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP.,
Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200510/s1494779.htm
(citing August 5, 2004 affidavit filed by David Hicks’s attorneys).
27. LASRY, supra note 2, at 3, 5 (citing the United States government’s
position in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,466 (2004)).
28. Whitmont, supra note 14.
29. Hicks was represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights and
its cooperating attorney, Joseph Margulies.
See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
30. Interview of Maj. Michael Dan Mori, United States Marine Corps, in
N.Y., N.Y. (May 3, 2007).
31. See infra note 39.

LAWYERING IN THE “LEGAL BLACK HOLE”32

Major Michael Dan Mori of the U.S. Marine Corps is a nowcelebrated military officer who was detailed to represent David
Hicks.33 In June 2003 Mori returned from his station in Hawaii to
do so. Hicks was also represented by FAC (Foreign Attorney
Consultant) Australian attorney Steve Kenny.34
Mori entered the case in a “court martial mindset.”35 He
expected that rules and procedures would be fair and that he
would be able to obtain the facts and apply the law as he had been
trained in the JAG corps to understand it. He was sorely
surprised as he got into the commission system. The entire
structure of the military commissions was, as he put it, “set up
There was no
with a vested interest in convictions.”36
independent judge; hearsay was permitted, as was evidence

32. The press uses this term extensively. See, e.g., Editorial: A Legal
Black Hole; Guantánamo Detainees Deserve Habeas Relief, L.A. TIMES, May 1,
2007; Editorial: Black Hole: By Stripping Detainees of Legal Rights, U.S. Has
Created a Judicial Conundrum, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 8, 2007.
33. This was Mori’s sole assignment for nearly four years until the case
was resolved. Mori traveled to Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Australia nearly ten
times to conduct investigations and engage in other activities on behalf of
Hicks.
34. The FAC’s were essentially Australian equivalents of military Judge
Advocate General (JAG) officers and were allowed to “consult” with Hicks,
subject to the U.S. Defense Department’s rules on security restrictions. For
the Defense Department’s outline of these rules, see Press Release, United
States Department of Defense, U.S. and Austrailia announce agreements on
Guantánamo
Detainees
(Nov.
25
2003),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=5818. The types
of pressures and constraints imposed on Hicks’s American lawyers were
echoed, if not amplified, for their Australian counterparts. Australian
attorneys McLeod and Griffin, who replaced Kenny in 2005, had to sign
lengthy agreements with the U.S. military including a provision saying that
they would be extradited to the U.S. for prosecution if they were found to be
violating commission rules on classified information. Kenny had signed a
similar document in 2003, but was able to get the extradition clause taken
out. McLeod said of the agreement, “I’ve never seen anything like it. It goes
on for pages. It was very intimidating but the problem was, if you didn't
agree to sign it, you weren’t going to get access to David Hicks.” Fenella
Souter, Keep Quiet or Face Extradition to the U.S.: Hicks Lawyers Made To
Sign Gag Order, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 23, 2006,
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/keep-quiet-or-face-extradition-to-ushicks-lawyers-made-to-signgag-order/2006/09/22/1158431897922.html.
35. Mori Interview, supra note 30.
36. Id.

obtained under coercion. Attorney client conversations could be
monitored.37 As Mori said:
Stepping into it, I thought I was going to be involved in
courts martial. I have plenty of experience dealing with
court martials and that’s the laws we would be using.
Unfortunately what I found out [was] that we were in
something different, something completely made up and
resurrected from 1492.38
As many lawyers recognized, “basically there were no rules.
They made them up as they went along.”39 The highly respected
Independent Observer for the Law Council of Australia, who was
a former justice on the Supreme Court of Victoria, would later call
these “ad hoc” procedures and term the ultimate proceedings
“shambolic.”40 Critical flaws included: (1) a person could be
convicted based on secret evidence and summary evidence; (2)
“evidence” could be based on rank hearsay (e.g., interrogators
reading statements from other detainees whether obtained
through abuse, coercion or torture) and without any defense
access to those witnesses; (3) military officers were the judges and
juries and the rules for who served on the judicial panels were
arbitrary; (4) judges on the panel other than the presiding judge
need not be lawyers; (5) civilian counsel could not readily gain
access to the accused, witnesses, and evidence; (6) attorney client
discussions could be monitored; and (7) counsel was restricted
from speaking to the press.41
Representation before such a body presented the most
profound of ethical dilemmas. How could a lawyer represent
anyone in such a system? This was a front burner issue for the
criminal defense bar, particularly just after March 2002 when the
procedures for the operation of the commissions were established

37. Id.
38. Transcript from an interview with Maj. Mori on Enough Rope, with
Andrew Denton, Australian Broadcasing Corporation, (Aug. 14 2006)
available at http://www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcripts/s1709428.htm.
39. Interview with attorney Joshua L. Dratel, in N. Y., N.Y. (Jun. & Nov.
2007) and Interview with attorney Joshua L. Dratel, in Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 2007) [hereinafter Dratel Interviews].
40. LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 5.64.
41. See Dratel Interview, supra note 39; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
577, 614. See also Abraham, supra note 8; note 42, below.

by the Secretary of Defense.42 Significantly, in August 2003, the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)
issued an Ethics Opinion declaring that it was unethical for a
civilian lawyer to represent a detainee before the commissions
with procedures that deny fundamental due process.43 Mori,
however, was detailed to represent Hicks. Mori and Steve Kenny
visited him in December 2003.
The appointing authority
permitted this attorney client meeting solely for the purpose of
discussing a plea bargain and imposed restrictions on Mori’s
ability to speak about the case with the media. Despite the press’s
intense interest in the Hicks case, Mori did not make public
statements. He was cautious.44
Mori had no experience in cases involving the law of war. He
sought assistance. Shortly after this first Guantánamo visit,
civilian defense attorney, Joshua Dratel, joined the Hicks defense
team.45 Dratel, then co-chair of the NACDL committee on
military tribunals, was a highly respected civilian criminal
defense lawyer who had handled the “embassy bombing” case in
New York and marshaled expertise on terrorism cases.46 He had
previously obtained security clearance and thus, was readily
available to consult with Hicks.47
The government attempted to impose restrictions on Dratel’s
representation of Hicks—the precise terms that led to the NACDL
Ethics Opinion that it was unethical to represent Gitmo detainees.
42. See Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain NonUnited States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 32 C.F.R. § 9 (2008).
The military commissions were created by Presidential Order on Nov. 13,
2001. See Press Release, The White House, President Issues Military Order
(Nov.
13,
2001)
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html. See also Williams Michael, Jr. &
Joseph Margulies, Trying Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 59 BENCH
& B. MINN. 20 (Feb. 2002).
43. Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 0304
(Aug.
2003),
available
at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/ethicso
pinions/$file/ethics_op_03-04.pdf. See Cheh, supra note 3; see also Lasry,
supra note 2.
44. Mori Interview, supra note 30.
45. “Civilian defense counsel” are private lawyers who apply to and must
be approved by the Office of Military Commissions Chief Defense Counsel to
defend detainees (along with military counsel) in the commissions.
46. See U.S. v. Bin Laden, 160 F. Supp. 2d 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
47. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.

It presented Dratel with an affidavit that required him to
acknowledge that his attorney-client consultations could be
monitored, that all of his work on the case had to be completed at
Guantánamo, and that the defense team would not include
consultants. Dratel refused to sign.
The government then
negotiated the terms of the affidavit. Two days later, it withdrew
nearly all conditions. The government backed down because it
wanted Dratel to consult Hicks so the guilty plea could be
secured.48
Dratel and Mori visited Hicks on January 9, 2004.49 No
doubt, this case was unique and could not be treated like any
other criminal case where a lawyer seeks to discuss disposition of
criminal charges. On the one hand, the lawyers believed that a
plea bargain might, as the government hoped, provide some
legitimacy to the commission system and Hicks’s detention.50
They were loathe to serve as justification for this system. On the
other hand, they were zealous advocates for an individual client,
and as any zealous defense lawyer in a criminal case, had to
discuss the potential benefit of a plea bargain.51 The lawyers
acknowledged this classic potential conflict, discussed it, and then
proceeded to discuss plea bargaining with Hicks. Of course, as
48. Id. The affidavit, known as Annex B, also contained a condition that
defense counsel acknowledged that he would not be present during a hearing
on the use of classified information. Dratel ultimately signed an affidavit
that indicated that he could challenge his lack of presence at such a hearing.
49. Dratel Interview, supra note 39. Dratel was the first civilian lawyer
permitted access to a client at Guantánamo Bay.
50. The government, expecting that a plea bargain with terms
prohibiting Hicks from talking about conditions of his confinement, hoped
this information would not become public knowledge. Dratel Interview,
supra note 39. See p.492 infra regarding conditions of Hick’s ultimate plea
bargain.
51. This potential conflict between the lawyer’s representation of an
individual client and the lawyer’s personal and political goals—often termed
“cause lawyering”—was hardly unique. Criminal defense lawyers confront
such potential conflicts in many settings. It is amplified in the Guantánamo
cases where the system is viewed as, and ultimately adjudged to be,
fundamentally unfair. See SARAT & SCHEINGOLD, supra note 5; Mark
Denbeaux & Christa Boyd-Nafstad, The Attorney-Client Relationship in
Guantánamo Bay, 30 FORDHAM. INT’L L.J. 491, 491 (2007); Margareth
Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1195, 1195 (2005); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7. Ultimately there
was no conflict of interest. See p.495 infra.

there were no existing criminal charges, there could not be a full
discussion of disposition until the charges were concretized which
they expected would be in April 2004. Hicks and the lawyers soon
realized that a guilty plea was not an appropriate resolution, as
there appeared to be no options to secure release within the
military commission system, nor could the lawyers wait for the
resolution of the civil cases that challenged the legality of the
military commissions.52 “It would take years,” Mori later said,
“and David would still languish at Guantánamo subject to abuse
that is now well documented.”53
With no meaningful recourse in the military commissions,
Hicks’ legal team shifted their focus to the broader political
context. They strategized that the route to securing Hicks’s
release would be primarily through the court of public opinion.
They would, of course, continue to zealously advocate in the
commissions and in the United States courts, but they knew that
the Hicks case had to be brought to the Australian people, as well.
Only they could put pressure on their government to acknowledge
the necessity for a meaningful legal process that conformed to
requirements of law.54
It was daunting to overcome the public’s perception of David
Hicks because there was a strong and loud sentiment in Australia
52. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
53. Mori Interview, supra note 30. Mori’s assessment was borne out by
events. Despite Supreme Court rulings in Rasul v. Bush, 452 U.S. 466, and
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, many Guantánamo detainees still
languish without ability to appear in fair proceedings. See, e.g., David
Bowker & David Kaye, Guantánamo by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2007, at A15 (noting that as of publication, over three hundred detainees
remained at the camp, and not a single one had gone to trial); William
Glaberson, U.S. Mulls New Status Hearings for Guantánamo Inmates, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at A16 (placing number of detainees at 330). In early
February of 2008, the government announced military commission charges
against six “high value” detainees. See William Glaberson, 6 at Guantánamo
Said To Face Trial in 9/11 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2008, at A1. It has since
dropped the case of one, Mohammed al-Qahtani, without explanation.
Qahtani’s military lawyer suspects this is because the evidence that would
have been used against him was “derived by torture.” William Glaberson,
Case Against 9/11 Detainee Is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008. The
proceedings in Qahtani’s case clearly demonstrate the “heads I win, tails you
lose” logic of the military commissions: The fact that he is not being tried
means simply that Qahtani can continue to expect indefinite detention at
Guantánamo.
54. LASRY, supra note 2, at 16-17.

that Hicks was a dangerous and high-level terrorist.55 Ultimately
the blame for this sentiment was put on the United States’ release
of a photo of Hicks with a rocket launcher that implied that he
was at a terrorist training camp. There was widespread and
consistent publication of this photo in Australia. In fact, the photo
was from his 1999 training with NATO allies in Albania. As Mori
stated:
Unfortunately the photo makes it appear as if he is firing
a rocket launcher. If they showed the whole picture,
you’d see there is nothing in it, it’s just the tube. I have
my pictures in my military books, I’m holding my
machine gun on my waist, and everybody’s has got their
buddy picture.56
Media perception of Hicks had to be reversed.
Mori, who had only spoken to the media once before in his
career, decided that such public comment was essential to zealous
representation of his client. He discussed the idea of media
commentary with military colleagues. He was nervous. Up to
that point, no military lawyer had publicly criticized the military
commissions. They said “are you sure that you want to do this?”57
But Mori reasoned that the government itself had made his client
a media case,58 and that Hicks therefore had to be defended in the
media—particularly because there was no actual court in which to
do so.59
55. See id. at ¶¶ [6.51-.52.].
56. Enough Rope with Andrew Denton (ABC television broadcast Aug. 14,
2006) (transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcript
s/s1709428.htm).
57. Mori Interview, supra note 30.
58. Through frequent press releases and public statements, as in the case
of Jose Padilla, government officials had made David Hicks a household
name; the popular media and the Defense Department itself simply referred
to him as the “Australian Taliban.” See Australian-Taliban To Be Handed
over to U.S. Military, CNN.COM, Dec. 14, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/12/14/ret.australia.taliban/; Kathleen T. Rhem,
Military Commission Proceedings To Resume for ‘Australian Taliban,’
DEFENSELINK,
Sept.
21,
2005,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=17250.
59. During 2004, the appointing authority slowly shifted its views on
military counsel’s ability to exercise First Amendment rights and to speak to
the press. Initially, the legal affairs officer expressed skepticism about any
statements to the press. Then Mori obtained permission to give his opinion

Mori carefully reviewed the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.60 Gentile and subsequent ethics
rules that protect lawyers from discipline when the public
statements about a pending case are made to overcome the
prejudicial effect of publicity not initiated by the lawyer. He and
others with whom he consulted believed that Mori’s press
statements were necessary to overcome the severe prejudice
caused by the government’s release of numerous statements and
the resulting articles.61
The defense launched a three-country media strategy in
Australia, Great Britain, and the United States, including a
frontal attack on the system that would be used to try Hicks. Mori
traveled to Australia numerous times in early 2004 and proceeded
to speak out strongly against the legal regime in Guantánamo
Bay. He believed that it was essential for Australians to
understand the Guantánamo system that its government
supported. His March 2004 trip made him a “minor celebrity.”62
A self-described apolitical person, he said of the tribunals, “It
offends my understanding of what justice is that’s been ingrained
in me by the Marine Corps and by my legal training.”63
In April 2004, he surprised an audience of Oxford University
students with his candor when he spoke out, along with military
lawyers Lieutenant Commander Swift and Major Mark Bridges,
and denounced the tribunals. He told them that “the system is not
set up to produce even the appearance of a fair trial,” and declared
that they were “kangaroo courts.”64 He argued that Hicks should
be tried in conformity with international legal standards, or else
returned to Australia.65 Mori also spoke at public rallies in
Australia. His statements and speeches harshly criticizing the
on the rules and procedures of the military commissions but was not
permitted to make more specific comments about Guantánamo or the Hicks
case. As the Hicks case began to receive significant media attention, these
restrictions were relaxed. See Mori Interview, supra note 30.
60. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6.
61. Mori Interview, supra note 30; Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
62. Neil A. Lewis, Military’s Lawyers for Detainees Put Tribunals on
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A1.
63. Raymond Bonner, Marine Defends Guantánamo Detainee, and
Surprises Australians, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at 13.
64. Neil A. Lewis, Military Lawyers for Detainees Put Tribunals on Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A1.
65. Id.

tribunals rattled his superiors.66 He still confined his comments
to the lack of fundamental fairness in the commission process,
however, and was careful not to discuss conditions of confinement
or the specific facts of the Hicks case.
The defense worked closely with the human rights community
in Australia. Geoff Robertson, one of Australia’s highest profile
human rights lawyers, challenged the Howard government for not
demanding the release of an Australian citizen and said that it
could face war crimes for “willfully depriving a prisoner of war of
the right of a fair and regular trial.”67
Despite the media attention, the Australian government
would not heed any requests that it should demand a fair legal
process or the return of its citizen. Prime Minister Howard’s
rationale was that they could not bring him home because there
was no crime that he could be charged with in Australia. The
Howard government believed that the Bush administration had
the situation “under control.”68
By spring 2004, Mori had become a minor celebrity in
Australia. He visited regularly and his interviews appeared
frequently. One reporter for a major national television network
said that news accounts “compared Major Mori to Tom Cruise,
who played a valiant military defense lawyer at Guantánamo in
the film ‘A Few Good Men.’” The Aussies loved him. “Mori has
come to represent everything about Americans that Aussies love
to admire.”69
In the United States Mori took reporters to the Lincoln
Memorial in Washington D.C. to talk about the Hicks case.
Though Mori’s statements were confined to criticism of the
commissions, his public stance and participation in rallies were
angering his superiors.
April through June 2004 were watershed months for Hicks
and Gitmo detainees. In April 2004, after the Supreme Court
heard oral arguments in Rasul v. Bush, the government decided to
permit habeas corpus lawyers into Guantánamo and leaked
66. Mori Interview, supra note 30.
67. Geoffrey Robertson, In Thrall to the Bush Lawyers, THE AGE, Aug. 17,
2006,
http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/in-thrall-to-the-bush
lawyers/2006/08/16/1155407878903.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
68. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
69. Nothing but an Echo, supra note 16.

information about the conditions under which the detainees were
held.70 The Abu Ghraib scandal was front-page news and lead to
subsequent allegations and investigations of abuses in military
prisons.71 In June of 2004, the Supreme Court decided Rasul v.
Bush, declaring that detainees had the right to judicial review,
and the infamous “Torture Memo” was leaked to the press.72
Slowly Dratel and Mori began to speak more openly with the press
about the facts of Hicks’s confinement and his case.
In June 2004 official charges were finally filed against Hicks.
These charges were unknown to the law of war and “inherently
flawed.”73 First, even though Hicks was an Australian who owed
no formal allegiance to the United States, he was charged with
“aiding the enemy.” He was also charged with the crime of
conspiracy—which the Supreme Court noted in the Hamdan case
was “not a recognized violation of a law of war”74—and of
attempted murder by an unprivileged belligerent.75
Hicks was arraigned on the charges in August 2004 and
preliminary motions were argued in October 2004. The day after
arguments on the Hicks motions, the entire proceeding was stayed
as a consequence of the District Court’s ruling in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld that the military commission were violative of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.76 Once again, Hicks had no
legal recourse in the military commissions.
Relying upon Hamdan, the defense filed an amended
complaint in federal court and in the military commissions
attacking the structure and procedures of the commissions. These
cases were stayed pending resolution of the Hamdan case. The
Howard government, publicly criticized for its position in the
Hicks case, said that the defense lawyers bore responsibility for

70. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
71. Thom Shanker & Jacques Steinberg, The Struggle for Iraq: Captives;
Bush Voices ‘Disgust’ at Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at
A1.
72. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo
Says Torture ‘May Be Justified,’ WASHINGTONPOST.COM, June 13, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun13.html;
The Military Archipelago, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A30.
73. LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 4.1.
74. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 563.
75. LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 4.1.
76. 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).

the delay.77
By this time, however, the public perception of Howard’s
criticisms of the Hicks team had shifted. This resulted, in part,
from comments from Lex Lasry, the prominent Australian lawyer
who had attended the October 2004 preliminary hearings as an
independent observer and representative of the Law Council of
Australia. Upon his return to Australia, he roundly condemned
the proceedings.78 This provided impetus for the involvement of
the established legal community.79
The case had now become of widespread concern to the
Australians as the public became increasingly knowledgeable
about Hicks’s case. With the shift in public perception and the
pressure on the Howard government to utilize its “moral
authority” to insure that the government’s “integrity was not
compromised by its support of [the military commission] process,”
the lawyers could now hopefully engage in behind the scenes
negotiations with the government.80 David McLeod and Michael
Griffin, military reserve lawyers with private practices, became
Australian counsel to the Hicks case.81
While pursuing negotiations in Australia and with legal
proceedings stayed in the United States, the defense turned to the
British legal system. During one GTMO meeting with Mori and
Griffin, the lawyers learned that Hicks’s grandparents were
British citizens. Britain had recently changed its laws so that
Hicks could now obtain British citizenship based upon his lineage.
During 2005, the legal team secured the services of solicitors and
barristers in London to file for Hicks’s citizenship. The British
government had demanded and successfully secured the release of
nine of its citizens from Gitmo, and the legal team hoped that

77. LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 3.38. The independent examiner concluded
that this was “nonsense and demonstrates why Australia’s moral authority
has been compromised by the attitude of the Australian government.” Id. at
¶ 3.38.
78. Hicks Trial ‘Shambolic,’ THE AGE, June 24, 2007, http://www.
theage.com.au/news/national/hicks-trial-shambolic/2007/07/24/118504308874
.html?page=fullpage#contentSwap1. Lasry’s basic biography is available on
the
University
of
Sydney’s
website.
http://www.econ.usyd.edu.au/event/55.html.
79. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
80. Id.
81. These lawyers replaced Steve Kenny. See supra note 34.

when Hicks obtained citizenship, it would do so for him.82
In December 2005, the British High Court, over the
government’s objection, ordered that Hicks should be registered as
a British citizen.83 The British Home Office appealed numerous
times, and the High Court finally ordered that it would not allow
additional appeals.84 The Home Office complied and “secretly”
made Hicks a citizen while in his cell at Guantánamo.85 The next
day the British Home Secretary personally revoked citizenship.86
The defense then filed a legal action that was never resolved.87
The Hicks citizenship issue led to increased awareness of the
Hicks case in Britain, and exacerbated public concern in
Australia.
In the summer of 2005, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district
82. U.K. Guantánamo Four To Be Released, BBC NEWS, Dec. 8, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7133760.stm.
For
a
BBC
News
comprehensive timeline, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6241991.stm
(five British detainees released on March 19, 2004). See also ‘Delight’ at
Release
of
Guantánamo
Men,
BBC NEWS,
Mar.
11,
2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3500156.stm (detailing release of the
“Tipton Three”—which included Rasul—and two others); Jane Holroyd,
Government ‘Pushed’ for Hicks Trial, THE AGE, Sept. 27, 2005,
http://www.theage.com
.au/news/world/father-welcomes-david-hicks-trialdate/2005/09/27/1127586827
641.html (the Australian Foreign affairs minister, Alexander Downey,
claimed that the attorneys were trying to “circumvent” justice by attempting
to gain a British passport for Hicks).
83. See Annabel Crabb, Hicks Wins Citizenship Fight, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, May 7, 2006, http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/court-puts-hicksback-on-track-for-british-citizenship/2006/05/06/1146335967064.html
[hereinafter Crabb, Hicks Wins]; Annabel Crabb, Law Strips Hicks of UK
Citizenship in Hours, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 20, 2006,
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/law-strips-hicks-of-uk-citizenship-inhours/2006/08/19/1155408075077.html [hereinafter Crabb, Law Strips Hicks].
84. Crabb, Hicks Wins, supra note 83.
85. Id.
86. Jeannie Shawl, Gitmo Detainee Stripped of UK Citizenship One Day
After Request Granted, JURIST, Aug. 19, 2006, http://64.41.216.61/paperchase/
2006/08/gitmo-detainee-hicks-stripped-of-uk.php (noting that the citizenshipstripping was pursuant to the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act of
2006 which allows the secretary to “deprive a person of citizenship if the
Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public
good.” See Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, S. 56 (1), available
at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060013_en_1#56.
87. Upon defense motion, the court ordered a hearing on the issue of
whether Hicks had been tortured. The hearing was never held because of the
resolution of Hicks’s case in the military commission. Dratel Interview,
supra note 39 (motions on file).

court in Hamdan thus permitting the resumption of the military
commissions.88 The hope faded for a negotiated return of Hicks to
Australia, and the Howard government pressed for a hearing
date.89 First scheduled for September 2005, the date was
adjourned until November 2005, with the Howard government
maintaining that the defense lawyers were responsible for the
delay.90 The proceedings were soon stayed again when the United
States Supreme Court then granted certiorari in Hamdan.
During 2006, the Australian public clamored for the Howard
government to press for Hicks’s return.91 There were rallies
throughout the country and regular press accounts of Hick’s
unlawful detention. Events had progressed to the extent that
Dratel and Mori, in an April 2006 trip to Australia, had meetings
to discuss the rules and conditions for a transfer agreement if
Hicks was returned to Australia. The defense team also engaged
lawyers who began a legal action in Australia to order Hicks
returned.92
In June 2006, the historic Hamdan decision, which declared
the military commissions to be violative of the Geneva
Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, nullified
the military commission proceedings against Hicks. The Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) was passed in response to
Hamdan.93
Mori remained on the offensive in the media, attacking the
structure and proceedings established under the new MCA. In
88.
89.
90.
91.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Holroyd, supra note 80.
LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 3.38.
See, for example, Seven Out of Ten Australians Want Hicks Home,
CANABERRA TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006; Free-Hicks Rallies Roll On, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 11, 2006; Australians Believe Hicks Should Get Fair Trial
Now, TOWNSVILLE BULLETIN, Sept. 16, 2006. In November of 2006, the Upper
House of the Australian Senate passed a motion urging the government to
intervene in Hicks’s case. Senate Wants Hicks Home, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov.
10, 2006. The sheer volume of coverage received by Hicks in 2006 is also
worth noting: A search of Australian newspapers in which Hicks’ name
appeared in headlines reveals 408 hits for that year, with entire articles
devoted to minute developments in the status of his case, his physical
condition, and even his father’s nomination for “Father of the Year.”
92. A hearing on that case was schedule for May 2007 and became moot
upon the resolution of Hicks’ case in the military commission. Dratel
Interview, supra note 39 (motions on file).
93. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w (2007).

August 2006, he went on a lecture tour in Australia on behalf of
Hicks, attending a rally in Adelaide and leading a march to the
office of the Australian Foreign Minister. He charged the Bush
administration with creating another illegal system that violated
Hicks’s rights and reiterated that the new military commission
system—like the old one—was “rigged for convictions only.”94
Speaking at an almost sold-out event organized by the Australian
Lawyers’ Alliance at the Brisbane Convention Center, Mori noted
that “providing information to the public and elected officials had
to become part of defending [Hicks].”95 “I’m sure some ministers in
the Australian Government would just like us to go away quietly
and let David get done over by an unfair system,” Mori remarked,
“but that wouldn’t be doing justice to an Australian citizen.”96
Howard’s approval ratings continue to decline. Especially
when joined with the issue of the Iraq war, Hicks’s case seemed to
symbolize the Howard government’s willingness to acquiesce to
American demands—a vulnerability particularly noted in
Australia’s 2007 elections that linked him to the increasingly
unpopular President Bush.97 In Australia in November 2006,
Mori attended the signing of the Fremantle Declaration, a
“declaration demanding the Commonwealth take action to ensure
Guantánamo Bay detainee David Hicks is immediately brought to
trial.”98 All attorneys general of the States and territories of
94. Hicks’ Lawyer to Meet with Ministers in Canberra, AUSTRALIAN
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 13, 2006.
95. Stealing a March: Hicks’ Lawyer Pounds PR Trail To Win Over
Hearts and Minds, COURIER MAIL, November 14, 2006.
96. Id.
97. Steve Lewis, Newspoll: Rudd Gains Ground on Howard, THE
AUSTRALIAN,
Jan.
23,
2007,
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21102080-601,00.html
(“[a]s John Howard prepares to freshen up his ministry, voters have also
criticised the Government’s handling of the war in Iraq, with more than 70
percent saying it will influence their vote. The Government’s handling of
terror suspect David Hicks has also been denounced by voters . . . .” Id.);
Nick Bryant, Howard Faces Election Year Battle, BBC NEWS, Feb. 15, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6361361.stm (noting “one of the main
effects of the row over Iraq has been to bind Mr. Howard even closer to
George W. Bush, a U.S. president deeply unpopular in many quarters of the
Australian electorate. Whether it is his reluctance to engineer the quick
release of David Hicks, an Australian imprisoned for five years without trial
at Guantánamo Bay, or his shared stance with the Bush administration over
Kyoto, Mr. Howard would appear to be on the wrong side of public opinion.”).
98. A-Gs Demand Immediate Action on Hicks Trial, AUSTL. BROAD. NEWS

Australia attended with the pointed exception of the Federal
Attorney General, Philip Ruddock, who refused to attend. His
absence was highlighted in the press.99
In February 2007 the charges were dismissed and two new
charges were sworn against Hicks: (1) Attempted murder in
violation of the law of war; and (2) providing material support for
terrorism. The Convening Authority for the Military Commissions
referred only the material support for terrorism charge for trial.100
This charge was not available under the old military commissions,
but was introduced in the MCA of 2006.
Just as Hicks was about to be arraigned on these new
charges, Colonel Morris Davis, the then chief prosecutor for the
military commissions, publicly warned that Mori’s “politicking” on
behalf of Hicks could result in prosecution for his actions under
Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which
forbids officers from speaking “contemptuous words” about the
President, Vice President, or Secretary of Defense.101 Davis
claimed, among other things, that “certainly in the U.S. it would
not be tolerated having a U.S. marine in uniform actively
inserting himself into the political process.
It is very
disappointing to see that happening in Australia and if that was
one of my prosecutors, they would be held accountable.”102

ONLINE,
Oct.
11,
2006,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200611/s1785856.htm.
99. Id.
100. See LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 4.5. This charge had two specifications.
The first provided that Hicks intentionally provided material support or
resources to an international terrorist organization (al Qaeda) which was
engaged in hostilities against the United States. The second specification
alleged that Hicks provided that support knowing or intending that that it
would be used in preparing for or carrying out an act of terrorism. Hicks
ultimately pled only to the first specification.
101. Raymond Bonner, Terror Case Prosecutor Assails Defense Lawyer,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at A10. See 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006) (“Any
commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President,
the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a
military department, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Governor or
legislature of any State, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty
or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”).
102. David Nason, Mori Charges Could Be Laid After Trial, THE
AUSTRALIAN,
Mar.
03,
2007,
available
at
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21315542-2,00.html.

While Davis’s notion that Mori could have been prosecuted103
appears far-fetched—Article 88 has rarely been invoked in
military courts-martial, and only in extreme cases104—Davis’s
allegations were serious enough to cause Mori to worry that he
might be impeding Hicks’s case by continuing to represent him.105
The defense once again went on the offensive. Dratel, in
public comment, said that Davis’s threats were the “latest
example of the corrupt system that will try Hicks.”106 Dratel and
Synder filed a motion to disqualify Davis based upon prosecutorial
misconduct. They charged:
The curious timing of Col. Davis’ initial accusations . . .
suggests that Col. Davis made the accusation to chill and
hinder Maj. Mori’s representation of Mr. Hicks and to
derail the defense shortly before the arraignment. These
allegations diverted the defense team from preparing for
Mr. Hicks’ trial, forcing them to focus instead on
assessing the potential conflict of interest between Maj.
Mori and Mr. Hicks. They also required Maj. Mori to
refrain from making public comments on behalf of Mr.
Hicks until he could obtain legal advice on the issue.107
The threat of a court martial of Mori led to press accounts
that Hicks’s case would be delayed yet again if Mori was recused
from representation.
The defense filed numerous motions all the while, negotiating
a plea bargain on favorable terms for Hicks. The anticipated plea,
of course, would be premised upon a charge that was without
103. See, e.g., Morris D. Davis, AWOL Military Justice, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
10,
2007,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oedavis10dec10,0,2446661.story (ironically, Colonel Davis resigned as Chief
Prosecutor over the “politicized” nature of the military commission’s
procedures and subsequently leveled his own criticisms of his former
superiors.).
104. See Michael J. Davidson, Contemptuous Speech Against the President,
ARMY LAW. 1, 2-3 (July 1999). See also Luban, supra note 7.
105. Tom Allard, Hicks Trial at Risk If Mori Taken Off Case, THE AGE,
Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2007/03/04/1172943276209
.html.
106. Id.
107. Defense Motion for Appropriate Relief, Prosecutorial Misconduct, 19
March 2007 (on file with author). This was one of eighteen motions that
remained unresolved at the time of the Hicks plea. Mori Interview, supra
note 30.

foundation under the law of war—the very point made by the
defense in one of its motions to dismiss. Nine eminent lawyers
had provided affidavits to the commission to the effect that there
was no such crime as material support for terrorism under the law
of war, and that in any case, it was clearly “retrospective in its
application to Hicks and was a recently invented and new war
crime.”108 Additional arguments provided convincing support that
the charge was “brought and prosecuted in violation of
international law.”109
On March 26, 2007, Hicks pled guilty to providing material
support for terrorism, notwithstanding the fact that the charge
was arguably not sustainable and that the proceedings were held
before a body without legal authority and lacking in fundamental
due process.110
The proceedings demonstrated the arbitrariness of the
process.111 Two of Hicks’s three attorneys were dismissed by the
Judge at the outset. Rebecca Snyder was dismissed because the
Judge claimed that she was not on active duty and therefore could
not qualify as military counsel, nor did he interpret the MCA to
permit her to remain as civilian counsel.112 The judge would not
108. LASRY, supra note 2, ¶4.14 (emphasis added).
109. Id. ¶ 4.16.
110. The defense entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25 (1970) based upon stipulated facts. An Alford plea does not require
the defendant to state that he is guilty. Rather it permits the entry of a
guilty plea with a statement acknowledging that, based upon the
particularized facts, the prosecution could prove their case beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Alford plea avoids the issue of whether an attorney
may assist a client in the entry of a guilty plea to a charge it “knows” to be
not sustainable under law. Zealous advocacy for a criminal defendant should
permit the entry of a guilty plea whether or not the attorney believes the
charge is sustainable; however, this is an issue that has not been adequately
addressed in legal ethics literature. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal
Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L.
REV. 73 (1995); MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS’ ETHICS (3d ed. 2004) (arguing that ethics rules are rooted in the
moral values expressed in the Bill of Rights, not in moral philosophy.) Id. at
8); Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not To Plead: Effective Assistance and
Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841 (1998); Albert W. Alschuler,
The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975);
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909 (1992).
111. LASRY, supra note 2 (calling the procedures “ad hoc”).
112. He also ruled that she could not qualify as civilian counsel and

permit Dratel to appear as counsel unless he would sign a consent
agreement to be bound by all rules, including those which were
not yet in existence. Dratel’s argument that he could not sign a
“blank check” but that he would sign an agreement to be bound by
“all applicable rules presently in existence” was not acceptable to
the Judge.113 Dratel left the courtroom as Hicks stated, “I am
shocked. I just lost another lawyer.”114 Mori remained at Hicks’s
side in the proceedings and ultimately entered a guilty plea in
proceedings described by the independent observer as
“shambolic.”115
The plea agreement, worked out at the highest levels of
government without knowledge of the prosecutor,116 provided for a
sentence that permitted Hicks to return to Australia to serve only
nine remaining months.117 Hicks also agreed to refrain from
suggested she remain as a “consultant.” Hicks stated that he wanted her to
be his attorney, not a consultant. For a full account of the legal arguments,
see LASRY, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5.9-5.14.
113. Id. ¶¶ 5.15-5.25.
114. Id. ¶ 5.24.
115. Hicks Trial Shambolic, supra note 78.
116. The deal was negotiated between Mori and Susan Crawford, the “top
military commission official” and one of Vice President Cheney’s former
deputies—notably, without prosecutor Morris Davis’ input. Josh White,
Australian’s Plea Deal Was Negotiated Without Prosecutors, WASH. POST, Apr.
1, 2007, at A07. Vice President Dick Cheney had visited with Australian
Prime Minister John Howard in early 2007, during which they discussed the
Hicks case. The visit occurred in the context of wide protests over Hicks’s
treatment and a promise by Howard to press the issue. See, e.g., U.S. VicePresident Pledge on Hicks, BBC NEWS, Feb. 24, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6392051.stm; Cheney Visit Prompts Protests, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/
cheney-visit-prompts-protests/2007/02/22/1171733922521.html;
James
Grubel, Australia To Press Cheney on Guantánamo Trial for Hicks, REUTERS,
Feb. 19, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSSYD10287
820070219; White, supra note 13.. One Australian newspaper reports that a
deal was directly brokered between Vice President Cheney and Prime
Minister Howard during his visit to the country, even though the Australian
government denied it. 'Deal' That Freed Hicks, THE AGE, Oct. 23, 2007,
http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/cheney-howard-deal-freedhicks/2007/10/23/1192941024047.html.
117. Though Hicks was sentenced to seven years, the plea bargain
permitted him to serve only nine remaining months after what had been five
years in American custody. He was released on December 29, 2007. Terror
Detainee
Back
in
Australia,
NYTIMES.COM,
May
20,
2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/world/asia/20hicks.html;
Raymond
Bonner, Australian Terrorism Detainee Leaves Prison, NYTIMES.COM, Dec. 29,

speaking to the media for one year and, notably, to make a
statement that he “has never been illegally treated,” along with a
promise not to file any lawsuits pursuant to his treatment in
Guantánamo.118 The “deal helped Australian Prime Minister
John Howard, a U.S. ally, avoid a bruising domestic
controversy.”119 The case was widely reported in the media. The
U.S. Department of Defense issued a press release claiming,
“Military commissions are regularly constituted courts, affording
all the necessary judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples for purposes of common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions.”120
The Military Commissions spokeswoman said that the Hicks
case showed that Guantánamo commissions offer a “fair,
legitimate and transparent forum,”121 while the Washington Post
reported that the guilty plea “marks a victory for the Bush
administration.”122
Hick’s father’s statement was, perhaps, more representative
of the public’s view: Hicks pled guilty, he said, just to “escape the
isolated prison.”123 The press reported the dismay of military
authorities when the imposed seven year sentence was reduced to
nine months in accordance with the plea bargain.124
Mori was made an honorary member of the Australian Bar
2007,
http://www
.nytimes.com/2007/12/29/world/asia/29hicks.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%2
0Topics/People/B/Bonner,%20Raymond.
118. William Glaberson, Australian To Serve Nine Months in Terrorism
Case, NYTIMES.COM, May 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/
washington/31gitmo.html?ex=1333080000&en=5a6690d157e5ca31&ei=5124
&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink.
119. Scott Horton, Military Lawyers and the Gitmo Commissions,
HARPER’S MAG., Oct. 30, 2007, http://harpers.org/archive/2007/10/hbc90001549.
120. Detainee Convicted of Terrorism Charge at Guantánamo Trial, U.S.
Department of Defense, March 30, 2007 (http://www.defenselink.mil/
releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10678.)
121. Some Bumps at Start of War Tribunals at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES,
April 1, 2007.
122. Josh White, Australian’s Guilty Plea Is First at Guantánamo, WASH.
POST, Mar. 27, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/03/26/AR2007032602439.html.
123. Australian Guantánamo Detainee Hicks Sentenced to 9 Months After
Plea
Deal,
FOXNEWS.COM,
Mar.
30,
2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,262960,00.html.
124. Id.

Association in a ceremony where he was touted for advocacy called
“fearless and passionate.”125 In the past year, he has received
numerous awards for dedicated, zealous lawyering.126 And while
Major Mori avoided prosecution, his zealous advocacy was not
rewarded by the military. He was reassigned to a base in San
Diego as soon as Hicks left Guantánamo and has been passed over
for promotion twice since taking on his case.127 In January 2008
he was sent to Iraq.
LAWYERING IN HINDSIGHT

Mori and the defense team undertook a remarkable challenge
in what was described by the Australian Law Council’s
Independent Observer as an “inherently oppressive and coercive
system” where “liberty is a bargaining chip that the State may use
to avoid accountability and buy impunity.”128
Recognizing that the case would be resolved in the political
arena, a self-described apolitical military lawyer employed a
strategy that is often described as “political lawyering” or “cause
lawyering.”129 Engaging in a relatively novel tactic for a military
lawyer, Mori extensively utilized the media to overcome negative
public perception of his client and promote the need for a fair
process. The media strategy assisted the international campaign
of human rights organizations and activists. Mori continued his

125. Honorary Membership for Major Mori, NEWS.COM.AU, June 29, 2007,
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21990165-1702,00.html.
126. Id.
127. Mori Reassigned to ‘Top Gun’ Marine Base, AUSTL. BROAD. NEWS
ONLINE,
May
22,
2007,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/05/22/1929231.htm.
128. LASRY, supra note 2, ¶ 7.3.
129. These terms are defined in varied ways and often used
interchangeably.
See, e.g., Martha Minow, Political Lawyering: An
Introduction, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 287 (1996) (deliberate efforts to use
law to change society or to alter allocations of power); David Luban, The
Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 955 (1995) (articulating a theory of “moral activism” in which “lawyers
have substantial moral responsibilities to parties other than the client.”);
Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of
Legal Work Against Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client
Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 493 (1996) (arguing that individual
client representation may be “cause lawyering”); Etienne, supra note 51 at
1196-97 (defining cause lawyers as those who “use the law as a means of
creating social change in addition to a means of helping individual clients.”).

highly visible public advocacy even when threatened with
prosecution that could have been a disqualifying conflict of
interest.
Mori and the defense team successfully coordinated the legal
strategy with the political one across three continents as the
landscape shifted during five years.130 They did so understanding
that Hicks’s situation presented potential conflicts. While the
lawyers necessarily mounted a highly visible campaign to bring
Hicks before a tribunal, all the lawyers believed that the military
commissions were unlawful and that its processes were
fundamentally unfair. They did not want to legitimate those
commissions by participation in the process, especially because
their client would be the first detainee to participate in a military
commission.
They correctly could predict that the U.S.
government would claim legitimacy and victory by Hicks’s
participation and guilty plea. Moreover, the lawyers did not
believe that the ultimate charge against Hicks was legally valid.
Nevertheless, the duty to David Hicks was paramount; the end of
his detention and his return to Australia were the goals.
These potential conflicts, present in many criminal cases and
notably in those defined as “cause lawyering,” did not become
actual conflicts. Ultimately, the lawyers’s goal was the traditional
one for all criminal defendants: resolution of their case on the
most favorable terms for their client. That goal was served by the
defense team’s creative and effective multi-pronged strategy
employed for the “cause” of challenging the unlawful regime at
Guantánamo Bay and upholding the rule of law. Both “causes”
were served by the Hicks guilty plea and sentence. As Dratel said:
From the outset, there was always a tension between
what we call “cause lawyering” vs. “client lawyering” and
my hope was always that we could serve the client
without undermining the cause. . . . As it turned out, we
achieved that even in unanticipated ways. We have done
as much as we can to demonstrate that it is an invalid

130. Similar strategies have been employed in a wide range of cases. See
e.g., Michael D. Davis & Hunter R. Clark, Thurgood Marshall: Warrior at the
Bar, Rebel on the Bench 100-12 (1992); Arthur Kinoy, RIGHTS ON TRIAL (1983);
Michael Ratner, How We Closed the Guantánamo HIV Camp: The
Intersection of Politics and Litigation, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 187 (1998).

system and we hope that was achieved . . . . At the same
time there was disillusionment from the other side—this
is the “worst of the worst” and you are freeing him?” . . .
The “Hicks deal” is now a term of art. People say, “I want
a Hicks deal.”
It robbed the commissions of any
authority.131
In these extraordinary circumstances, the judgment that the case
had to be resolved in the political arena required the zealous
lawyering undertaken by Mori and the defense team. It was,
perhaps, the only way to provide meaningful legal representation
at all.

131.

Dratel Interview, supra note 39.

Notes & Comments
Fear Mongering, Filters, the Internet
and the First Amendment: Why
Congress Should Not Pass Legislation
Similar to the Deleting Online
Predators Act
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to
protect liberty when the government’s purposes are
beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress maintains that “[t]hough the Internet represents
tremendous potential in bringing previously unimaginable
education and information opportunities to our nation’s children,
there are very real risks associated with the use of the Internet.”2
Accordingly, Congress has “repeatedly reaffirmed”3 the
government’s compelling interest in protecting children from
potentially harmful material on the Internet.4 Juxtaposed against
this legitimate concern is the First Amendment, which guarantees
Americans that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the

1. Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
2. CHILDREN’S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT, S.REP. NO. 106-141, at 2
(1999).
3. Id. at 7.
4. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757-58 (1982).
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freedom of speech, or of the press.”5 Early attempts at regulating
the harmful material available to minors over the Internet were
unsuccessful because the Supreme Court found each to be a
flagrant violation of the First Amendment.6 Congress succeeded
in balancing concern for child welfare with constitutional
requirements when it passed the Children’s Internet Protection
Act (CIPA) in 2000.7 For the first time, Congress addressed fears
“that the E-rate and Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA)
programs were facilitating access to illegal and harmful
pornography.”8 To curtail growing concern, CIPA conditioned
funding from these subsidized programs, requiring that schools
and libraries have technology filters in place to prevent children
from accessing obscene or harmful material on the Internet, and
that these filters could be disabled if necessary.9 The filter
requirement was upheld by the Supreme Court, and for the first
time Congress believed it had made strides in adopting an
effective policy of Internet safety.10
What Congress did not anticipate, given the rapidly evolving
reach of the Internet, was the rise of social-networking sites, and
the wave of panic that news stories regarding these sites would
create.11 As a result, the House of Representatives, in an attempt
to “appear pro-child and pro-family,” introduced the Deleting
Online Predator’s Act (DOPA) in 2006. Riding on a wave of
“MySpace Madness,”12 the House of Representatives fed off the
mostly unwarranted fears of parents, which were promulgated by
the media, and then accused dissenters of being weak on child
protection.13 The DOPA departed from the constitutionally
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA II), 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004); Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
845 (1997).
7. M. Megan McCune, Comment, Virtual Lollipops and Lost Puppies:
How Far Can States Go To Protect Minors Through the Use of Internet Luring
Laws, 14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 503, 520 (2006).
8. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 200 (2003).
9. Children’s Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000)).
10. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 201.
11. See Nat’l Coal. Against Censorship, The Dangers of the Deleting
Online Predators Act, July 27, 2006, http://www.ncac.org/Internet/20060515~
USA~Deleting_Online_Predators_Act.cfm.
12. Tom Zeller Jr., Link by Link: A Lesson for Parents on MySpace
Madness, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2006, at C4.
13. See Nat’l Coal. Against Censorship, supra note 11.

acceptable filters required under the CIPA, and conditioned filters
based on technology and not on content.14 The proposed filters
under the DOPA are aimed at the dreaded commercial socialnetworking site, yet would not necessarily block all harmful
material and would purposefully ensnare a tremendous number of
valuable websites, which are protected by the First Amendment.15
This constitutional infirmity cannot be cured through the
implementation of disabling features. “Treating MySpace sites
like poison,”16 proponents of the DOPA touted it as “legislation not
designed to limit speech or infringe on the rights of law-abiding
adults,”17 but to combat social-networking sites which “have made
it easier for pedophiles and child predators to contact children and
to groom, or befriend, and seduce, them.”18 Luckily, a new session
of Congress in January of 2007 assured that the DOPA would not
become law.19 However, those who were concerned with the clear
First Amendment violations of the DOPA cannot rest easy, for on
January 4, 2007, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska proposed the
Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act, which includes a
section that mirrors the DOPA word for word.20 Protecting
children from harm when they are often not capable to do it
themselves is a vital goal of government and “every right-thinking
and decent American;”21 however, Congress cannot partake in

14. See Alex Halperin, No Space for MySpace?, BUSINESS WEEK, May 12,
2006, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/may2006/tc20060512
_299340.htm.
15. See Am. Library Ass’n Office for Intellectual Freedom, Podcast Script:
Online Social Networking and Intellectual Freedom, http://www.ala.org/ala/
oif/ifissues/issuesrelatedlinks/podcastnetworking.htm (last visited May 12,
2008).
16. Declan McCullagh, Lawmakers Take Aim at Social-networking Sites,
CNET NEWS, Dec. 19, 2006, http://news.com.com/Lawmakers+take+aim+at+
social-networking+sites/2100-1028_3-6071040.html?tag=sas.email.
17. 152 CONG. REC. H5883, H5886 (July 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Fitzpatrick).
18. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 109TH CONG.,
REPORT ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN OVER THE INTERNET, 2 (Comm.
Print 2007).
19. H.R. 5319 [109th]: Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-5319 (last visited May 12,
2007).
20. S. 49 [110th]: Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-49 (last visited May 12,
2007).
21. 152 CONG. REC. H5883, H5888 (2006) (statement of Rep. Dingell).

“fear mongering”22 as motive to ignore the requirements of the
First Amendment. The DOPA, and any similar legislation would
fail to meet constitutional requirements due to the large burden
placed on protected speech. Because the proposed filters target
the technology of the site, and not necessarily the content, the
reach of this legislation is so broad that it is irrational.
Part II of this Comment examines the ways in which
Congress has attempted to protect children from potential harm
on the Internet.
Part III provides information on socialnetworking sites, and the fear that they have engendered. Part IV
discusses the actual language of the DOPA, and Part V illustrates
how the DOPA and similar subsequent legislation do not survive
constitutional scrutiny on First Amendment grounds. In addition,
Part VI alerts the reader to the newly proposed Protecting
Children in the 21st Century Act, which mimics the DOPA word
for word.
II. PREVIOUS CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT
CHILDREN AGAINST HARMFUL MATERIAL ON THE INTERNET

Congress has a significant interest in protecting children from
being harmed by material they view on the Internet.23 Since the
founding of the Internet, this concern has prompted Congress to
pass legislation in an attempt to effectuate its paramount goal:
protecting children from harm. Early Congressional attempts at
regulating material on the Internet were promptly met with First
Amendment challenges and were ultimately held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court,24 and it was only when Congress focused
on filtering material on the Internet, and linking these mandatory
filters with federal subsidies, that it found success.25
A. The Communications Decency Act of 1996
The Communications Decency Act (CDA), part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, was Congress’s first attempt to
regulate children’s access to harmful information on the

22. Halperin, supra note 14 (quoting Anne Collier, co-founder of
BlogSafety.com).
23. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757-58.
24. See COPA II, 542 U.S. at 670; Ashcroft v. Free Sp. Coal., 535 U.S.
234, 240 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997).
25. See McCune, supra note 7.

Internet.26 The CDA “criminalized the online transmission of
‘any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image or other
communication which is . . . indecent’ to a person known to be
under the age of eighteen, as well as the display of ‘patently
offensive’ material ‘in a manner available to’ a person under
eighteen.”27 Senator James Exon, sponsor of the legislation,
argued before the Senate that “the most disgusting, repulsive
pornography is only a few clicks away from any child with a
computer,”28 and not just “Playboy or Penthouse magazines,”29
but “[t]he most hardcore, perverse types of pornography, photos
and stories featuring torture, child abuse, and bestiality.”30
The CDA was “quickly challenged”31 by theAmerican Civil
Liberties Union in Reno v. ACLU.32 The Supreme Court of the
United States recognized “the legitimacy and importance of the
congressional goal of protecting children from harmful
materials,”33 yet ultimately found that the CDA abridged the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.34 The
Court found the breadth of the CDA’s coverage wholly
unprecedented,35 and that the CDA differed from various laws
and orders upheld in previous cases in that:
[I]t does not allow parents to consent to their children’s
use of restricted materials; is not limited to commercial
transactions; fails to provide any definition of ‘indecent’
and omits any requirement that ‘patently offensive’
material lack socially redeeming value; neither limits its
broad categorical prohibitions to particular times nor
bases them on an evaluation by an agency familiar with
the medium’s unique characteristics; is punitive; applies
26. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110
Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
27. ROBERT S. PECK, LIBRARIES THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CYBERSPACE
126 (Eloise L. Kinney ed., American Library Association 2000) (quoting CDA
(internal quotations omitted)).
28. 141 CONG. REC. S8310, S8330 (June 14, 1995) (Statement of Sen.
Exon).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 167 (New York University Press 2003).
32. Reno, 521 U.S. at 845.
33. Id. at 849.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 877.

to a medium that, unlike radio, receives full First
Amendment protection; and cannot be properly analyzed
as a form of time, place, and manner regulation because it
is a content-based blanket restriction on speech.36
The portion of the CDA prohibiting the knowing transmission
of obscene materials was the only portion of the regulation that
survived constitutional scrutiny, as obscenity does not enjoy First
Amendment protection.37
B. The Child Pornography Prevention Act
The Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) attempted to
expand the existing law regarding child pornography on the
Internet to include computer generated images “of what appear to
be children engaging in sexually explicit conduct, that are
virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from
unretouched photographic images of actual children engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.”38 The statute prohibited “possessing or
distributing these images, which may be created by using adults
who look like minors or by using computer imaging.”39 Congress
stressed that the elimination of child pornography and the
protection of children from sexual exploitation provide a
compelling governmental interest for prohibiting the production,
distribution, possession, sale, or viewing of visual depictions of
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct, including both
photographic images of actual children engaging in such conduct

36. Id. at 845. The Court’s opinion compared the CDA to the rulings in
three cases relied upon by the government: Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 646 (1998) (Upholding the constitutionality of a New York statute that
prohibited selling to minors under 17 years of age material that was
considered obscene as to them even if not obscene as to adults); Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (Court upheld a zoning ordinance
that kept adult movie theaters out of residential neighborhoods. The
ordinance was aimed, not at the content of the films shown in the theaters,
but rather at the "secondary effects"such as crime and deteriorating
property valuesthat these theaters fostered); and FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S.
726, 730 (1978) (Court upheld a declaratory order of the FCC, holding that
the broadcast of a recording of a 12-minute monologue entitled "Filthy
Words" that had previously been delivered to a live audience "could have
been the subject of administrative sanctions”). Id. at 845.
37. Id. at 883.
38. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000)).
39. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240.

and depictions produced by computer.”40
The Free Speech Coalition challenged the constitutionality of
the CPPA in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.41 The Court found
that “by prohibiting child pornography that does not depict an
actual child, the statute goes beyond New York v. Ferber, which
distinguished child pornography from other sexually explicit
speech because of the State’s interest in protecting the children
exploited by the production process.”42 The CPPA’s restrictions on
images that appear to involve a minor, or images that convey the
impression that person pictured is a minor, were overbroad, in
that the statute “bans materials that are neither obscene nor
produced by the exploitation of real children.”43 Essentially, the
CPPA criminalized speech “that records no crime and creates no
victims by its production.”44 Although the government argued
that virtual child pornography “whets the appetites of pedophiles
and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct,”45 the Court
held that “[t]he government may not prohibit speech because it
increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed ‘at some
indefinite future time.’”46 Ultimately, the CPPA failed because
the Court ruled that “[p]rotected speech does not become
unprotected merely because it resembles the latter,”47 and “[t]he
overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning
unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is
prohibited or chilled in the process.”48
C. The Child Online Protection Act
In direct response to the Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU,49
Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) in
1998.50 COPA was essentially “a bar on commercial Internet

40. Id.
41. Id. at 234.
42. Id. at 240 (citing Ferber, 45 U.S. at 757-58).
43. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240.
44. Id. at 250.
45. Id. at 253.
46. Id. (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)).
47. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 255.
48. Id.
49. PECK, supra note 27, at 131-32.
50. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1401-1406, 112
Stat. 2681-736 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-231 (2000)).

expression that is harmful to minors.”51 In an attempt to
narrowly tailor the regulation, Congress “incorporated the
Supreme Court’s test for obscenity, as stated in Miller v.
California,”52 which hinges upon community standards to
determine if the material is obscene.53 With “[t]he limitation to
commercial expression and the harmful to minors standard,”54
Congress was anxiously trying to “fit within the rubric of the Reno
decision.”55 Committee reports evidence that Congress firmly
believed “that the bill str[uck] the appropriate balance between
preserving the First Amendment rights of adults and protecting
children from harmful material on the World Wide Web.”56 In
addition to providing much clearer terms, the COPA gives explicit
examples of good faith affirmative defenses that would allow a
commercial entity to protect itself from prosecution.57 Under the
COPA, these defenses consist of “requiring use of a credit card,
debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification
number, or. . . any other reasonable measures that are feasible
under available technology.”58
The constitutionality of the COPA was challenged by the
American Civil Liberties Union in Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA I),59
and was appealed to the Supreme Court after the Third Circuit
affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the COPA’s use of
contemporary community standards to identify material that is

51. PECK, supra note 27, at 131 (internal quotations omitted).
52. McCune, supra note 7, at 517 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
24 (1973)). “The test announced by the Supreme Court to determine whether
communications are obscene is:
(a) whether the average person applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”)
McCune, supra note 7, at 517 n.110.
53. McCune, supra note 7, at 518.
54. PECK, supra note 27, at 132.
55. Id.
56. Child Online Protection Act, H.R. Rep. No. 105-775 (1998) (alteration
in the original).
57. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1401-1406, 112
Stat. 2681-736 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-231 (2000)).
58. Id.
59. Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA I), 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002).

harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.60
The Court ultimately held that “the COPA’s reliance on
community standards to identify ‘material that is harmful to
minors’ does not by itself render the statute substantially
overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment,”61 and remanded
the case back to the Third Circuit to review the constitutionality of
the COPA according to the ruling.62 The “second review by the
Third Circuit found that the COPA did not use the least
restrictive means to protect children from harmful material and
consequently violated the First Amendment.”63 In Ashcroft v.
ACLU (COPA II),64 the Supreme Court upheld the Third Circuit’s
ruling on the COPA, but the “Court’s reasoning was based on a
narrower, more specific rationale than the court of appeals.”65
The Court agreed that, “the Government has failed, at this point,
to rebut the plaintiffs’ contention that there are plausible, less
restrictive alternatives to the statute,”66 and that “filtering
software may be a less restrictive means and more effective
protection then the COPA in protecting children on the
Internet.”67 The Court again remanded the case to allow further
evidence to “be introduced on the relative restrictiveness and
effectiveness of alternatives to the statute.”68
D. The Children’s Internet Protection Act
Notwithstanding the failure of the CDA, the CPPA, and the
COPA, Congress passed the Children’s Internet Protection Act in
2000 (CIPA).69 Unlike the other statutes, the CIPA reflected
“Congress[‘s] fear that federal subsidies for the Internet were
facilitating access in public libraries to obscenity, child

60. Id. at 564.
61. Id. at 585.
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69. Children’s Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763, 2763A-340 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000)).

pornography, and other materials harmful to minors.”70 While
the CDA, the CPPA, and the COPA “focused primarily on Web site
operators, CIPA focuses on Internet users.”71
Schools and
libraries that “participate in certain federal programs,”72 namely
the E-rate73 program and programs under the Library Service and
Technology Act of 199674 would be “obligated to comply” with the
CIPA. 75 The E-rate program “ensure[s] that schools and libraries
have affordable access to advanced telecommunications.”76 The
Library Service and Technology Act of 1996,” makes grants to
state library administrative agencies to electronically lin[k]
libraries with educational, social, or information services, assis[t]
libraries in accessing information through electronic networks,
and pa[y] costs for libraries to acquire or share computer systems
and telecommunications technologies.”77 The CIPA requires
libraries and schools to have “in place a policy of Internet safety
for minors that includes the operation of a technology protection
measure with respect to any of its computers with Internet access
that protects against access through such computers to visual
depictions that are, obscene; child pornography; or harmful to
minors.”78 The term “technology protection measure” is defined as
“a specific technology that blocks or filters Internet access”79 to

70. Leah Wardak, Note, Internet Filters and the First Amendment: Public
Libraries After United States v. American Library Association, 35 LOY. U.
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555, 560 (2005).
72. MADELINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 267 (Carolina
Academic Press 2002).
73. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.501-54.502 (2003).
74. See 20 U.S.C. § 9101 (2001).
75. Miltner, supra note 71, at 560.
76. The U.S. Department of Education, E-Rate Questions and Answers,
http://www.ed.gov/Technology/overview.html (last visited Feb. 17. 2007)
(eligible schools and libraries can receive discounts of 20-90 percent on
telecommunication services, Internet access and internal connections
necessary for deploying technology into the classroom). In the year ending
June 30, 2002, libraries received $58.5 million in such discounts. Am. Library
Ass’n Inc., 539 U.S. at 199.
77. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003)
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). In fiscal year 2002,
Congress appropriated more than $149 million in LSTA grants. Id. at 199.
78. Childrens Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2001).
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obscene material, child pornography or other material that may be
harmful to minors. The “CIPA permits libraries to disable the
filtering technology to allow access for bona fide research or other
lawful purposes.”80 When the library/school receives E-rate
funding, 81 the filters may only be disabled for adults, but when
libraries receive LSTA funding, the filters can technically be
disabled for both children and adults. 82
The American Library Association challenged the
constitutionality of the CIPA in United States v. American Library
Association.83 Plaintiffs in the case “argued that the filtering
requirement was overbroad and that it unconstitutionally
infringed upon patrons’ First Amendment rights.”84 The Court
ruled that “Internet access in public libraries is neither a
traditional nor a designated public forum,”85 and that libraries do
not provide access to the Internet in order to create a public
forum, but “facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits
by furnishing materials of the requisite and appropriate
quality.”86 The Court reasoned that “while a library could limit its
Internet collection to just those sites it found worthwhile, it could
do so only at the cost of excluding an enormous amount of
valuable material,”87 and “[g]iven that tradeoff, it is entirely
reasonable for public libraries to reject that approach and instead
exclude certain categories of content.”88 The Court further held
that any concerns over blocking protected speech were “dispelled
by the ease with which patrons may have the filtering software
disabled.”89 The Court also determined that there were no valid
issues concerning the funding correlation, because “when the
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is
entitled to define the limits of that program.”90 Ultimately the
Court upheld the CIPA “[b]ecause public libraries’ use of Internet
filtering software does not violate their patrons’ First Amendment
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution,
and is a valid exercise of Congress’ spending power.”91 The CIPA
“provoked tension between two competing interests: protecting
minors from cyber pornography and safeguarding First
Amendment rights,”92 and for the first time Congress was
successful in tipping the scales in its favor.
Prior to the DOPA, Congress could pass legislation regulating
the Internet if: the legislation is aimed at unprotected speech, the
legislation does not prohibit speech just because it increases the
chance that a crime will be committed in the future,93 the
legislation contains specific and narrowly tailored definitions
regarding what material Congress is attempting to combat,94 and
the legislation contains disabling provisions that allow adults
and/or children access to potentially overblocked material.95 In
addition, if the legislation is reviewed under heightened scrutiny,
there will inevitably be problems if the legislation does not use the
least restrictive means possible to prevent children from access to
harmful material.96
III. THE RISE OF SOCIAL-NETWORKING SITES AND THE
SUBSEQUENT RISE OF THE DELETING ONLINE PREDATORS
ACT

While the Internet had always contained potentially harmful
material, the rise of social-networking sites and interactive web
based applications presented a host of new challenges for
Congress.
Hyped up concern surrounding these new sites,
particularly MySpace, and their possible link to online child
predation, prompted Congress to once again introduce legislation
aimed at regulating children’s use of the Internet.
A. Interactive Web Applications and Social-Networking Sites
Interactive web application “is a broad term encompassing
many types of online tools, many of which allow people to
communicate with each other either in real time or through
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posts.”97 These applications include “online distance education,
instant messaging, chat rooms, message boards, photo and video
sharing sites, blogs that allow comments, and even sites like
Amazon.com and Evite.”98 These applications “are changing how
we all work with the Web,”99 but crucial to their success is the fact
that the “people who use the tools make them even more useful by
contributing their knowledge and data.”100
“Interactive web application” also encompasses socialnetworking sites which “are, generally speaking, online spaces
where people connect with others who share similar interests.”101
These sites were developed to allow members to “interact with
current friends and to meet new ones,”102 while “sharing thoughts,
ideas, and information.”103 There are literally “hundreds of these
sites on the Web, including Facebook, Friendster, LiveJournal,
and MySpace.”104 Facebook calls itself “a social utility that
connects you with the people around you,”105 that “is made up of
many networks, each based around a company, region, high school
or college,”106 which will allow you to “share information with
people you know, see what’s going on with your friends, and look
up people around you.”107 Friendster’s website states that
“Friendster is the best way to stay in touch with your friends and
it’s the fastest way to discover the people and things that matter
to you most.”108 LiveJournal “is a simple-to-use communication
tool that lets you express yourself and connect with friends
online,”109 which you can use “in many different ways: as a private
journal, a blog, a social network and much more.”110 Lastly,
97. Am. Library Ass’n Office for Intellectual Freedom, supra note 15.
98. Id.
99. Steve Apiki, What You Need To Know About Web 2.0, July 25, 2006,
http://www.smallbusinesscomputing.com/biztools/article.php/3622356.
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105. Welcome to Facebook, http://www.facebook.com, (last visited Feb. 17,
2007).
106. Id.
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108. About Friendster, http://www.friendster.com/info/index.php?statpos=
footer (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
109. What is LiveJournal, http://www.livejournal.com/ (last visited Feb.
17, 2007).
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MySpace labels itself as “an online community that lets you meet
your friends’ friends,”111 where you can “share photos, journals
and interests with your growing network of mutual friends.”112
While most adults are dumfounded by these sites, “they function
very much like the malls and burger joints of earlier eras,”113
where young people go “to hang out, gossip, posture, dare, and
generally figure out how the world works.”114
Social-networking sites “have literally exploded in popularity
in a few short years.”115 A recent poll shows that “87 percent of
those aged 12 to 17 use the Internet on a regular basis.”116 In
addition, “of this 87 percent, approximately 61 percent report
having personal profiles on networking Web sites like MySpace[]
[or] Facebook. . .”117 While other sites are certainly utilized,
MySpace is the most popular of the social-networking sites.118
MySpace “currently has more than 100 million profiles, with
230,000 new members signing up everyday.”119 In July of 2006
MySpace “became the most-visited Web site in the United States
over Google and Yahoo Mail,120 and accounted for “81% of visitors
to leading social-networking sites, according to Hitwise, a market
research company.”121 The thoughts of one teenager, “[if] you are
not on MySpace, you don’t exist,”122 demonstrate that MySpace is
“a cultural requirement for American high school students.”123
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REPORT, Sept. 18, 2006, at 48.
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120. Whitney McFerron, Censoring MySpeech: Is the First Amendment
Lost in the MySpace Debate, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER, 2006, http://
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121. Andrews, supra note 113.
122. Danah Boyd & Henry Jenkins, MySpace and Deleting Online
Predators Act (DOPA), MIT TECH TALK, May 26, 2006, http://www.
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B. Fears Over Social Networking Sites
Since social-networking sites have exploded in popularity they
have become the focus of intense parental, and thus political,
concern.124 It is true that “[a]mong the many millions of people
visiting these sites, some, indeed are sexual predators, and there
have been some highly publicized accounts of teenagers who’ve
been lured into offline meetings at which they have been
[sexually] assaulted.”125 In what has been deemed the first
lawsuit of its kind, a fourteen-year-old girl and her mother sued
MySpace and its parent company News Corporation Incorporated,
alleging that the girl was raped after meeting a man she met on
the site.126 The complaint details how the girl, even though she
was under the age of fourteen, created a profile and was soon
contacted by Peter Solis (Solis), a nineteen-year-old community
college student (who had told the girl he was fourteen), whom she
then began communicating with on a regular basis.127 The girl
“eventually met him for dinner and a movie after which they drove
in his car to the parking lot of an apartment complex, where, the
complaint alleges, he sexually assaulted her.”128 The complaint
“makes claims against MySpace and News Corp[oration] for
negligence,
gross
negligence,
fraud
and
negligent
misrepresentation and against Solis for sexual assault and
intentional infliction of emotional distress,”129 for which the
plaintiff “seeks damages for present and future medical and
psychological care, pecuniary loss, mental anguish, psychological
trauma, pain and suffering, and emotional distress.”130 The
124. Andrews, supra note 113, at 47.
125. Id. at 48 (alteration in original).
126. Jane Doe v. MySpace, Inc., No. D-1-GN-06-002209 (D.C. of Travis
Cty., Tex. June 19, 2006) (Jane Doe MySpace complaint page 13). On
February 14, 2007, a federal judge in Texas dismissed the lawsuit against
MySpace that blamed the Web site for lacking proper safeguards to protect
underage users. Peter Lattman, Federal Judge Tosses MySpace Lawsuit,
THE WALL ST. J., February 15, 2007 available at http://blogs
.wsj.com/law/2007/02/15/federal-judge-tosses-myspace-lawsuit. The judge
ruled that expecting MySpace to verify every user’s age “would of course stop
MySpace’s business in its tracks,” and if anyone had a duty to protect Julie
Doe, it was her parents, not MySpace.” Id.
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128. Rebecca Porter, Advocates Look to Protect Kids From Web Networking
Dangers, 42 OCT. TRIAL 16 (2006).
129. Id. at 16, 18.
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complaint details what the plaintiff deems to be “a disturbing
number of incidents [that] have occurred nationwide in which
adult MySpace users contacted young underage MySpace users on
MySpace,”131 then “arranged to meet the minors, and often
sexually assaulted them.”132 The plaintiff contends, “there are
absolutely no meaningful protections or security measures to
protect young underage users from being contacted by sexual
predators on MySpace.”133
Understandably “parents are
134
however there is real debate over
traumatized by such stories,”
whether these concerns are warranted.135
Many argue that the “national media coverage of MySpace
and other similar sites has overplayed a few instances of child
predation online,”136 and created a situation that is “ripe for moral
panic.”137 The media would have people believe that socialnetworking sites are “a haven for online sexual predators who
have made these corners of the Web their own virtual hunting
ground.”138 “The latest wave of parental concern seems to have
been largely spurred by ‘To Catch a Predator,’ a series on the NBC
news magazine program ‘Dateline’ that began in September of
2004.”139 Through the use of hidden cameras, this program has
offered “visual evidence,”140 of pedophiles coming to meet children
they initially contacted over the Internet.141
Seen as the
“complete and utter tipping point,”142 “To Catch A Predator,” has
the American public “convinced the Internet Bogeyman is going to
come into their window.”143
Danah Boyd, a Ph.D student at the School of Information at
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the University of California-Berkley, has done extensive research
on social-networking sites, and argues that “[t]he media coverage
of predators on MySpace implies that 1) all youth are at risk of
being stalked and molested because of MySpace; 2) prohibiting
youth from participating on MySpace will stop predators from
attacking kids,”144 and that “[b]oth are misleading; neither is
true.”145 Statistics prove that “kids are more at risk at a church
picnic or a boy scout outing than they are when they go on
MySpace.”146 The risk is often covered extensively, while few
actual cases emerge, exploiting anxiety and feeding fears.147
When people are allowed to “indulge[] in fear mongering”148 there
is naturally “a call to take action, even if it is wrong, a call to
action which races well ahead of any serious research or
thoughtful reflection on the matters at hand.”149
Unfortunately, “it was in this atmosphere that the House of
Representatives passed the Deleting Online Predators Act, or
DOPA.”150 Given the fervor of “MySpace Madness,”151 the
legislation was eagerly embraced by politicians who wished to
appear “pro-child and pro-family.”152 The DOPA was proposed by
Senator Michael Fitzpatrick, a Republican Senator from
Pennsylvania,153 who was a member of the Suburban Caucus, “a
newly formed group of Republican representatives who are
focused on addressing the concerns of suburban voters.”154
Legislative history demonstrates that Congress played upon the
fears promulgated by the media, and touted the DOPA as
legislation that would combat “the dark underside of social
networking Web sites, which have been stalking grounds for
sexual predators who are preying on children all across the
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nation.”155
Advocates of the legislation argued, “[s]ocial
networking sites such as MySpace and chat rooms have allowed
sexual predators to sneak into homes and solicit kids,”156 and
through
these
cyber-relationships,
children
are
being
157
victimized.
Reports to Congress detail the process of
“grooming,” where “by communicating with children regularly
over the Internet, the child predator is able to befriend the child
and make him or her comfortable with sharing personal
information with someone he or she has not met face-to-face,”158
and then “[e]ventually these communications become sexual in
nature, often as a precursor to asking the child to meet the
predator or to share sexual images of herself or himself.”159 The
DOPA was described as a new tool to protect our children from
online sexual predators, and its supporters challenged anyone to
oppose. The truth is “[w]ith the media whipping the nation into
hysteria about the perils of MySpace, what politician wouldn’t
want to be seen as protecting kids?”160 The fear factor was alive
and well, and “whatever their real opinion, politicians. . .vote[d]
for DOPA rather than risk being painted as pro-predator.”161
When panic is a component, “the Web gets censored in an
increasingly broad, slipshod way,”162 which was clearly the case
with the DOPA. The DOPA “raises questions about how much the
federal government should regulate the Internet,”163 and while
protection is a necessary goal it should not be “pursued to the
detriment of a legitimate and often vital exchange of ideas.”164
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The DOPA raises “red flags for all First Amendment
advocates,”165 because it “threatens free speech and education
online, while doing little to deter online predators.”166
Congress, faced with growing media hype over isolated
incidents of child predation, and genuine concern for child safety,
passed the DOPA. While Congress’ intentions were undoubtedly
righteous, the DOPA goes beyond the goal of protecting children
and infringes on First Amendment rights.
IV. THE DELETING ONLINE PREDATORS ACT

Officially, the Deleting Online Predators Act would “amend
the Communications Act of 1934 to require recipients of universal
service support for schools and libraries to protect minors from
commercial social networking sites and chat rooms.”167 The
legislation conditions E-rate funding for schools upon proof that
they are:
Enforcing a policy of Internet safety for minors that
includes monitoring the online activities of minors and
the operation of a technology protection measure with
respect to any of its computers with Internet access that
(I) protects against access through such computers to
visual depictions that are obscene; child pornography; or
harmful to minors; and (II) protects against access to a
commercial social networking website or chat room unless
used for an educational purpose with adult
supervision.168
In addition, E-rate funding for libraries is conditioned upon
certification that the library:
Is enforcing a policy of Internet safety that includes the
operation of a technology protection measure with respect
to any of its computers with Internet access that protects
against access through such computers to visual
depictions that are obscene; child pornography; or
AGAINST CENSORSHIP NEWSLETTER – CENSORSHIP NEWS, SPECIAL ISSUE: FREE
EXPRESSION ONLINE, (NCAC, New York, N.Y.) 2006.
165. Nat’l Coal Against Censorship, supra note 11.
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167. Deleting Online Predators Act, H.R. 5319, 109th Cong. (2006) (official
title as introduced).
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harmful to minors; and protects against access by minors
without parental authorization to a commercial social
networking website or chat room, and informs parents
that sexual predators can use these websites and chat
rooms to prey on children.169
While the final definition of a commercial social-networking
website will be determined by the Federal Communications
Commission, the DOPA suggests that the Commission:
Take into consideration the extent to which a website is
offered by a commercial entity; permits registered users
to create an on-line profile that includes detailed personal
information; permits registered users to create an on-line
journal and share such a journal with other users; elicits
highly-personalized information from users; and enables
communication among users.170
The bill would allow access to these sites in schools with adult
supervision and only if the site is being accessed for an
educational purpose.171 In libraries access to the blocked sites
would be allowed during use by an adult or by minors with adult
supervision to enable access for educational purposes.172 Finally,
the DOPA requires the Federal Trade Commission to:
Issue a consumer alert regarding the potential dangers to
children of Internet child predators, including the
potential danger of commercial social networking
websites and chat rooms through which personal
information about child users of such websites may be
accessed by child predators, and establish a website to
serve as a resource for information for parents, teachers
and school administrators, and others regarding the
potential dangers posed by the use of the Internet by
children, including information about commercial social
networking websites and chat rooms through which
personal information about child users of such websites
may be accessed by child predators.173
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V. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS WITH THE DOPA IN LIGHT
OF THE RULING IN UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN LIBRARY
ASSOCIATION

In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court held that unlike
invasive radio or television, the Internet is not “subject to the type
of government supervision and regulation that has attended the
broadcast industry.”174 For the Court, the Internet is entitled to
the highest degree of First Amendment protection similar to the
protection afforded to print media.175 However, the Court has
consistently acknowledged that the government has a compelling
interest in protecting children from physical and psychological
harm, including obscene and indecent material.176 As a result,
the government can apply restrictions for children in areas where
they would not be allowed to limit adults, and these restrictions
are often given deference by the courts.177 According to the Court,
Congress finally found an acceptable balance between these
competing concerns when it passed the CIPA,178 the only child
protection Internet regulation to pass judicial scrutiny thus far.179
The DOPA has been compared to the CIPA, as proponents see this
new legislation as simply an extension of what had already been
deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court.180 The CIPA is
considered “the dominant federal law in the area of schools,
libraries, and the Internet,”181 so it is seems crucial to analyze the
constitutionality of the DOPA under the same framework utilized
by the Court in United States v. American Library Association.
Even when analyzed under the American Library Association
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structure the DOPA is constitutionally problematic because the
filters lead to extensive overblocking of constitutionally protected
speech.
A. Level of Scrutiny
With the CIPA, the Court held that “the government has
broad discretion to make content based judgments in deciding
what private speech to make available to the public.”182 The first
crucial step in the Court’s analysis was determining whether a
library is considered a public forum for purposes of First
Amendment examination.183
The public forum analysis
determines the level of scrutiny the Court will apply to the
challenged legislation.184 Content-based restrictions aimed at a
public forum require strict scrutiny, while content-based
regulations aimed at a non-public forum only have to survive
rational basis.185 While examining the constitutionality of the
CIPA, the Court held that libraries are not considered public
forums for purposes of the First Amendment, and that libraries
offer their resources “to facilitate research, learning, and
recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of requisite and
appropriate quality.”186 Thus, the Court reviewed the CIPA under
a rational basis standard, but only with a plurality of justices
agreeing.187 Although American Library Association did not
discuss schools, the Court has held that “school facilities may be
deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have by
policy or by practice opened those facilities for indiscriminate use
by the general public, or by some segment of the public, such as
student organizations.”188 In addition, “[t]he government does not
create a public forum by inactions or by permitting limited
disclosure, but only by intentionally opening a non-traditional
forum for public discourse.”189 For the Court, “the Internet is
simply another method for making information available in a
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school or library.”190 Therefore any constitutional challenge to the
DOPA, which is aimed at both schools and libraries, will likely be
subject to rational basis review. Rational basis review requires
the government to only show a legitimate state interest and that
the law in question is rationally related to that interest.191 Even
under rational basis, which is viewed as an undemanding
standard, the DOPA does not pass constitutional scrutiny because
the commercial social-networking definition is so broad that it is
irrational.
Some argue that the DOPA should be subject to a higher
degree of scrutiny. This argument is analogous to Justice Breyer’s
concurrence in American Library Association.192 For Breyer the
CIPA should have been analyzed under “heightened, but not
strict, scrutiny,”193 where the Court should have “examin[ed] the
statutory requirements in question with special care.”194 This
was especially necessary when “complex, competing constitutional
interests are potentially at issue or speech-related harm is
potentially justified by unusually strong governmental
interests.”195 Under this heightened scrutiny, the Court must
determine “whether the harm to speech-related interests is
disproportionate in light of both the justifications and the
potential alternatives.”196 To resolve this question the Court
should consider “the legitimacy of the statute’s objective, the
extent to which the statute will tend to achieve that objective,
whether there are other, less restrictive ways of achieving that
objective, and ultimately whether the statute works speechrelated harm that, in relation to that objective, is out of
proportion.”197 Ultimately Justice Breyer found that even under
the heightened scrutiny, “[g]iven the comparatively small burden
that the Act imposes upon the library patron seeking legitimate
Internet materials, I cannot say that any speech-related harm
190. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 106-141, 7 (1999) (alteration in original).
191. Robert Corn-Revere, United States v. American Library Association:
A Missed Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Clarify Application of First
Amendment Law to Publicly Funded Expressive Institutions, (CATO SUPREME
COURT REV.) 105, 115 (2003).
192. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 216-17 (Breyer, J. concurring).
193. Id. at 216.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 217.
197. Id. at 217-18.

that the Act may cause is disproportionate when considered in
relation to the Act’s legitimate objectives.”198
Because the
decision in American Library Association was only a plurality
opinion, many argue that rational basis review will not be the last
word on such filtering issues. It is possible that in the future the
Court might review legislation such as the DOPA under Breyer’s
heightened scrutiny standard, a view more in keeping with
decisions prior to American Library Association.199 Reviewing
legislation under
heightened scrutiny allows the Court to
question the fit of the law and its objectives, as well as less
onerous filtering alternatives.200 These issues were discussed at
length in earlier cases deciding the constitutionality of
Congressional attempts at regulating the Internet for children.201
Logically if the DOPA fails rational basis, it also would be
constitutionally infirm under a heightened scrutiny as well.
B. Broad Definition of Commercial Social-Networking Sites
Leads to Overblocking
Critics challenged the CIPA because of “its tendency to
overblock access to constitutionally protected speech that falls
outside the categories software users intend to block.”202 The
objective of the CIPA was to “block images that constitute
obscenity or child pornography, and to prevent minors from
obtaining access to material that is harmful to them,”203 however
challengers argued that the legislation screened out material that
was constitutionally protected. This was of particular concern
regarding adults, for they would “be denied access to a substantial
amount of non-obscene material harmful to children but lawful for
adult examination, and a substantial quantity of text and pictures
harmful to no one.”204 The Court seemed to summarily dismiss
this argument by holding that “such concerns are dispelled by the
198. Id. at 220 (alteration in original).
199. See Corn-Revere, supra note 191, at 116.
200. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 217 (2003).
201. See Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA II), 542 U.S. at 660. The Court held
that the government failed to rebut the contention that there were plausible
less restrictive alternatives available. Id. See also Free Speech Coal., 535
U.S. 234, 255 (2002). The Court held that the CPPA failed constitutional
muster because it prohibited protected speech. Id.
202. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 195-96.
203. Id. at 199.
204. Id. at 233-34.

ease with which patrons may have the filtering software
disabled.”205 The CIPA allowed the filters to be disabled “to
enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purposes,”206
and stated that adults can ask for the filters to be disabled at
anytime.207
While a disabling feature salvaged the CIPA, it is unlikely
that the DOPA’s disabling element would produce the same result.
The CIPA filters were aimed at preventing certain types of
harmful information to reach minors, so websites were filtered
based on content,208 however, the DOPA proposed filters, created
to prevent harmful information from reaching minors, appear
more focused on technology than content. Instead of blocking sites
that simply contain harmful information, the DOPA would make
restrictions based on the technology of the website,209 under the
assumption that sites utilizing this technology are “a haven for
online sexual predators who have made these corners of the Web
their own virtual hunting ground.”210 Essentially the DOPA
would require blocking access to the social-networking sites
themselves, without even looking at whether there was harmful
material on the site.
This restriction would reach more
constitutionally protected speech, for both minors and adults, than
a
filter
that
might
prevent
initial
access
to
www.SuperBowlXXX.com
because it contains the keywords
“XXX.”211 While the majority of the speech blocked by the CIPA is
harmful to minors, most of the speech blocked by the DOPA is not
harmful, and thus constitutionally protected.212 Although the
DOPA allows access to social-networking sites for educational
purposes with adult supervision,213 this is likely not enough when
one considers the sheer magnitude of websites caught in the cross-

205. Id. at 209.
206. Id. at 201 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) and 47 U.S.C. § 254
(h)(6)(d)) (internal quotations omitted).
207. See id. (quoting U.S.C. § 254 (h)(6)(d)).
208. See Children’s Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2001).
209. Deleting Online Predators Act, H.R. 5319, 109th Cong. (2006).
210. 152 CONG. REC. H5883, H5884 (2006) (statement of Rep. Upton).
211. See Ann Beeson & Chris Hansen, Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace
Burning, ACLU Legal Department, Mar. 17, 2002, http://www.aclu.org/
privacy/speech/15145pub20020317.html.
212. See 152 CONG. REC. H5885 (2006) (Mr. Stupak quoting the American
Library Association).
213. See Deleting Online Predators Act, H.R. 5319, 109th Cong. (2006).

fire. The majority of the blocked websites would contain speech
that is protected both for children and adults. The language of the
DOPA is “overly broad and too restrictive,”214 and thus is
irrational in scope.
Even with disabling provisions, the number and assortment of
websites that would be ensnared in the DOPA’s proposed
definition for commercial social-networking sites is intolerable
even under a rational basis standard. The DOPA would “put offlimits a wide swath of the Internet: MySpace, but also Blogger,
AIM, parts of Google and Yahoo!, and perhaps even news sites like
the NYTimes.com (which allows visitors to create profiles and add
comments).”215 In addition the DOPA would block blogging tools,
mailing lists, video and podcast sites, and photo sharing sites,216
and even sites like Amazon.com (where you can make a wish list)
and the government’s own First Gov website.217 The potential for
children to obtain or encounter harmful material through socialnetworking sites, “may not be enough to overcome the free speech
problems that the bill creates by its broad restrictions on access to
and use of this and similar sites,”218 even under rational basis.
When one takes into consideration the potentially positive
attributes of the material being overblocked by the DOPA, the
lack of a rational relationship between the objective of protecting
children, and the all encompassing commercial social-networking
definition is clear. The DOPA’s description of a commercial socialnetworking site does not take into account the “real pedagogical
value”219 of Internet sites labeled under the definition. Teachers
are beginning to:
Use blogs for knowledge sharing in schools; they use
mailing lists to communicate expectations about
homework with students and parents;”220 “[t]hey are
discovering that students take their assignments more
seriously and write better if they are producing work
which will reach a larger public rather than simply sit on

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Kenney, supra note 160.
Id.
Boyd, supra note 122.
Ramasastry, supra note 181.
Pike, supra note 180.
Boyd, supra note 122.
Id.

a teacher’s desks;”221 and they are “linking together
classrooms around the country and around the world,
getting kids from different cultural backgrounds to share
aspects of their everyday experience with each other.”222
If according to the Court, the “worthy mission”223 of libraries
and schools is to “facilitate learning and cultural enrichment,”224
it seems unlikely that it would accept such a tenuous link between
protecting children, and blocking all social-networking sites.
In addition to the loss of educational tools, “there are
countless positive uses for networking applications that are not
necessarily related to formal education.”225 The definition of a
commercial social-net-working site would include “educational
tools used to provide distance education, community forums that
allow children to discuss issues of importance, online e-mail
programs through which family members can communicate with
each other and with teachers and librarians at their local schools
and libraries, and even find one another in case of emergency.”226
The commercial social-networking site definition found in the
DOPA appears to assume that all sites that fit into the definition
harbor some material that is harmful to children, but the
definition fails to take into consideration “the value of Interactive
Web applications.”227 Social-networking sites “include support
groups for teenagers with physical and emotional disabilities,
forums for the exchange of ideas, and even tools to help kids
become acclimated to new surroundings.”228 For instance, “David
Smith, executive director and founder of Mobilizing America’s
Youth, the Washington D.C. based group that operates
Mobilize.org, said that many students . . . are finding that social
networking sites can be a great tool for social activism.”229 In
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 225 (2003).
224. Id.
225. Hearing Before the H. Sub. Comm. on Telecommunications and the
Comm. on Engery and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Beth
Yoke, Executive Director, Young Adult Library Services Association).
226. Id. at 2.
227. 152 CONG. REC. H5883, H5885 (2006) (statement of Rep. Stupak).
228. Hearing Before the H. Sub. Comm. on Telecommunications and the
Comm. on Engery and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Beth
Yoke, Executive Director, Young Adult Library Services Association).
229. McFerron, supra note 120.

March of 2006, “thousands of high school students across the
country, including an estimated 40,000 in Southern California,
walked out of school in protest of the anti-illegal immigration
legislation, many of which were organized in part on MySpace.”230
Danah Boyd, argues that “giving youth access to a public of their
peers, MySpace provides a fertile ground for identity development
and cultural integration.231 In addition, the DOPA may “increase
the digital divide,”232 because “lower-income kids may have their
only access [to the Internet] at schools or libraries,”233 and thus
would
be
prevented
from
“participat[ing]
in
online
communications, websites, and from learn[ing] the skills that
come from the use of such sites.”234 Research proves that these
“[n]ew Internet-based applications (also known as socialnetworking technologies) for collaboration, business, and learning
are becoming increasingly important, and young people must be
prepared to thrive in a work atmosphere where meetings take
place online and where online social networks are essential
communication tools.”235
In American Library Association, the Court determined that
under the CIPA, the number of overblocked sites would not create
a significant restraint on constitutionally protected speech,
because the content-based filters were specifically targeted “to
prevent computer users from gaining Internet access to child
pornography, obscenity or material comparably harmful to
minors,”236 and the ease with which the filters could be
disabled.237 Alternatively, the DOPA would place a significant
burden on protected speech because the technology-based filters
have little rational connection to the proposed basis for the
legislation, which is protecting minors from obscene material,
child pornography, and any other material that might be deemed
harmful to minors.238 While “it is important to protect children
from predators, laws should not inflict the collateral damage of
230. Id.
231. Nat’l Coal Against Censorship, supra note 11.
232. Ramasastry, supra note 181.
233. Id. (alteration in the original).
234. Nat’l Coal Against Censorship, supra note 11.
235. American Library Association, DOPA Information Packet: A Resource
for Librarians and Library Workers, Aug. 8, 2006, http://www.ala.org/yalsa.
236. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 215 (2003).
237. Id. at 209.
238. Deleting Online Predators Act, H.R. 5319, 109th Cong. (2006).

preventing Internet use.”239 Given the widespread filtering
authorized under the DOPA, even the disabling feature does little
to cure the constitutional infirmity of overblocking. Because the
DOPA would purposefully block access to many valuable “websites
whose benefits outweigh their detriments,”240 a library patron or
student would be forced to ask to release a significantly higher
percentage of websites they wished to visit This does not equate
with the “ease with which patrons may have the software
disabled,”241 for inadvertently blocked websites under the CIPA.
The DOPA as it was written would not survive constitutional
scrutiny under rational basis because blocking access to all
commercial social-networking sites is unreasonable when the
focus of the legislation is to protect children from harmful
material on the Internet. If the mandated filters from the CIPA
are formatted to block harmful material, the definition espoused
in the DOPA does not add additional safeguards; it simply blocks
additional protected speech. The DOPA is so overbroad it is
irrational, and thus does not pass constitutional muster.
VI. THE DEMISE OF THE DOPA AND THE BIRTH OF THE
PROTECTING CHILDREN IN THE 21ST CENTURY ACT

Luckily the DOPA never became law.242 However, even if it
had, it would have been struck down on First Amendment
grounds. After passing in the House of Representatives by an
overwhelming majority thanks to unusual bipartisan support,243
the legislation lingered in the Senate after having been referred to
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.244
When a new session of Congress began in January of 2007, all
proposed bills and resolutions that had not passed (including
DOPA), were removed from consideration.245 In addition, the
DOPA’s main sponsor, Michael Fitzpatrick, lost his bid for re239. Halperin, supra note 14.
240. 152 CONG. REC. H5883, H5885 (2006) (statement of Rep. Stupak
quoting American Library Association).
241. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 209.
242. H.R. 5319 [109th]: Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-5319 (last visited Feb. 17,
2007).
243. Id. Vote totals were 410 ayes, 15 nays, and 7 present/not voting. Id.
Role number was 405. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id.

election in November of 2006 when he was defeated by the
Democratic challenger, Patrick Murphy.246
Although this
momentarily allowed school children across the country to breathe
a sigh of relief,247 commentators agreed that it was very “possible
that in the next session . . . the issue of social networking
technologies might come to the forefront again.”248 Harsh critics
of the DOPA worry that another MySpace-related panic will lead
to new legislation aimed at social-networking sites.249
These fears were cemented on January 4, 2007 when Senator
Ted Stevens of Alaska proposed the Protecting Children in the 21st
Century Act.250 Although the legislation is in its very early stages
and has just recently been referred to the Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee,251 many are already
labeling the legislation as the “DOPA Jr.,”252 or “DOPA II.”253
The asserted purpose of the new legislation is “to amend the
Communications Act of 1934 to prevent the carriage of child
pornography by video service providers, to protect children from
online predators, and to restrict the sale or purchase of children’s
personal information in interstate commerce.”254 The second
section of the new bill is even called “Deleting Online
Predators,”255 and this section contains virtually the same
language as the DOPA.256 In addition to the DOPA language, this
section also calls for “a policy of Internet safety for minors that

246. Vikas Bajaj, Northeast, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at P10.
247. See Matthew Nelson, DOPA Dead (Probably), Jan. 3, 2007,
http://blog.clickz.com/070103-182147.html.
248. Young Adult Library Services Association, DOPA (Deleting Online
Predators Act), http://teentechweek.wikispaces.com/DOPA (last visited Feb.
17, 2007).
249. See LibraryJournal.com, Why Did DOPA Die? The Senate, the Foley
Scandal, and the Election, Jan. 8, 2007, http://www.libraryjournal.com
/article/CA6404709.html.
250. S. 49 [110th]: Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-49 (last visited Feb. 17,
2007).
251. Id.
252. Andy Carvin, The Birth of DOPA Jr., Jan. 23, 2007, http://www
.pbs.org/teachersource/learning.now/2007/01/the_birth_of_dopa_jr.html.
253. Xendi Jardin, Senator “Series of Tubes” Stevens Introduces DOPA II:
The Sequel, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.tuzworld.com/index.php/archives/954.
254. Protecting Children in the 21st Century, S. 49, 110th Cong. (1st Sess.
2007).
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256. Id.

prevents cyberbullying and includes monitoring the online
activities of minors and the operation of a technology protection
measure with respect to any of its computers with Internet
access.”257 As written, the Protecting Children in the 21st Century
Act would raise the exact same constitutional concerns as the
DOPA, with the additional concern that this legislation is still
viable and susceptible to the same fear mongering. On Tuesday,
February 13, 2007, “Dateline” aired the results of its ninth
undercover investigation in the “To Catch a Predator” series.258
The continual visibility of such remote threats is bound to keep
“MySpace Madness”259 alive and well, and the pressure on
Congress to protect our nation’s children will be stronger then
ever.
VII. CONCLUSION

In addition to the constitutional questions surrounding the
DOPA and similar legislation, there is the realization by many
that this type of legislation would do little to protect children from
danger on the Internet.260 The reality is, “Internet protection is a
moving target, and social networking is evolving more quickly
than the legislation aimed at regulating it.”261 Many advocates of
child safety believe that the most effective way to protect children
is through education where children can “learn how to use all
kinds of applications safely and effectively, and where young
people can learn how to report and avoid unsafe sites.”262 It is
difficult to see the wisdom in legislation that would “actually drive
children to go to unsupervised places, to go online, where they will
become more vulnerable to child predators.”263 To truly shield
children from harmful material, Congress cannot let emotion and
fear play a predominant role in legislation, because “reacting in
ignorance and fear. . . they increase the risks and discard the

257. Id.
258. Chris Hansen, All Kinds of Men, All Kinds of Stories – Part One of the
Texas Investigation, DATELINE, Feb. 13, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com
/id/17137110/.
259. Zeller, supra note 12.
260. Ramasastry, supra note 181.
261. Halperin, supra note 14.
262. American Library Association, DOPA Information Packet: A Resource
for Librarians and Library Workers, Aug. 8, 2006, http://www.ala.org/yalsa.
263. 152 CONG. REC. H5883, H5885 (2006) (statement of Rep. Stupak).

benefits of these emerging cultural practices.”264 Congress should
“take the initiative to research, identify, and develop the most
effective means to protect minors without restricting their access
to constitutionally and socially essential materials.”265 The DOPA
does not represent the most effective means to protect children
from harmful material on the Internet because it would be struck
down as a violation of the First Amendment due to pervasive
needless overblocking.
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Undocumented Immigrants and Their
Personal Injury Actions: Keeping
Immigration Policy Out of Lost Wage
Awards and Enforcing the
Compensatory and Deterrent
Functions of Tort Law
Immigration is by definition a gesture of faith in social
mobility. It is the expression in action of a positive belief in the
possibility of a better life. It has thus contributed greatly to
developing the spirit of personal betterment in American society
and to strengthening the national confidence in change and the
future. Such confidence, when widely shared, sets the national
tone. The opportunities that America offered made the dream real,
at least for a good many; but that dream itself was in large part the
product of millions of plain people beginning a new life in the
conviction that life could indeed be better, and each new wave of
immigration rekindled the dream.
John F. Kennedy1
I. INTRODUCTION

Today approximately 10.5 million undocumented immigrants2
1. JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 67-68 (1964).
2. For the purposes of this article, the population of immigrants who do
not have documentation to reside legally in the United States will be referred
to as “undocumented immigrants.” Besides the negative social implications
associated with the term, referring to a portion of the population as “illegal”
can be equated with assuming one is guilty until proven innocent. See
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1192 (4th
ed. 2002). When such dangerous assumptions are made, they negate the
viability of immigration laws because just as in other areas of the law, people
who must navigate through immigration proceedings may have valid legal
claims which afford them remedies under the law. See id. Furthermore, the
term “alien” even when used alone, carries its own negative implications. Id.
The term is isolationist, relegating even “legal” immigrants to the outer
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live within the borders of the United States and the number keeps
growing.3 The undocumented population is increasing at the
average rate of 408,000 people per year.4 Combined with the
documented population, the immigrant population is at its largest
level in history and continues to increase.5 It is against this
backdrop that the topic of immigration receives extensive publicity
via the media and, with the advent of the internet, public opinion
is much more accessible.6 While at first glance, public sentiment
about immigrants appears increasingly negative, public opinion
fluctuates dramatically over short periods of time.7 This wavering
opinion of and uncertainty about the immigrant population is not
surprising, however, considering that the factual basis on which
such opinions are premised is mixed and inconsistent at best.8
fringes of our society. Id.
3. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Jan. 2005),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ILL_PE_2005.pdf.
4. Id.
5. MARC J. PERRY ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MIGRATION OF NATIVES
AND THE FOREIGN BORN: 1995 TO 2000, at 1 (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-11.pdf.
The total immigrant
population (documented and undocumented) in 2000 was 31.1 million, an
increase of 57% in 10 years. Id.
6. The advent of the internet perhaps allows more fringe views on
immigration to be accessible to the average citizen. There are innumerable
websites devoted to anti-immigration policy which might give rise to an
inference that Americans are anti-immigrant. See, e.g., Border Guardians,
http://www.borderguardians.org (promoting the burning of Mexican flags at
anti-immigration rallies); Boycott Mexico, http://www.boycottmexico.com
(calling Mexico the “neighbor from hell”); NoInvaders.org, http://
www.NoInvaders.org (listing the names, addresses and related information of
companies across the United States that allegedly hire undocumented
immigrants).
7. In a recent Gallup Poll, people were asked whether they favored
reducing immigration. Only 39% of respondents to the June 2006 poll
favored a reduction in immigration. See Gallup’s Pulse of Democracy:
Immigration, http://www.galluppoll.com/content/?ci=1660. Compare this
number with the results of the same poll in April 2006, in which 47% of
respondents favored reducing immigration. Id. The number fluctuated, at
times erratically, from 58% in October 2001 to 49% in 2002 to 38% in 2000,
for example. Id.
8. Discourse as to the actual effects of immigration on the economic,
social and environmental areas of American life is diverse. There is no
consensus. Is it a wonder Americans are confused? For example, some argue
that immigration causes economic disadvantage for low-skilled Americans
who must compete for jobs with immigrants, see, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS,
HEAVEN’S DOOR – IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 63-64

This inconsistency seeps not only into the minds of Americans
but also into the law. While controlling immigration, with an
emphasis on undocumented immigration, is the traditional focus
of immigration law,9 there is an insidious movement to address
immigration issues through the back door of tort law by denying
undocumented immigrants a full course of remedies for their
injuries.10
Specifically, attempts have been made to deny
undocumented immigrants the right to collect lost wages11 in
personal injury actions with varying results.12 The result of
focusing on immigration policy when awarding lost wages in tort
actions is nothing less than erratic.13 Some undocumented
immigrants are denied any right to collect lost wages,14 whereas
others are allowed to collect lost wages based on American wage
rates,15 while yet others are allowed to establish lost wages based
on the wage rates of their country of origin.16 The focus on
(1999), while others argue that American workers are utilized in a more
productive fashion, resulting in an efficiency that is beneficial to the
economy. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, THE NEW AMERICANS – ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL
EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 4-8 (James P. Smith et al. eds., 1997). As for social
implications, some argue that we cannot be a sovereign nation because we
are too diverse, see, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION – COMMON SENSE
ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION DISASTER 209-11 (1995), while others argue
that it is our unique cultural differences that unify us. See, e.g, Stephen J.
Legomsky, Immigrants, Minorities and Pluralism: What Kind of Society Do
We Really Want?, 6 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 153, 160-61 (1998).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part III.A-D.
11. For purposes of this article, the term “lost wages” includes both past
and future lost wages unless otherwise indicated.
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1334
(D. Fla. 2003).
15. See Hernandez v. M/V Rajaan, 848 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1988);
Barros v. E.W. Bliss Co., Civ. A. No. 91-126330Z, 1993 WL 99930, at *2 (D.
Mass. 1993); Hagl v. Stern, 396 F. Supp. 779, 779 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Balbuena
v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1260 (N.Y. 2006); Majlinger v. Cassino
Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 70 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2005), aff’d sub
nom. Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246 (2006); Collins v. N.Y.
City Health and Hosp. Corp., 607 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t
1994); Klapa v. O&Y Liberty Plaza Co., 645 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (Sup. 1996);
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 247 (Tex. App. 2003); Peterson
v. Neme, 281 S.E.2d 869, 874 (Va. 1981).
16. See Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ. A. 01-1241-JTM, 2003
WL 22519678, at *7 (D. Kan. 2003); Sanango v. 200 East 16th St. Housing
Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316-19 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2004); Jallow v. Kew

immigration policy thus negates the compensatory nature of tort
law
by
inadequately
and
sporadically
compensating
undocumented immigrants for injuries they suffer as a result of
another’s negligence.
As a hypothetical example, assume Ms. A, an undocumented
immigrant from Guatemala, has resided in Rhode Island for 12
years. Ms. A has worked all twelve years at a local mill on a fulltime basis at the rate of $8.00 per hour. While walking home from
work one evening, she is hit by a drunk driver. Ms. A sustains
serious injuries and is out of work for one year, losing over
$16,000.00 in wages. Under the present system of awarding lost
wages, there are three possible outcomes to this scenario. First,
Ms. A finds herself before a court whose primary agenda is
promoting federal immigration policy and is thus denied lost
wages because she is in the country illegally. Alternately, Ms. A
finds herself before a court that tries to balance tort policy and
federal immigration policy resulting in an award of past lost
wages based on the rate of pay she would earn in Guatemala,
$2.00 per hour, leaving her with a lost wage award of
approximately $4,000.00. Finally, Ms. A finds herself before of a
court whose interest in a personal injury case is to abide by the
compensatory and deterrence functions of tort law, in which case
Ms. A is granted the opportunity to collect lost wages based on
American wage rates, thus being fully compensated for her injury.
This Note argues that whether or not an immigrant is
documented or undocumented, lost wage awards in personal
injury actions should always be based on American wage rates.
There is no legal basis for denying undocumented immigrants lost
wage awards based on American wage rates in personal injury
actions. The Supreme Court has never decided such a case. In
addition, while the Federal Government is responsible for
developing immigration law and policy, awarding lost wages to
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions is not
preempted by federal immigration policy. Finally, when the
courts fail to award lost wages based on American wage rates, the
compensatory and deterrent functions of tort law, which should be
the primary consideration in personal injury cases, are completely
diminished.
Not only do lost wage awards based on an
Gardens Hills Apartments Owners, No. 28907/2003, 2005 WL 1712206, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).

undocumented immigrant’s home country wage rates diminish the
efficacy of tort principles, but they also hinder the enforcement of
immigration law. Awarding lost wages based on American wage
rates serves a dual purpose in the enforcement of immigration
law. First, it serves as a deterrent for employers who might
otherwise be willing to hire undocumented immigrants to work in
unsafe working conditions and take the risk knowing that even if
an immigrant is injured, the employer may not have to pay lost
wages. Second, even when the negligent party is not an employer,
the backlash employers might face when a negligent party is
forced to pay an undocumented immigrant lost wages serves as a
secondary deterrence function which promotes immigration policy.
Part II of this Note outlines the historical development of the
areas of immigration law and tort law, delineating the unique
policies driving each area of the law. Part III of this Note
examines the issue of awarding lost wages to undocumented
immigrants and the bases of analysis in addressing the manner
and method of awards. Specifically, there is a close examination
of the Supreme Court case of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB17 and a discussion of why this lost wage case arising out of
a conflict between two federal labor law statutes is not applicable
to tort actions. Further, this Note addresses the preemption
argument against awarding lost wages. This Note analyzes how,
in fact, lost wage awards in personal injury actions are not
preempted by federal immigration policy. Part III of this Note
examines the policy arguments supporting awards of lost wages to
undocumented immigrants.
This Note concludes with the
suggestion that lost wage awards in personal injury cases of
undocumented immigrants should always be based on American
wage rates in order to promote the policies of tort law and that,
further, in promoting tort policy, immigration law and policy will
be best served.

17.

535 U.S. 137 (2002).

II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND TORT LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES

A. Evolution of Immigration Law
1.

Early Developments

Prior to the 1800s, immigration law was primarily committed
to the control of the states.18 Immigration legislation was largely
unnecessary in a fledgling nation in need of populating itself.19
The policy of the time was come one, come all.20 Unspoken
promises of religious freedom and a tolerant government induced
immigrants to leave their homelands.21 With undeveloped land
and a new world came the knowledge that a hard-working person
could create a new life and accumulate wealth.22 States passed
few anti-immigration laws at this time because of the need for and
value of labor.23 Furthermore, early attempts by the federal
government to restrict immigration met with animosity.24 Thus,
federal regulation was generally restricted to pro-immigrant
legislation.25 Under this policy of promoting the growth of a
fledgling country, the nation grew exponentially.26 From 1790 to
1850 approximately 2,515,000 foreigners migrated to the United
States.27
18. LEGOMSKY, supra note 2, at 2.
19. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.02[1]
(2004).
20. Id. There is some dissent as to how inclusive immigration laws were
even under state control. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of
American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1835-36
(1993) (arguing that immigration was not as unrestricted as today’s scholars
purport it to be).
21. EMBERSON E. PROPER, COLONIAL IMMIGRATION LAWS: A STUDY OF THE
REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION BY THE ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 9-10
(2003).
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 17.
24. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[1]. The Alien Act of 1798 gave the
President power to remove any alien he thought to be dangerous from the
U.S. Id. The Act was allowed to lapse after a two year time period because it
was so unpopular. Id.
25. Id. For example, in 1819 federal legislation controlling conditions on
ships carrying immigrants to the U.S. was passed. Id.
26. Id.
27. GEORGE M. STEPHENSON, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION: 18201924, at 99 (1926).

With the late 1800s came increased involvement by the
federal government in the area of immigration. The first general
immigration law28 enacted by the Federal Government was a tax
of 50 cents imposed on any non-citizen passenger coming by ship
to the United States.29 During this time period, labor groups were
organizing with an agenda focused on limiting the influx of
contracted labor from outside of the United States.30 While the
agenda was focused on labor issues, much of the labor group
agendas also carried racial undertones.31 Under the pressure of
labor groups and other anti-immigrant proponents, the rise of
immigration restriction began in 1882 with the enactment of the
Chinese Exclusion Act,32 which banned the entry of Chinese
laborers into the United States.33 In 1885, Congress passed a
law34 to discourage the importation of foreign laborers unless they
were needed for a new industry in which there was unmet
demand.35
The law was amended in 188836 to allow for
deportation of certain contract laborers.37 It is important to note
that much of this legislation passed during a period of time in
which depletion of open land and the competitive labor force was
increasing.38 Thus, the open policy of immigration which incited

28.
29.
30.
31.

Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 142.
Id. at 143.
ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882, at 17 (2004). In the 1870s,
the National Labor Union promoted the restriction of Chinese immigration,
pressuring legislatures to stop the “evil” presence of Chinese laborers in the
United States. Id. at 16-17.
32. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.
33. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 19. The Chinese Exclusion Act included a
provision that any Chinese person who was in the United States on
November 17, 1880 or had come to the United States between November 17,
1880 and August 4, 1882 could leave the United States and return. Id. This
provision was repealed in 1888, leaving many Chinese unable to return to the
United States even though they fell within the date requirement of the
Chinese Exclusion Act. Id. at 20. While the repealing act was challenged in
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the resulting decision produced further
restrictions on immigration law with the court reasoning that exclusion of
non-citizens was not a question for the judiciary, being a political issue and
incident to sovereignty. See 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
34. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332.
35. STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 143.
36. Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 566.
37. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[2].
38. STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 145.

development of a nation quickly turned into immigration control.
Even during this time period, the focal point of many of the
immigration laws was not only centered on labor but, more
importantly, on employers.39 Finally, in 1891, immigration came
under federal control40 with the creation of the Bureau of
Immigration.41
While earlier legislation generally focused on labor and
employment issues, the development of the Bureau of
Immigration brought about an even more exclusionist
immigration policy. The Bureau’s creation incidentally occurred
in the “depression-scarred” 1890s.42 The 1891 act that created the
Bureau also excluded from entering the United States various
groups including paupers, people suffering from contagious
diseases, and people convicted of crimes of moral turpitude.43 The
act further called for deportation proceedings against anyone who
entered the country illegally.44 In 1903, the list of excludable
immigrants grew to include such groups as beggars and
epileptics.45 In 1907, the feeble-minded and children without
parents were added to the ever-growing list of excludable
immigrants.46 While exclusion of the above classes of immigrants
was originally intended to limit entry for those immigrants who
were unable, due to physical or mental health problems, to care
for themselves, the restrictions ultimately were used to exclude
physically and mentally capable but poor immigrants.47
Restrictive immigration regulation reached its zenith in 191748
with the passage of legislation requiring a literacy test for all
incoming immigrants.49 While the earlier exclusionist laws
targeted what were thought to be “undesirables,”50 the literacy
39. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 28. Laws made it unlawful for
employers to contract with or import immigrants, publish advertising that
promoted immigration with promises of work or to pay for the importation of
immigrants to the U.S. See STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 145-48.
40. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
41. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 29.
42. Id. at 11.
43. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[2].
44. Id.
45. Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213.
46. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898.
47. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 28.
48. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
49. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 46.
50. STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 156.

test was a general restriction on all immigrants to the United
States signaling a nuanced shift in immigration policy in the
United States. Even though the literacy test was only enacted in
1917, it was discussed and promoted as early as 1912,51 at which
time immigration was reaching its peak.52 Compounding the
problem was the fact that World War I brought with it a sharp
decrease in immigration,53 but people realized that the end of the
War would bring along with it refugees from war-torn, ravaged
countries,54 resulting in mass immigration. Thus, the political
climate of the times facilitated passage of the literacy
requirement. While the literacy requirement was ineffective in
limiting immigration to the United States, its significance lay in
the fact that it garnered overwhelming support despite its
restrictionist nature. 55
By the end of World War I, immigration began to increase but
not at the “flood” rates that many anticipated.56 Even so, the
trend of restrictionist immigration policy continued influenced
largely by the post-war economic depression.57 Many of the
unemployed were war veterans, and this fact combined with the
threat of jobs being taken away from these men by immigrants,
stirred up “anti-immigrant hysteria.”58 At this time the United
States adopted a quota system59 to control immigration, beginning
51. See id. at 161.
52. 9.9 million immigrants entered the United States from 1905 to 1914,
more than any other ten year period in the history of immigration. DANIELS,
supra note 31, at 45.
53. STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 157.
54. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 45-47; STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at
157-58.
55. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 46-47.
56. See STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 178. 805,228 immigrants entered
the United States by fiscal year end June 30, 1921, a lower number of
immigrants than had entered the United States before the start of World
War I when the average rate of entry between 1910 and 1914 was over one
million immigrants per year. Id. It seems that fear of a mass immigration
was unfounded.
57. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[3].
58. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 47.
59. The quota systems have always generated interesting scholarly
debate. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 74-75 (arguing, among other
things, that the system is illogical and unreasonable and discriminates
among immigrants on “the basis of accident of birth”); Patrick Weil, Races at
the Gate: A Century of Racial Distinctions in American Immigration Policy
(1865-1965), 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 625 (2001) (discussing the racial
undertones of the quota system).

with the Quota Law of 1921,60 a temporary measure that
remained in place until 1924 when a permanent quota policy61
was enacted by Congress.62 The quota laws signaled another
subtle shift in immigration policy towards decreasing immigration
altogether.63 The quota policy implemented by the Immigration
Act of 1924 limited immigration by nationality, based on the
number of people of that nationality in the United States in 1920
up to 150,000.64 The result was a decrease in immigration of
nationalities governed by the quota system, particularly southern
and eastern European immigrants.65 The restrictive limitations
on immigration that developed over the years remained largely
unchanged until 1952.
2.

The Immigration and Nationality Act

In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), which codified existing legislation, loosened some
restrictions barring naturalization of East Asians, and simplified
reunification of husbands and wives.66 The most restrictive
aspect of the previous immigration laws, however—the national
origins quota system based on 1920 census statistics—remained
intact.67 While still largely restrictive, the more liberal elements
of the legislation were the result of the post-Cold War sentiment
which emphasized America’s role as the leader of the free world.68
The national origins quota system was finally abolished in 1965
and replaced with a fixed quota system.69 This change occurred
as a result of pressure from the Democratic platform of the early
1960s which described the national origins quota system as “a
policy of deliberate discrimination” contradicting “the founding

60. Act of May 19, 1921, ch.8, 42 Stat 5. The Act implemented a quota
system which limited the number of aliens of any nationality that could
immigrate to the United States at 3% of the number of foreign born people of
the same nationality already residing in the United States as calculated by
the 1910 U.S. Census. Id. at § 2(a).
61. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.
62. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[3].
63. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 48-50.
64. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat 153, sec. 11(b).
65. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[3].
66. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 77.
67. See GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.04[1].
68. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 113.
69. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.04[3].

principles of this nation.”70 The pressure for immigration reform
continued under the administration of President John F. Kennedy,
and abolition of the system came to fruition under the
administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson.71 Other than
abolition of the national origins quota system, however,
immigration law remained largely restrictionist in scope, with the
focus always on control.72
The system remained largely
untouched until the mid-1980s, when the focus began to shift back
to employment and labor concerns.73
3.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198674 (IRCA)
represents the single most extensive change to U.S. immigration
laws since the demise of the quota system in 1965.75 Fear of
undocumented immigration was at a peak during the 1980s as a
result of economic factors including inflation, recession, runaway
interest rates, and the highest unemployment rates since the
Depression.76 Implemented as a result of national dissatisfaction
with an immigration policy that was ineffective in preventing
undocumented immigration,77 the primary policy behind IRCA
was to deter illegal immigration.78 IRCA aimed to reduce
undocumented immigration via a multi-directional approach
emphasizing three areas: first, controlling illegal immigration;79
second, imposing penalties on employers80 who hired
undocumented immigrants;81 and third, allowing legalization for
certain undocumented immigrants already in the United States.82
While IRCA continued to place restrictions on immigration policy
in the United States, Congress emphasized that employer
70. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 129.
71. Id. at 133-35.
72. Id. at 135.
73. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.04[9][c].
74. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (1986).
75. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: IRCA AND THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE 1980S, at 2 (Frank D. Bean et al. eds., 1990).
76. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 220.
77. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION, supra note 75, at 1-3.
78. Id. at 2.
79. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 45 (1986).
80. Id.
81. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION, supra note 75, at 2.
82. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 49 (1986).

sanctions were the “most humane, credible and effective way to
respond to the large-scale influx of undocumented aliens.”83 Thus,
the focus of punitive sanctions was not on the immigrant as much
as it was on the employer.84 Furthermore, in making allowances
for undocumented immigrants already in the United States,
Congress focused not only on the contributions of these
immigrants, but also on their victimization and exploitation.85
While the focus of overall immigration policy remained on
restriction, punishing undocumented immigrants was not in the
minds of our legislature.86
4.

Developments After IRCA

Since IRCA, various legislative acts have continued to place
controls on immigration to the United States. The Immigration
Act of 1990, a great example of the historical ambivalence of the
United States towards immigration, increased the number of
immigrants allowed into the United States in future years while
simultaneously restricting due process rights of deportees.87 By
the mid 1990s, the ambivalence tipped towards restriction with a
proposed ballot initiative in California that prohibited
undocumented immigrants from attending public schools.88 The
ambivalence culminated in 1996 with the passage of a series of
restrictive acts. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

83. Id. at 46.
84. See id. Jobs and the economic benefits that flow therefrom are a
primary motivator for immigration to the United States. Take the story of
Elmer Jacinto, for example. Adam Geller, One Country’s Loss Is Another’s
Gain, THE STANDARD-TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at B6, available at http://
archive.southcoasttoday.com/daily/01-07/01-14-07/07perspective.htm.
Mr.
Jacinto left the Philippines, where he was considered one of the nation’s up
and coming doctors, to work in the United States as a nurse. Id. A doctor in
the Philippines makes between $300 and $800 per month whereas a nurse in
the United States makes $4,000 per month. Id.
85. H.R. Rep. No. 99-628(I), at 49 (1986).
86. Punishing undocumented immigrants is arguably counterproductive.
See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Stranger and Afraid: Undocumented Workers and
Federal Employment Law, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 553 (1989) (arguing that
demand for undocumented workers can be decreased by affording
undocumented workers access to extensive remedies for employment law
violations).
87. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
88. See Philip Martin, Proposition 187 in California, 29 INT’L MIGRATION
REV. 255 (1995).

Responsibility Act of 199689 (IIRAIRA) restricted immigration by
increasing border patrols, increasing punishments for
immigration law violations, providing for the building of more
barriers on the United States/Mexico border, and placing 10-year
bans on admission for immigrants attempting to enter the United
States after having been illegally in the United States at any
time.90 Other acts passed during this time decreased the rights of
legal immigrants to food stamps and supplemental social security
income.91 The tides had turned once again towards decreasing
immigration to the United States.
B. Evolution of Tort Law92
1.

Early Developments

The political and economic pressures that influenced the
development of American immigration policy emphasizing
restriction and control lie in stark contrast to the amorphous
policies underlying the development of tort law in the United
States. While immigration law was slowly federalized in the late
1800s,93 tort law evolved into its own distinct field of law.94 The
development of tort law was a direct result of the industrial
revolution, which brought with it not only jobs but also modern
machines and tools capable of crushing, slicing, and crippling
89. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
90. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 246.
91. Id. at 246-48.
92. The focus of Part II.B of this Note is the deterrence and compensation
functions of tort law and development of those functions through history.
This section is by no means meant to be an exhaustive analysis of tort
doctrine, which is beyond the scope of this Note. There are varying thoughts
on the purpose of tort law, theories behind tort law and whether the policies
behind the development of tort law are successfully served. The depth and
breadth of scholarly literature on the subject is limitless. See generally CARL
T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA (2001) (discussing the
regulatory nature of lawsuits); ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW
(1976) (compiling essays of varying viewpoints on tort theory); Victor E.
Schwartz et al., Toward Neutral Principles of Stare Decisis in Tort Law, 58
S.C. L. REV. (2006) (discussing neutral principles available to judges to
evaluate stare decisis while simultaneously changing tort law rules); Ernest
J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989)
(discussing tort law theory from an instrumentalist viewpoint).
93. See supra Part II.A.
94. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
3 (1980).

those who were unfortunate enough to cross their paths.95 With
modernization came increased risks, and by the late 1800s and
early 1900s industrial accidents accounted for about 35,000 deaths
and close to 2,000,000 injuries per year.96 The development of tort
law thus arose “out of the various and ever-increasing clashes of
the activities of persons living in a common society.”97 Increased
modernization brought with it “losses, or injuries of many kinds
sustained by one person as the result of the activities of others.”98
“The purpose of the law of torts was to adjust these losses and to
afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the
result of the conduct of another.”99 The resulting system for
combating these newfound risks was one focused on negligence,
which arises when the conduct of one person fails to meet a
standard of reasonable care and results in injury to another.100
Thus, an important policy underlying the development of tort law
was compensating individuals for injuries sustained as a result of
another person’s faulty conduct.101
While compensating the injured for their injuries was a
primary consideration of tort policy, there was some tension in the
early period of tort law resulting from the desire to redress the
injured as balanced against the economic growth and wealth
which in the late 1800s were thought to be for the “greater good of
society.”102 The same machines that happened to cut off one
man’s finger were giving thousands of other men jobs, and
producing, for example, railroad tracks that would be laid across
the country by tens of thousands of other men.103 There was
concern about placing so much liability on companies that it would
still the American economy.104 The courts developed numerous
doctrines to counter these concerns. The doctrine of contributory
95. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 262 (1973).
96. Id. at 422.
97. Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
238, 238 (1944).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE
COURTS: A STUDY OF TORT ACCIDENT LAW 18 (1987).
101. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed.
1971).
102. FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 410.
103. This hypothetical is not based on any statistical information and is
merely used as an example.
104. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 410-12.

negligence came into use in the United States in the 1850s, forcing
any plaintiff in a personal injury case not only to prove that
defendants were negligent but also to show that the plaintiff
herself was faultless.105 In 1842, the fellow-servant rule, which
barred employees from suing their employers for injuries caused
by the negligence of other employees, developed in American
courts.106 Other doctrines, such as the doctrine of immunity of
charities,107 assumption of risk,108 and the doctrine of imputed
negligence,109 continued to immunize companies from tort
actions.110 Negligence theory during this time period in history
had a marked affect on the ability of tort law to function as a
compensatory system.111 Arguably, during these early stages, tort
law was primarily about balancing economic interests against the
welfare of the injured, with a slight tendency to favor industry.112
Despite the fact that tort law development in the 1800s was
quite restrictionist, the courts were loath to encourage
carelessness.113
After all, another equally important policy
behind the development of tort law was that of impeding socially
unreasonable conduct.114 The more that people are held liable for
injuring others, the stronger the incentive to prevent similar
harms from occurring.115 Therefore, the driving force behind
liberal changes in tort policy during this time period was the goal
to counter the restrictionist nature of early developments in tort
law.116 Judges rejected the doctrine of imputed negligence.117
105. See Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41
ILL. L. REV. 151, 151 (1946).
106. See Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
107. The doctrine of immunity of charities protected charitable entities
such as hospitals from liability as a result of the negligence of employees or
others on their premises. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 416.
108. See, e.g., Lamson v. Am. Axe & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585, 585 (1900)
(holding that an employee who understands a danger and takes the risk is
barred from suing his employer for negligence).
109. This doctrine imputed the negligence of a parent to his child and a
driver to his passenger resulting in the child or passenger being unable to
recover for his or her injury. FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 417.
110. Id. at 416-17.
111. WHITE, supra note 94, at 61.
112. TORT LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS,
at xiii, (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987).
113. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 417.
114. PROSSER, supra note 101, § 5.
115. Id. § 4.
116. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 417-25.

The vice-principal doctrine developed, allowing injured employees
to sue their employers if their injuries were due to the negligence
of a supervisor.118 Legislative acts imposed higher standards of
care on tortfeasors,119 created negligence per se laws,120 and
imposed safety regulations on corporations.121 Finally, many of
the restrictionist rules were rejected by juries, who would “let
their hearts dictate results.”122 While ultimately the restrictionist
developments of the 1800s exceeded the expansionist
developments, the policies of compensation and deterrence
survived.
2.

Early 20th Century Developments

The early 20th century saw a general stability in the system of
tort law, with cases during this period tending to clarify tort
doctrine.123 Some change did occur during this period, however,
particularly in the area of causation.124 These developments
resulted from a shift in theoretical legal thought, from a more
scientific methodology to one largely influenced by the realism of
the 1900s.125 The nature of legal analysis took a turn toward
more policy-oriented doctrine.126 According to some scholars, the
case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad127 marked the shift in the
concept of causation, from a legal doctrine to an issue of public
policy.128 The Palsgraf case involved two men, one carrying a
package, trying to board a train.129 The guard on the train tried
to help the men onto the train as it moved away and, in the
process, dislodged the package, which fell to the rails and
exploded.130 Mrs. Palsgraf, who was standing near the platform
117. See id. at 417 (citing Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366 (1885); Bunting
v. Hogsett, 21 Atl. 31 (1891)).
118. See WHITE, supra note 94, at 51-55.
119. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 419.
120. Id. at 419-20.
121. Id. at 420-21.
122. Id. at 423.
123. Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 605 (1992).
124. See WHITE, supra note 94, at 93-102.
125. See id. at 91-93.
126. Id. at 98.
127. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
128. See WHITE, supra note 94, at 101.
129. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
130. Id.

but at a distance, was hit in the head by a scale that fell as a
result of the explosion.131 The Cardozo majority opinion focused
on the fact that the railroad owed no duty to Mrs. Palsgraf
because she was not within the zone of danger, making her injury
unforeseeable.132
The Andrews dissent was policy-driven,
reasoning that everyone owed “to the world a large duty of
refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the
safety of others.”133
After this decision, causation was
increasingly seen as an aspect of tort theory that involved policy
considerations such as fairness and social justice.134 This policy
shift complemented the notions of redress and deterrence that had
originally influenced the development of tort law.
3. The Mid to Late 20th Century Developments
Spurred by the public policy activism of the 1960s, which
abolished the national origin quota system,135 the mid to late 20th
century signaled a further shift in tort theory, strengthening the
deterrence and compensation policies of tort law with the
expansion of tort liability.136 The scope of liability broadened with
the abolition of immunities for charities and government.137
Comparative negligence replaced the contributory negligence; the
latter had barred recovery for plaintiffs bearing any responsibility
for the negligence, while the new doctrine merely apportioned
liability, allowing plaintiffs some recovery.138 The National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966139 was a response to
the realization that the most effective way to address highway
safety and decrease injuries and deaths was through better
product design.140 The 1972 Consumer Product and Safety Act141
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placed a new emphasis on protecting consumers and deterring
poor manufacturing practices.142 The policymakers of the era
therefore emphasized and promoted the deterrence function of tort
doctrine.
From the late 20th century to the present, the trend of
expanding liability has slowed, largely as a result of lobbying by
corporations concerned about the skyrocketing cost of liability.143
There have been a couple of notable exceptions, one in the area of
medical malpractice: the loss of chance doctrine allows patients to
recover in instances where doctors negligently diagnose their
conditions, even if their pre-diagnosis chances of recovery were
less than 50%.144 There was also an increase in the ability of
crime victims to sue landlords, public agents, and agencies for
negligence.145 However, expansion of liability has been largely
curtailed as a result of the legislative movement towards tort
reform.146 This type of tort reform focuses on reforming punitive
damages and pain and suffering damages, and on revising rules
for joint and several liability.147 Even so, the principles of
deterrence and compensation remain alive and well hundreds of
years after their development.
C.

Countervailing Interests of Immigration Law and Tort Law

When comparing the underlying purposes of immigration law
and tort law, it is notable from the historical development of each
area of law that each serves a separate and distinct function in
our society.148 Moreover, these functions lead in two very different
directions.
Immigration legislation, often influenced by the
prevailing political winds, serves to appease the masses by
excluding the powerless, whereas tort law serves to protect the
masses by holding negligent companies and people accountable for
their actions, and by allowing the injured to be compensated for
the injuries they have suffered.149 Because each area of law
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143. Id. at 691.
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serves a distinct and arguably useful150 function, the question
then becomes whether or not awarding lost wages to
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions serves the
policies of each area of law. Despite what may seem like
countervailing interests, the policies of both tort law and
immigration law are best served by awarding lost wages to
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions based on
American wage rates.
III. BASING LOST WAGE AWARDS ON AMERICAN WAGE RATES

A. The Country-Wide Inconsistencies
In awarding lost wages to undocumented immigrants in
personal injury actions, courts across the country take four
general routes. First, courts allow lost wages to be based on
American wage rates.151 Second, courts limit the award of lost
wages to wages immigrants would earn in their country of
origin.152 Third, courts elect not to award any lost wages
whatsoever for undocumented immigrants.153 Finally, courts give

150. In implementing the term “useful” by no means is it my intent to
support the current state of immigration law. It is likely that there are those
who would disagree that tort law as it stands today serves any useful
purpose. However, the purpose of this Note is to address the viability and
utility of awarding lost wages in personal injury actions of undocumented
immigrants only.
151. See Hernandez v. M/V Rajaan, 848 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1988)
(affirming award of future lost wages); Barros v. E.W. Bliss Co., Civ. A. No.
91-126330Z, 1993 WL 99930, at *2 (D. Mass. 1993); Hagl v. Stern, 396 F.
Supp. 779, 779 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d
1246, 1260 (N.Y. 2006); Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d
56, 70 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2005), aff’d sub nom. Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC,
845 N.E.2d 1246 (2006); Collins v. N.Y. City Health and Hosp. Corp., 607
N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1994); Klapa v. O&Y Liberty Plaza Co.,
645 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (Sup. 1996) (pertaining to future lost wages); Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W. 3d 233, 247 (Tex. App. 2003); Peterson v.
Neme, 281 S.E.2d 869, 874 (Va. 1981).
152. See Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ. A. 01-1241-JTM, 2003
WL 22519678, at *7 (D. Kan. 2003) (pertaining to future lost wages); Sanango
v. 200 East 16th St. Housing Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316-19 (App. Div. 1st
Dep’t 2004); Jallow v. Kew Gardens Hills Apartments Owners, No.
28907/2003, 2005 WL 1712206, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (pertaining to both
past and future lost wages).
153. See Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1334
(D. Fla. 2003).

juries154 the opportunity to award wages based on either
American wage rates or country of origin wage rates.155 The
inconsistencies in lost wage awards arise as a result of some
courts emphasizing policies underlying immigration law156 while
other courts emphasize policies underlying tort law.157 These
inconsistencies reveal the tensions the courts face in both
considering fairness to the injured and honoring the purposes of
immigration law and tort law. To compound the problem, the
Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of awarding lost
wages in personal injury actions of undocumented immigrants;
thus, the states are left to fend for themselves.158

154. In these cases, juries are allowed to weigh evidence of immigration
status. For an analysis of evidentiary issues relating to immigration status,
see Benny Agosto, Jr. and Jason B. Ostrom, Can the Injured Migrant Worker’s
Alien Status Be Introduced at Trial?, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 383 (2005)
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and ways to safeguard against admissibility of status).
155. See Madeira v. Affordable Housing Found., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504,
507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (conceding that immigration status was relevant to
determining lost wages but holding that the jury’s award based on U.S.
wages should stand); Mischalski v. Ford Motor Co., 935 F. Supp 203, 207
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that while immigration status could not be
considered to calculate damages, it could be used in calculating lost wages);
Rodriguez v. Kline, 232 Cal.Rptr. 157, 158 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1986)
(discussing that it is for the court to decide whether or not lost wages shall be
calculated based on U.S. rates or limited to country of citizenship); Melendres
v. Soales, 306 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing jury to
consider immigration status in calculating lost wages); Rosa v. Partners in
Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994 (N.H. 2005); Oro v. 23 East 79th St. Corp., 810
N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Sup. App. Term 2005) (holding that immigration status
could be considered in awarding lost wages); Echeverria v. Lindner, No.
018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (allowing
immigration status to be considered in determining future lost wages).
156. See, e.g., Veliz, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1335; Hernandez-Cortez, 2003 WL
22519678, at *6.
157. See, e.g., Madeira, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 507; Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus
Lines, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 576, 577 (N.D. Ill. 1936); Rosa, 868 A.2d at 1000;
Majlinger 802 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
158. However, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of awarding
lost wages to undocumented immigrants who were fired by their employers
for participating in unions. The Court has held that awarding lost wages
would be counter to federal immigration policy. Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 137 (2002); Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891
(1984). While advocates of prohibiting lost wage awards argued that
Hoffman and Sure-Tan apply to personal injury actions, the courts have
overwhelmingly rejected the argument. See Rosa, 868 A. 2d at 1000; Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W. 3d 233, 244 (Tex. 2003). Hoffman and SureTan are discussed further infra Part III.C. For a further look at how lost

In considering awards of lost wages for undocumented
immigrants in personal injury actions, a tri-focal pattern evolves:
first, because there is no Supreme Court decision with respect to
lost wages in personal injury actions, proponents rely on Hoffman
as applicable to personal injury actions.159 Second, the courts
focus on preemption of state tort law by federal immigration
policy.160 Finally, the courts emphasize the policy arguments for
and against both tort law and immigration law.161 However, a
closer examination of cases across the United States will show
that awarding “American” lost wages to undocumented
immigrants promotes the policies behind both immigration law
and tort law despite their countervailing interests.
B. The Role of Hoffman Plastics in Tort Actions
Although there is no Supreme Court decision on awarding lost
wages to undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions,
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB162 and its predecessor
Sure-Tan v. NLRB163 are often cited as a bar to such awards.164
In the Hoffman case, Jose Castro, who was not legally authorized
to work in the United States, was laid off from his employment
with Hoffman Plastic Compounds as a result of his participation
in a union organizing campaign.165 Castro filed a complaint with
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) arguing that the
layoff violated the National Labor Relations Act.166 The NLRB
agreed with Castro and ordered back pay from the date of
termination to the date the employer discovered Castro was

wage awards for undocumented immigrants are treated in various areas of
law after Sure-Tan, see Timothy M. Cox, A Call To Revisit Sure-Tan v.
NLRB: Undocumented Workers and Their Right to Back Pay, 30 SW. U. L.
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164. See Madeira v. Affordable Housing Found., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504,
507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ. A. 01-1241JTM, 2003 WL 22519678, at *6 (D. Kan. 2003); Majlinger v. Cassino
Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 60 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2005); Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 243 (Tex. 2003).
165. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137.
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unable to work.167 Hoffman Plastic Compounds petitioned for
review, arguing that IRCA, which made it unlawful to both
employ undocumented immigrants and to use fraudulent
documents to gain employment as an undocumented immigrant,
precluded the NLRB from awarding back pay.168 The Supreme
Court agreed with the petitioner and held that “federal
immigration policy, as expressed by Congress in IRCA, foreclosed
the Board from awarding back pay to an undocumented alien who
has never been legally authorized to work in the United
States.”169 The Court reasoned that in enacting IRCA, Congress
had implemented a comprehensive scheme to deter the
employment of undocumented immigrants, and that allowing a
back pay award in a labor dispute violated specific prohibitions of
federal immigration law.170
While there have been numerous attempts to apply Hoffman
in personal injury cases,171 such application poses several
problems due to the limited holding of Hoffman. The Hoffman
court’s decision involved resolving an apparent conflict between
two federal statutes, IRCA and the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”).172 In contrast, tort actions are generally governed by
state statutory regulation. Further, a prevailing issue in Hoffman
was the conflict between IRCA’s purpose of deterring employment
of undocumented workers and awarding lost wages as a result of
employer violations of NLRA.173 Federal labor law governs
employer/employee relationships. The same cannot be said,
however, for cases that arise under tort law. Tort law does not
regulate employer/employee relationships but governs negligent
behavior by negligent parties regardless of whether such a party
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 138.
171. See Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ. A. 01-1241-JTM, 2003
WL 22519678, at *1 (D. Kan. 2003); Uribe v. Aviles, No. B166839, 2004 WL
2385135, at *1 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845
N.E.2d 1246, 1260 (N.Y. 2006); Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802
N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2005); Sanango v. 200 East 16th St.
Housing Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2004); Jallow v.
Kew Gardens Hills Apartments Owners, No. 28907/2003, 2005 WL 1712206,
at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Gonzalez v. Franklin, 383 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Wis.
1986).
172. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137-41.
173. Id. at 137-39.

is an employer, a friend, or a stranger. Many personal injury
cases arise as a result of car accidents,174 medical malpractice,175
fireworks injuries,176 slips and falls,177 and subcontractor work,178
to name a few.
Furthermore, while the undocumented
immigrants in Hoffman were unnecessarily terminated from their
employment, they did not suffer any physical injuries that
prevented them from working or living their daily lives.179 In
contrast, when undocumented immigrants seek lost wages under
tort law, they suffer physical, sometimes permanent injuries.
Hoffman, which resolved a labor law conflict, is thus inapplicable
in personal injury cases, and this view is supported by courts
across the country.
Courts across the United States overwhelmingly reject
application of Hoffman to tort actions of undocumented
immigrants. While the court in a New York case, Madeira v.
Affordable Housing Foundation, Inc., found that the plaintiff’s
immigration status was relevant to determining the nature and
extent of the lost wage award, the court explicitly rejected the
defendant’s argument that, pursuant to the decision in Hoffman,
an award of lost wages would be in contravention of IRCA.180
Beside the fact that the case was based on diversity jurisdiction,
an award of lost wages to an undocumented immigrant in a
personal injury action based on state common law does not offend
the holding of Hoffman, the court held, because Hoffman does not
bar undocumented immigrants from utilizing state courts to seek
compensation for a defendant’s tortious conduct.181 The Majlinger
court dismissed Hoffman along the same lines, arguing that to
read Hoffman as extending to personal injury actions would
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expand Hoffman’s limited holding.182 In Tyson Foods Inc., v.
Guzman, the Texas Appellate Court also rejected application of
Hoffman in personal injury actions.183 While the defendant
argued that Hoffman precluded awarding undocumented
immigrants lost wages, the court’s analysis of Hoffman limited its
scope.184 The Tyson case involved a common law personal injury
claim, whereas Hoffman involved an employer’s violation of labor
laws.185 Thus, the lower court’s award of past and future lost
wages was upheld as to Mr. Guzman, who was injured when hit
by a forklift as he rounded up chickens.186 Overall, the courts go
to great lengths to distinguish between the Hoffman line of cases,
which involved labor policy considerations, and personal injury
cases, which involve disputes between two private citizens as a
result of tortious conduct.187
Even where a court applied Hoffman to a personal injury
case, this application was limited in scope.188 In HernandezCortez, the only personal injury case to use Hoffman, the plaintiffs
were injured in a car accident while being illegally transported
from Mexico to North Carolina.189 The plaintiffs sought past and
future lost wages based on projected earnings rather than on
The court agreed with the plaintiffs’
actual earnings.190
contention that Hoffman did not preclude the ability of
undocumented immigrants to recover wages for work actually
performed.191 However, the court distinguished the instant case
from other personal injury cases which rejected the application of
Hoffman, because in the instant case there were no wages earned
and no actual work performed.192 The court was unwilling to
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award lost wages based on an entirely imaginary figure.193 The
court relied heavily on the fact that the undocumented
immigrants in this case did not work at all in the United
States.194 Application of Hoffman in this particular case did not,
therefore, support any arguments that Hoffman should be applied
generally in other personal injury actions because of the
Hernandez-Cortez is so easily distinguished. Personal injury cases
rejecting Hoffman have all involved injured parties who sought
lost wage awards based on actual work in the United States,195
unlike the instant case.
C. State Tort Law and the Preemption Argument
1.

Preemption Basics

Courts which bar lost wage awards often rely on federal
immigration legislation which allegedly preempts such awards.
Deterring the employment of undocumented immigrants in the
United States is a focal point of federal immigration law.196
Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a197 bars the employment of
undocumented immigrants,198 provides mechanisms by which an
employer is to examine the appropriate documentation of
employees,199 and includes penalties for employers who fail to
abide by the statutory provisions.200 The argument that develops
in cases wherein undocumented immigrants seek lost wage
awards for their personal injuries is that the “wages” earned in
the past, or those that could be earned in the future, are a result
of illegal employment in the United States.201
Because
immigration law seeks to deter employment of undocumented
immigrants, courts have argued that federal immigration policy
preempts any lost wage award based on illegal employment.202
Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress is empowered to
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preempt state law.203 Preemption arises in one of three ways.
First, state law may be preempted by explicit statutory language,
known as express preemption.204 Second, “[i]n the absence of
explicit statutory language signaling an intent to preempt, a court
may infer such intent where Congress has legislated
comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation.”205 This
type of preemption is known as field preemption. Third, federal
law preempts a state law that stands as an obstacle to the
purposes of the federal law, a type of preemption known as conflict
preemption.206
Thus, unless a state statute is expressly
preempted, field preempted, or conflict preempted, it will survive
the Supremacy Clause. In the case of awarding lost wages to
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions, such
awards survive all three prongs of the analysis.
2.

Express Preemption

There is little contention as to whether or not a lost wage
award to documented immigrants in personal injury actions is
expressly preempted by federal immigration policy, particularly
IRCA. Federal immigration statutes only preempt “any State or
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon those who
employ”207 undocumented immigrants. Congress thus limited
express preemption to sanctions against employers, not
employees. For example, in summarily rejecting the express
preemption argument, the Majlinger court reasoned that in
enacting IRCA, Congress gave no indication nor did it provide that
undocumented immigrants would be barred from their ability to
sue in state courts for personal injuries or barred from the right to
recover lost wages.208 What Congress did choose to do was to
implement employer sanctions.209
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3.

Field Preemption

While the federal government has the exclusive authority to
regulate immigration,210 this authority cannot be construed to
give the federal government exclusive authority to regulate
immigration through tort law. The premise on which field
preemption arguments are based is that field preemption
prohibits an award of lost wages because the federal government
has exclusive authority to regulate immigration, and this power
was exercised by Congress in its enactment of INA and IRCA.211
While this may be true, such an argument fails to consider that
lost wage awards in personal injury actions are based on state tort
law which is not a regulatory “arm” or extension for immigration
policy. Any lost wage awards that result from a personal injury
action are a result of tort policy, not immigration policy. Take, for
example, the case of Gorgonio Balbuena, a native of Mexico, who
suffered severe head trauma after falling from a ramp while
pushing a wheelbarrow, then sought redress under common law
negligence and labor law theories.212 The court quickly dismissed
the defense’s field preemption argument, noting that while IRCA
occupied the spectrum of immigration law, the state law in this
case occupied regulation of health and safety.213 In fact, the
federal government does not occupy the field of common-law torts,
which is traditionally an area of state control.214 Thus, an award
of lost wages in personal injury actions does not fall within the
scope of field preemption.
4.

Conflict Preemption

Awarding lost wages to undocumented immigrants under
state tort law is not an obstacle to Congress’ objectives in
implementing IRCA or federal immigration policy in general.215
The manner in which Congress intended to combat illegal
immigration via adoption of IRCA and other immigration statutes
supports the notion that such awards are not counter to federal
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immigration law.216 As previously discussed, federal immigration
law, including IRCA, places a burden on employers only.217 It was
never the intent of Congress to place immigrants, documented or
undocumented, in a position of undue hardship or suffering.218
Historically, Congress chose not to punish undocumented
immigrants by making “their contracts void and thus unjustifiably
enriching employers of such alien laborers.”219 To the contrary,
while Congress could very well implement legislation penalizing
undocumented immigrants for accepting jobs or preventing
undocumented immigrants from collecting lost wages, Congress
has chosen not to do so.220
In addition, occupational health and safety falls under the
broad police power of states, and barring access to lost wage
claims by injured undocumented workers decreases employer
incentives to abide by the state’s labor laws.221 Rejection of the
conflict preemption argument by the courts is even more
understandable in light of the fact that IRCA’s legislative history
expressly indicates that there was no intent “to undermine or
diminish in any way labor protections in existing law.”222
Furthermore, awarding lost wages in tort actions is
complementary rather than contradictory to immigration policy
because it makes the employment of undocumented immigrants
less attractive to “unscrupulous employers.”223
“Only by
equalizing defendants’ potential liability for injuries to authorized
and unauthorized workers can the objectives underlying both
federal immigration law and this State’s tort law and workplace
safety statutes be realized.”224
D. Policy Battle: Immigration vs. Tort Law
1. Where to Draw the Line
If Hoffman is inapplicable to personal injury cases because of
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its limited scope and state tort law is not preempted by federal
immigration law, then there should be no problem with awarding
American rate lost wages to undocumented immigrants in
personal injury actions.
Furthermore, in addition to legal
arguments that support awarding American lost wages to
undocumented immigrants, policy factors support the theory.
Underlying the majority of court decisions in such personal injury
cases is the struggle to balance the countervailing interests in tort
law and immigration law. Historically, tort law serves the
function of compensating injured parties and deterring negligent
behavior.225 Immigration law serves to control the flow of
immigration into the United States. Strict enforcement of tort law
principles will promote the policies behind both tort law and
immigration law.226
2.

Enforcement of Tort Policies

Juliet Neme was struck by a car while crossing the street.227
Mr. Rosa was severely injured when an aerial lift tipped over and
fell on him while he was working.228 Mr. Hagl’s employer was
hired by a factory to do some welding work and, because of the
factory’s negligence, Mr. Hagl fell into an open grease pit.229 Mr.
Melendres was enjoying an employee picnic when he decided to
join in the fun of diving into a lake from the dock.230 The facility
owners had not posted any signs barring diving or jumping into
the lake.231 Other people at the picnic had been diving into the
lake.232 Unfortunately, unlike the others, Mr. Melendres’s last
dive into murky waters of the lake left him paralyzed.233 All of
these people have several things in common: they are all
undocumented immigrants working in the United States, they
were all seriously injured and, most importantly, they all lost
wages as a result of their injuries.234 Under tort principles, the
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losses these injured parties bore, including lost wages, should be
redressed.235 However, barring or decreasing recovery to the
injured if they are undocumented immigrants places the emphasis
on immigration control and not the principles of tort law.
In upholding an undocumented immigrant’s right to lost wage
awards based on American rates of pay, courts should emphasize
the compensatory function of tort law. Someone who is injured as
a result of another party’s negligence has a right to recover
damages for his injury.236 The right to recover lost wages is not
limited to Americans but is a right that runs to immigrants
regardless of whether or not they are appropriately
documented.237 What is important is not the injured party’s
immigration status, but redressing a wrong that has occurred.238
Deterrence should also be a primary consideration in
awarding lost wages to undocumented immigrants. Even courts
that express some disfavor with the policy of awarding “American”
lost wages come to the conclusion that doing so is important for
the deterrence function of tort law. When Mr. Rosa filed a
negligence claim against various defendants as a result of injuries
he sustained when an aerial lift tipped over and fell on him, he
sought damages which included a claim for lost wages at United
States wage rates.239 The Superior Court of New Hampshire
transferred questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire all
surrounding the issue of whether or not the defendant was
entitled to lost wages.240 The Supreme Court acknowledged the
strong policies against awarding lost wages at U.S. rates in light
of the policies underlying federal immigration law.241 However, in
the same instance, the court recognized that the deterrence
principles of tort doctrine are in and of themselves an important
enough policy to allow lost wage awards against employers who
“knew or should have known” of the worker’s status.242 The court
found the fact that tort liability acts as a deterrent to reduce the
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risk of injuries to be compelling.243
eloquently put it:

As Justice Dalianis so

To refuse to allow recovery against a person responsible .
. . would provide an incentive for such persons to target
illegal aliens for employment in the most dangerous jobs
or to provide illegal aliens with substandard working
conditions. It would allow such persons to treat illegal
aliens as disposable commodities who may be replaced
the moment they are damaged. Such a result is
incompatible with tort deterrence principles.244
Thus, the deterrence function of tort law has been a primary
consideration when the courts undertake to allow lost wage
awards in the personal injury actions of undocumented
immigrants.
3.

Immigration Policy in Tort Decisions

Even as they promote tort policy, lost wages awards also serve
the secondary role of furthering federal immigration policy.
Holding a defendant liable for lost wages regardless of the
plaintiff’s immigrant status is compatible with and promotes the
IRCA’s policy of deterring employment of undocumented
Preventing undocumented immigrants from
immigrants.245
access to all remedies would not promote federal immigration
policy, but would create incentives for employers to hire
undocumented immigrants, “secure in the knowledge that such
employees would have no recourse in pursuing proper wages. . .”
for their injuries.246 By holding a negligent party as accountable
to an undocumented immigrant as that party would be to an
American employee, courts can reduce the incentive to hire
undocumented workers.247 Enforcement of tort law thus not only
supports the deterrence and compensation principles of tort law,
but also enforces deterrence of the hiring of undocumented
immigrants—the actual purpose of IRCA.248

243. See id.
244. Id.
245. Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (App.
Div. 2d Dep’t 2005).
246. Id. at 66.
247. Id.
248. See id.

In addition to serving as a deterrent to the hiring of
undocumented immigrants, awarding lost wages in tort actions
serves federal immigration policy by keeping the burden on
employers, thus comporting with the intent of IRCA.249 Under
IRCA, the emphasis is not on the duty of employees but on the
affirmative duty of employers to make sure that employees are
properly authorized to work in the United States.250 The intent of
IRCA was to hold employers accountable for unauthorized
employment; in fact, sanctions under IRCA are against employers,
not undocumented immigrants.251 Employers could avoid liability
issues by not hiring undocumented immigrants.252 As opposed to
frustrating the policy objectives of IRCA, awarding lost wages
supports these policies.253
IV. CONCLUSION

Injured plaintiffs who are deprived of their ability to work
because of their injuries should be able to avail themselves of all
tort remedies, including lost wage awards, regardless of their
immigration status. Not only should undocumented immigrants
be allowed to collect lost wage awards in tort actions, those
awards must be based on American wage rates. Regardless of
immigration status, undocumented immigrants who seek lost
wage awards have, with limited exceptions, worked in the United
States. As a result of injuries sustained due to another’s
negligence, they are prevented from continuing to work to their
previous capacity. Tort law is about compensating the injured.
When a plaintiff seeks a lost wage award, he is merely seeking to
be compensated for his loss. Immigration status has absolutely
nothing to do with the loss suffered. If an immigrant was earning
an American wage before his injury, his compensation should be
that same American wage.
Tort law also serves as a deterrent to future negligence. This
deterrent effect in and of itself is an important reason to award
American lost wages to undocumented immigrants. We send a
249. See supra Part II.A.
250. Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1001 (N.H. 2005)
(citing Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1119 (D. Kan.
2004)).
251. Majlinger, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
252. Rosa, 868 A.2d at 1000.
253. See id.

dangerous message when we punish the injured and not the
tortfeasor by limiting or rejecting their ability to collect lost wage
awards. Not only are we sending the message that undocumented
immigrants are a disposable commodity but we are also conveying
the message that unsafe work conditions, unsafe products, poor
driving skills, and other negligent behaviors are completely
acceptable. To diminish the ability of undocumented immigrants
to collect American lost wages is to eliminate the deterrence
function of tort law.
Finally, awarding American lost wages to undocumented
immigrants in personal injury actions keeps immigration as a
secondary issue, which is where it should be in tort decisions.
Basing tort law decisions on immigration policy is nothing less
than dangerous. Such decisions diminish the efficacy of tort law.
More importantly, decisions that focus on immigration policy
remove the burden of setting immigration policy from its rightful
owners, the legislature and the federal government. If, in fact,
there is an immigration “problem,” it is the legislature’s job to fix
it.
“[E]nforcement of immigration laws is the role of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. . .”254 not the courts that
are sought out by plaintiffs to remedy their injuries.
While immigration policy should take a back seat in tort law
decisions, awarding American wages to undocumented
immigrants in personal injury actions actually promotes
principles of immigration law, diminishing the strength of any
arguments to the contrary. A broad range of immigration
legislation focuses on employers.255 In implementing IRCA,
Congress emphasized that employer sanctions were the most
appropriate way to deal with the issue of undocumented
immigration, which is largely a function of economic necessity.256
Failing to award American lost wages in personal injury actions
thus diminishes the deterrence function of employer sanctions
imposed by immigration legislation further compounding the
immigration “problem.” Employers have no reason to discontinue
illegal hiring practices if those practices result in economic benefit
254. Cano v. Mallory Mgmt., 760 N.Y.S.2d 816, 818 (Sup. 2003). The
Immigration and Naturalization Service no longer exists and enforcement of
federal immigration laws is the responsibility of the Department of
Homeland Security.
255. See supra Part II.A.
256. Id.

to employers.
Perhaps the best way to enforce access to lost wages and other
remedies in tort actions is for the states to implement legislation
protecting the rights of immigrants in tort actions. Presently,
California is the only state that legislates that all people,
regardless of immigration status, have access to all “protections,
rights and remedies available under state law.”257 This type of
legislation protects immigrants and allows tort law to function as
it was intended. Further, this type of legislation sends a message
that may not have much to do with the law but says a great deal
about our nation and its policies; that the injured should be
treated fairly and with dignity regardless of who they are or where
they come from. In the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
“remember, remember always that all of us, and you and I
especially, are descended from immigrants and revolutionists.”258
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Virtually Face-to-Face: The
Confrontation Clause and the Use of
Two-Way Video Testimony
INTRODUCTION

Technological advancements have touched many aspects of
our society, including the way we communicate with one another,
the way we conduct business, and the way we entertain ourselves.
Technology has also had an impact in the legal field.1 E-mail
provides lawyers with the luxury of immediate and constant
contact with clients, the ability to exchange documents
instantaneously with clients and opposing counsel, and the
convenience of electronically filing documents with courts.2
Technological advancements, however, have raised questions
concerning the extent that such improvements will affect
courtrooms. One issue that has been raised is the use of live twoway video testimony in criminal trials.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .
. to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”3 This clause,
which is only applicable to criminal prosecutions, is incorporated
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus
making it binding among the states.4 The right to confront ones
accusers has also long been held as an important aspect of a fair
trial.5
There are several variations of electronic witness testimony in
criminal trials. First, the United States Supreme Court has held
1. Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World
or 1984?, 25 REV. LITIG. 633, 638 (2006).
2. Id. at 639.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay
Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 101 (1972).
5. See infra Part II.
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that under a “case-specific finding of necessity, the Confrontation
Clause does not prohibit a [s]tate from using a one-way closed
circuit television procedure for the receipt of testimony by a child
witness in a child abuse case.”6 Under this procedure, rather than
testify in the courtroom, the child witness is examined in a
separate room by the prosecutor and defense counsel during the
trial.7 The examination is recorded and displayed on a video
monitor for those in the courtroom to observe.8 Although the
defendant can see the witness, the witness cannot see the
defendant.9 The procedure permits the defendant to communicate
electronically with defense counsel, and objections and rulings are
made as though the child witness was present in the courtroom.10
Two-way closed circuit testimony is essentially the same set up
and procedure, except the witness can see the defendant over a
video monitor set up in the room where the witness is testifying.
While the Supreme Court has approved the use of one-way
closed circuit television in child sexual abuse cases,11 it has yet to
hear a case concerning the use of live two-way video testimony.
The circuit courts of appeals, however, are split on the issue. The
Second Circuit held that the two-way closed-circuit television
procedure, which permitted an ill witness in the Federal Witness
Protection Program to testify from a remote location, did not
violate the defendant’s right of confrontation.12 More recently,
however, the Eleventh Circuit held that witness testimony
provided via two-way video conference at trial violated the
defendant’s right of confrontation.13
In 2002, the Supreme Court considered a proposal to amend
Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that would
have expressly permitted testimony via video transmission.14 The
proposal provided:
In the interest of justice, the court may authorize
6. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990).
7. Id. at 841.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 841-42.
10. Id. at 842.
11. Id. at 860.
12. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80-82 (2d Cir. 1999).
13. United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1315-19 (11th Cir. 2006).
14. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 207 F.R.D. 89, 93 (2002) [hereinafter Amendments] (statement of
Scalia, J.).

contemporaneous, two-way video presentation in open
court of testimony from a witness who is at a different
location if:
(1) the requesting party establishes exceptional
circumstances for such transmission;
(2) appropriate safeguards for the transmission are
used; and
(3) the witness is unavailable within the meaning of
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4)-(5).15
The Court declined to adopt the proposal, however, for failure
to “limit the use of testimony via video transmission to instances
where there has been a case-specific finding that it is necessary to
further an important public policy.”16 In commenting on the
proposal, Justice Scalia not only disagreed with the proposal’s
acceptance of video conference testimony whenever the parties
were unable to take a deposition pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 15, but also with the Advisory Committee’s
suggestion that two-way video presentation “may be used
generally as an alternative to depositions.”17 Thus, the Court
rejected the proposed amendment, but more on the basis that it
permitted liberal use of video transmission testimony, not because
it would necessarily violate defendants’ right to confrontation in
exceptional cases.18
This comment proposes that live two-way video testimony is
constitutional under the Sixth Amendment for several reasons.
First, its use is consistent with the goals and protections intended
by the common law right of confrontation as it has been used
throughout history. Second, the procedure is more protective of
defendants’ interests under the Confrontation Clause than
currently accepted methods of presenting testimony, such as Rule
15 depositions and evidentiary hearsay exceptions. Finally, the
use of live two-way video testimony takes advantage of modern
15. Id. at 99 (appendix to statement of Breyer, J.).
16. Id. at 93 (statement of Scalia, J.) (internal quotations marks omitted).
17. Id. Rule 15 permits parties to substitute live witness testimony with
a witness’s deposition when there are “exceptional circumstances” and it is
“in the interest of justice” to do so. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(1).
18. See Amendments, supra note 14, at 93-94 (statement of Scalia, J.).

technology, making criminal trials more cost-efficient and
convenient, and increases foreign witness participation in trials
with foreign components not otherwise under the jurisdiction of
United States courts.
HISTORY

There is some debate over the origins of the Confrontation
Clause. Some scholars suggest that the right of confrontation
became a common law right as a result of the Sir Walter Raleigh
trial.19 Others claim that Raleigh’s trial provides merely a
“convenient but highly romantic myth”20 rather than the impetus
for the Sixth Amendment.21
The concept of confrontation can be traced back to biblical
times.22 Over two thousand years ago, as Governor Festus and
King Agrippa discussed the proper treatment of the prisoner Paul,
Festus stated: “It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any
man to die, before that he which is accused have the accusers
face[-]to[-]face, and have license to answer for himself concerning
the crime laid against him.”23 At a trial arranged by Festus,
Paul’s accusers confronted him and “laid many and grievous
complaints against [him], which they could not prove.”24
Face-to-face confrontation was also prevalent during the
Roman Empire.25 The Roman Emperor Trajan instructed the
Governor of Bithynia that in prosecuting Christians “anonymous
accusations must not be admitted in evidence as against any one,
as it is introducing a dangerous precedent, and out of accord with
the spirit of our times.”26
Confrontation surfaced in sixteenth century England when
the English established a jury system in which jurors decided a

19. See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 104 (1951).
20. Graham, supra note 4, at 100 n.4.
21. Id. at 104 n.23 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment was a reaction to the thenrecent form of trial in the vice-admiralty courts . . .”).
22. Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern
Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 384 (1959).
23. Acts 25:16 (King James); Pollitt, supra note 22, at 384.
24. Acts 25:7 (King James); Pollitt, supra note 22, at 384.
25. Pollitt, supra note 22, at 384; see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,
1015 (1988).
26. Pollitt, supra note 22, at 384 (quoting JOHN LORD O’BRIAN, NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 62 (1955)).

defendant’s guilt or innocence by applying the facts presented.27
Under this system, witnesses were sworn and asked to look upon
the prisoner.28 The witness then made his accusations against the
accused face-to-face, which the jury would consider in deciding
whether the accused was guilty or innocent.29
Despite confrontation’s crucial role in England’s early judicial
system, whether it was an absolute right was hotly debated.30
Originally, confrontation extended only to ordinary trials in the
assizes.31 In an attempt to protect the innocent, Parliament
enacted a statute in 1552 that required two accusers to be brought
before persons accused of treason.32 But because Parliament had
little influence at the time, the Crown ignored the statute, thus
“proof of treason usually consisted of confessions exacted from
alleged coconspirators under torture,” as the Sir Walter Raleigh
trial demonstrates.33
Raleigh was prosecuted in 1603 for the crime of high treason
and accused of plotting to make Arabella Stuart the Queen of
England.34 The only evidence to support his conviction was a
document containing the confession of an alleged coconspirator
named Lord Cobham, whose confession was obtained by torture.35
Raleigh, representing himself, demanded confrontation: “The
proof of the [c]ommon [l]aw is by witness and jury; let Cobham be
here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face, and I have
done.”36 Raleigh’s request, however, was not honored, and he was
convicted and executed.37
Interestingly, Lord Cobham’s
confession proved to be false, as he recanted in a letter to
Raleigh.38
Political prisoners did not receive the right of confrontation
until the John Lilburne trial, a man also known as “Freeborn

27. Jacqueline Miller Beckett, Note, The True Value of the Confrontation
Clause: A Study of Child Sex Abuse Trials, 82 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1609 (1994).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1610.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Pollitt, supra note 22, at 388 n.26).
33. Pollitt, supra note 22, at 388; see also Beckett, supra note 27, at 1610.
34. Graham, supra note 4, at 99-100; Pollitt, supra note 22, at 388.
35. Graham, supra note 4, at 100; Pollitt, supra note 22, at 388.
36. Graham, supra note 4, at 100.
37. Pollitt, supra note 22, at 389.
38. Graham, supra note 4, at 100; Pollitt, supra note 22, at 388.

John.”39 Lilburne, a Quaker minister, was accused of illegally
smuggling books into England that attacked bishops.40 At trial,
Lilburne refused to answer questions regarding the activity of
others in relation to the crime.41 Instead, he proclaimed:
I know it is warrantable by the law of God, and I think by
the law of the land, that I may stand on my just defence,
and not answer your interrogatories, and that my
accusers ought to be brought face to face, to justify what
they accuse me of.42
For his silence, the Star Chamber sentenced him “to [a] fine,
to stand in the pillory, to be whipped, and to stay in jail until he
was willing to answer questions.”43 But in a subsequent assembly
with Charles I, Parliament demanded Lilburne’s release, stating
that his sentence was “illegal, and against the liberty of the
subject: and also bloody, cruel, barbarous, and tyrannical.”44 As a
result, England provided its accused with the right to
confrontation.45
The right to confrontation, however, did not travel with the
English colonists to America, probably because many of them
lacked training in the law.46 Furthermore, problems inherent in
traveling to distant and unknown lands to colonize prompted the
colonial leaders to favor swift and rigorous execution of
judgments.47 Thus, the right to confrontation had to develop over
time in the American colonies.
The Salem witch trials were influential in establishing the
right to confrontation in the American legal system.48 In the
1600s, the existence of witches was such a concern in
Massachusetts that officials tortured individuals to learn the
identity of alleged witches.49 Many were accused of being witches
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Pollitt, supra note 22, at 389.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 389-90.
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Beckett, supra note 27, at 1612 (citing WITCH-HUNTING IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 8 (David D. Hall ed., 1st ed. 1991)
[hereinafter WITCH-HUNTING]).
49. Id. (citing WITCH-HUNTING, supra note 48, at 8).

based on these largely unsupported accusations.50 Once accused,
the suspected witches were “tried [before] a special tribunal . . . in
Salem without the opportunity to face their accusers, and
hanged.”51 Judge Saltonstall, one of the judges on the tribunal,
was so concerned with the methods and criteria used to convict
the alleged witches that he resigned.52
This tragic story, stained with false convictions and death,
finally ended when the Massachusetts legislature got involved.53
Troubled by the Salem witch trials, Reverend Increase Mather,
Massachusetts Colony’s Ambassador to England, insisted that the
Massachusetts legislature remedy the situation.54 In response,
the legislature issued a mandate requiring the tribunal to provide
the accused with an opportunity to face his accusers before final
conviction.55 As a result, the accusations decreased substantially,
because many were unwilling to face those they were accusing.56
The lack of evidence which ensued caused the Governor to dismiss
the Salem tribunal on October 29, 1692.57
Many of the other colonies also realized the importance of
confrontation. The Carolinas were one of the first colonies to
adopt confrontation as a rule of procedure.58 Connecticut used a
jury system that incorporated the right to confront one’s
accusers.59 Moreover, the New Hampshire General Assembly
recognized confrontation in a series of criminal laws, and New
York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania later followed.60
Furthermore, the notion of confrontation played a part during
the years leading up to the American Revolution. In 1774, the
First Continental Congress published Address to the Inhabitants
of Quebec to justify the American cause to the French settlers.61
The address stated:
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing THE SALEM WITCHCRAFT PAPERS (Paul Boyer & Stephen
Nissenbaum eds., 1977)).
52. Id. (citing WITCH-HUNTING, supra note 48, at 9).
53. Id. at 1612-13.
54. Id. at 1612 & n.53 (citing WITCH-HUNTING, supra note 48, at 9).
55. Id. at 1612-13 (citing WITCH-HUNTING, supra note 48, at 130).
56. Id. at 1613 (citing WITCH-HUNTING, supra note 48, at 130).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Pollitt, supra note 22, at 395).
59. Id. (citing Pollitt, supra note 22, at 393).
60. Id.
61. Kenneth Graham, Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 209, 218 (2005); Pollitt, supra note 22, at 398.

The next great right is that of trial by jury. This
provides, that neither life, liberty, nor property, can be
taken from the possessor, until twelve of his
unexceptionable countrymen and peers of his vicinage,
who from that neighborhood may reasonably be supposed
to be acquainted with his character, and the characters of
the witnesses, upon a fair trial, and full inquiry, face to
face, in open court, before as many of the people as
[choose] to attend, shall pass their sentence upon oath
against him.62
Prior to the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, the
Second Continental Congress recommended that the states set up
new government structures to better serve their constituents.63
Following the recommendation, Virginia’s Bill of Rights provided:
In all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right
to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be
confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for
evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an
impartial jury.64
Following Virginia’s initiative, Pennsylvania’s constitution
provided that “in all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man
hath a right to . . . demand the cause and nature of his accusation,
to be confronted with the witnesses, to call for evidence in his
favour, and a speedy public trial.”65 Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire also
adopted similar clauses in their state constitutions.66
Although the United States Constitution of 1778 provided for
trials by jury in all criminal cases, the right to confrontation was
only given in cases of treason.67 Many states objected and wanted
more procedural safeguards.68 Patrick Henry, fighting against
ratification in Virginia, maintained that without certain
procedural safeguards, Congress may resort to civil law instead of

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Graham, supra note 61, at 218; Pollitt, supra note 22, at 398.
Pollitt, supra note 22, at 398.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 399.
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common law, or even torture to obtain confessions.69 Several
states, including Virginia, New York, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire, agreed to ratify the Constitution if the first Congress
proposed a federal Bill of Rights.70 As a result of the ensuing
compromise, the Sixth Amendment was born and the right to
confrontation was formally entrenched in the American legal
system.71
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AS INTERPRETED BY THE COURTS

The Supreme Court acknowledged in its earliest
interpretations that the right of confrontation is not absolute, as it
“must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and
the necessities of the case.”72 One of the oldest exceptions to
confrontation is the hearsay exception.73 As early as 1895, the
Supreme Court considered in Mattox v. United States whether the
defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation had been violated
by admitting to the jury prior testimony of two deceased
witnesses.74 There, after a jury convicted the defendant of
murder, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment pursuant
to defendant’s writ of error and remanded the case for a new
trial.75 Because two government witnesses died during interim, at
the second trial the government introduced into evidence “a
transcribed copy of the reporter’s stenographic notes of their
testimony [from the first] trial.”76 The Court held that this
procedure did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to
confrontation because “[t]he substance of the constitutional
protection [was] preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has
once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him
to the ordeal of a cross-examination.”77
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 399-400.
72. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
73. Cathleen J. Cinella, Note, Compromising the Sixth Amendment Right
to Confrontation – United States v. Gigante, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 135, 143
(1998) (citing Michael G. Clarke, Comment, Illinois' Confrontation with the
Use of Closed Circuit Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: A Legislative
Approach to the Supreme Court Decision of People v. Fitzpatrick, 15 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 719, 722-23 (1995)).
74. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240.
75. Id. at 237-38.
76. Id. at 240.
77. Id. at 244.

Since Mattox, the Court has continued to delineate how
hearsay evidence may be admitted without violating the
Confrontation Clause.
In California v. Green,78 the Court
considered whether the admission of a witness’s prior testimony
from a preliminary hearing violated the defendant’s right to
confrontation.79
The Court recognized that while the
Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules are designed to serve
similar principles, the Confrontation Clause is not merely a
codification of the common law hearsay rules and exceptions.80 In
any event, the Court held that “the Confrontation Clause is not
violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as
long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full
and effective cross-examination.”81 This is because the essential
elements of confrontation have been adequately preserved; the
witness is under oath and subject to cross-examination for the jury
to observe.82
Following Green, the Court again considered whether the
admission of hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause
in Ohio v. Roberts.83 This time, however, the witness whose
testimony the prosecution admitted into evidence did not testify at
trial.84 In such a case, the Court found that the Confrontation
Clause requires the prosecution to first “demonstrate the
unavailability of . . . the declarant whose statement it wishes to
use against the defendant.”85 A witness is not unavailable unless
the prosecution has made a good-faith effort to produce him at
trial.86 Next, if the prosecution meets this burden, the statement
can be admitted only if there is an “indicia of reliability” that
serves the “underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to
test adverse evidence.”87 The reliability requirement is satisfied if
the evidence “falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 155-56.
Id. at 158.
Id.
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Id. at 58-60.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 74 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)).
Id. at 65.

possesses “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”88 The
Court held that the defendant’s right to confrontation was not
violated because the prosecution showed that the witness was
constitutionally unavailable,89 and because defense counsel crossexamined the witness at the preliminary hearing, thus providing
the transcript with an indicia of reliability.90
Then, in the landmark case Crawford v. Washington,91 the
Court expounded the relationship between hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause. In that case, Michael Crawford was
charged with assault and attempted murder for stabbing a man
who allegedly tried to rape his wife, Sylvia.92 Crawford claimed
he acted in self-defense, but Sylvia’s statement to police
contradicted his account of the incident.93 The state marital
privilege prevented the prosecution from compelling Sylvia to
testify in court without Crawford’s consent, but the trial court
allowed the prosecution to introduce Sylvia’s tape-recorded
statement to the police.94 With this evidence, the prosecution
successfully convinced the jury that that Crawford did not act in
self-defense.95
The Court reversed Crawford’s conviction, finding that the
introduction of Sylvia’s statement violated the Confrontation
Clause.96
In order to preserve the integrity of the Sixth
Amendment, the Court – in concluding that the reliability prong of
the Roberts standard was vague and manipulative – created a new
rule.97 The Court held that an out-of-court statement that is
“testimonial” in nature may not be admitted in criminal cases
unless the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.98 Thus,
88. Id. at 66.
89. Id. at 74-77.
90. Id. at 67-73.
91. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
92. Id. at 38-40.
93. Id. Specifically, Crawford told the police that the victim had
something in his hands before Crawford stabbed him, while Sylvia recalled
that the victim carried nothing. Id.
94. Id. at 40.
95. Id. at 40-41.
96. Id. at 68-69.
97. Id. at 67-68.
98. Id. at 68. In providing a rough sketch of what is testimonial, the
Court stated that “it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police

the defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine his accusers is at the
core of the Confrontation Clause.
In addition to hearsay exceptions, the Court created another
exception to face-to-face confrontation after a series of child sexual
abuse cases. In the first case, Coy v. Iowa, 99 the Court considered
whether the placement of a screen between testifying child victims
and the defendant at trial violated the defendant’s constitutional
right to confrontation.100 Coy was charged and convicted of
sexually assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls.101 The trial court
granted the state’s motion for the placement of a screen between
the defendant and the witness stand during the children’s
testimony.102 Once lighting adjustments were made, Coy could
dimly see the children through the screen as they testified, but
they could not see him at all.103 On appeal before the Court, Coy
argued that the procedure deprived him of his right to face-to-face
confrontation with adverse witnesses.104 The Court agreed, and
reversed his conviction.105
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia focused on the
importance of requiring face-to-face confrontation.106 Scalia noted
that physical confrontation makes it less likely that a witness will

interrogations.” Id. The introduction of nontestimonial hearsay, however, is
controlled by state law and Roberts. Id.
The Court subsequently held that out-of-court “[s]tatements are
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,”
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), while testimonial statements
are ones made under “circumstances objectively indicat[ing] that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.” Id.
99. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
100. Id. at 1014. The child witnesses were allowed to testify behind a
screen pursuant to Iowa law. Id. The statute provided in part that “[t]he
court may require a party be confined [sic] to an adjacent room or behind a
screen or mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child during the
child’s testimony, but does not allow the child to see or hear the party.” Id. at
1014 n.1.
101. Id. at 1014-15.
102. Id. at 1014.
103. Id. at 1014-15.
104. Id. at 1015.
105. Id. at 1022.
106. Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, Stevens, and O’Connor. Id. at 1013.

lie on the stand as “[i]t is always more difficult to tell a lie about a
person to his face than behind his back,”107 and even if the
witness does lie, it will likely be less convincing when recited
before the defendant.108 Furthermore, the trier of fact will have a
better opportunity to draw its own conclusions on the veracity of
the testimony based on the witness’s demeanor.109 Therefore,
because the children could not see Coy through the screen as they
testified, the procedure violated Coy’s right to confrontation.110
While the Court noted that the “rights conferred by the
Confrontation Clause are not absolute, and may give way to other
important interests,”111 it declined to address whether there were
any exceptions.112 Rather, the Court expressed that if any
exceptions existed, they would be permitted “only when necessary
to further an important public policy.”113 Because there were no
individualized findings justifying a need for special protection of
the child witnesses, no plausible exception to the defendant’s right
to confrontation existed.114
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor opined that rights
under the Confrontation Clause “may give way in . . . appropriate
case[s] to other competing interests so as to permit the use of
certain procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from
the trauma of courtroom testimony.”115 She suggested that the
use of one- or two-way closed-circuit television for introducing
child witness testimony – even if it does not adhere to the general
requirement of face-to-face confrontation – may not violate the
Confrontation Clause because such procedures may be necessary
to further the compelling state interest of protecting child
witnesses.116
Two years later, Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion
for the decision that recognized the exception to the Confrontation
107. Id. at 1019 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id.; see also id. at 1020 (face-to-face confrontation “may confound and
undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult”).
109. See id. at 1019 (“The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel
the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look
elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw its own conclusions.”).
110. Id at 1020.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1021.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1022 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 1023-25.

Clause for child sexual abuse cases.117 In Maryland v. Craig,
Sandra Craig was convicted of several sexual offenses involving a
six-year old girl.118 Prior to trial, the state moved to have children
who Craig allegedly abused testify via one-way closed circuit
television as permitted by a Maryland statute.119 Craig objected,
arguing that the procedure violated her rights under the
Confrontation Clause.120 The trial court overruled her objection
and granted the state’s request because it found that the children
would suffer severe emotional distress if they testified in the
courtroom.121
Additionally, the trial court noted that the
procedure preserved the values confrontation promoted:
permitting the defendant to observe and cross-examine the
witnesses while the jury watched.122
On appeal, the Court examined the Confrontation Clause,
noting that the clause’s central concern “is to ensure the reliability
of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to
rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before
the trier of fact.”123 The Court reiterated the four essential
elements imposed by the Confrontation Clause: (1) personal
examination of witnesses, who are (2) testifying under oath, (3)
subject to cross-examination, and (4) observed by a jury that will
assess their credibility.124
While the Court reaffirmed the
importance of face-to-face confrontation – “the core of the values
furthered by the Confrontation Clause”125 – the Court also
recognized that it is not an indispensable condition of the Sixth
Amendment.126 In other words, the Confrontation Clause does
not provide an absolute right to face-to-face confrontation, but
rather “a preference that must occasionally give way to

117. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
118. Id. at 840, 843.
119. Id. at 840.
120. Id. at 842.
121. Id. at 842-43. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s judgment, holding that while the Sixth Amendment does not require
face-to-face confrontation between the defendant and his accusers, the state
failed to make a sufficient showing that the statutory procedure should be
invoked in lieu of confrontation. Id. at 843.
122. Id. at 842.
123. Id. at 845.
124. Id. at 845-46 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
125. Id. at 847 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 157).
126. Id.

considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”127
In short, face-to-face confrontation should be dispensed with only
when “necessary to further an important public policy and only
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.”128
In applying this test to Maryland’s one-way closed circuit
television procedure, the Court first found that the procedure
sufficiently assured the reliability of the fact-finding process
because the testifying child had to be competent, was placed under
oath, cross-examined, and could be observed by the judge, jury,
and the defendant.129 Next, the Court held that the state’s
interest in protecting children in child abuse cases from the
trauma of testifying is adequately important to justify the use of
procedures that dispense with the defendant’s right to face-to-face
confrontation, as long as the state makes a sufficient showing of
necessity.130 The finding of necessity is case-specific, and requires
the trial court to determine whether the procedure (or one-way
closed circuit television) is necessary to protect the particular
child witness.131 Additionally, necessity requires a finding that
the child witness would be traumatized by the defendant’s
presence, not by courtrooms in general.132 Such trauma must be
more than “mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to
testify.”133
USE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TESTIMONY OUTSIDE OF MINORS AND SEXUAL
ASSAULT CASES

The use of alternative forms of testimony in child abuse cases

127. Id. at 849 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)). For instance,
the admission of certain hearsay statements of absent declarants at trial does
not violate a defendant’s right to confrontation. Id. at 847-48.
128. Id. at 850.
129. Id. at 851-52.
130. Id. at 855.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 856.
133. Id. (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987)). The
Court added that the Maryland statute met this constitutional standard
because it required a showing that the child witness would suffer “serious
emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.” Id.
(quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989) (current
version at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-303(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2001 &
Supp. 2007))).

has risen dramatically since Craig.134 The federal government
and nearly all states have enacted statutes providing for
alternatives to face-to-face confrontation when necessary to shield
child witnesses or other sensitive witnesses.135 The protections
provided by these statutes vary according to age, the nature of the
underlying crime, and the extent of the victim’s vulnerability.136
Craig dealt only with child witnesses and their susceptibility
to psychological trauma due to their immaturity. While Craig
permits a defendant’s right to confrontation to succumb to
important state interests regarding child witnesses, the Court is
yet to hear a case involving the use of alternative techniques with
adult witnesses. Indeed, cases in the lower courts with adult
witnesses testifying via closed-circuit television or videotape since
Craig have been sparse.137 But several states do have statutes
that allow certain adults to testify via closed-circuit television,
such as victims of physical attacks, victims of sexual abuse, and
mentally infirm crime victims.138
Several circuit courts have heard cases concerning closedcircuit testimony by adult witnesses, with various results. The
Second Circuit considered the use of two-way closed circuit
television testimony in United States v. Gigante.139 In that case,
the government charged Vincent Gigante with violating the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
RICO conspiracy, conspiracy to murder, extortion conspiracy, and
a labor payoff conspiracy.140 Because Gigante was affiliated with
the New York Mafia, the government’s case naturally consisted
mainly of testimony from former mafia members, which included
Peter Savino, a former associate.141 At the time of Gigante’s trial,
Savino was in the Federal Witness Protection Program and in the
final stages of an inoperable, fatal cancer at an undisclosed
location where he was being medically supervised.142 Per the
government’s request, the trial judge held a hearing and found,
134. See, e.g., Cinella, supra note 73, at 152 & n.114.
135. See Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40
HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1020-24 tbl.1 (2003).
136. Id. at 1019 n.130.
137. Cinella, supra note 73, at 152.
138. Chase, supra note 135, at 1020 & n.134.
139. 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999).
140. Id. at 78.
141. Id. at 78-79.
142. Id. at 79.

based on medical reports and testimony, that Savino could not
appear in court due to his poor health.143 Therefore, the trial
judge permitted Savino to testify via two-way closed-circuit
television at trial.144 The procedure allowed the jury, defense
counsel, judge, and defendant to see and hear Savino on video
screens in the courtroom, and Savino could likewise see and hear
the participants in the courtroom on a video screen from where he
was testifying.145 After the jury convicted Gigante, he challenged
the procedure on appeal, claiming it violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation and that no compelling
government interest justified the deprivation of this right.146
The Second Circuit upheld the defendant’s convictions and
found that the trial court’s use of two-way closed-circuit testimony
did not violate Gigante’s Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation.147 Despite the court’s admonishment that closedcircuit television testimony “must be carefully circumscribed,” it
found that its use effectively preserved Gigante’s confrontation
rights.148 First, the court noted that the closed-circuit procedure
used for Savino’s testimony preserved all of the necessary
elements of in-court testimony: “Savino was sworn [under oath];
he was subjected to full cross-examination; he testified in full view
of the jury, court, and defense counsel; and [he] gave this
testimony under the eye of Gigante himself.” 149 Next, the court
found that Craig did not apply, because while Craig restricted the
use of one-way closed-circuit television testimony to instances in
which the witness could not view the defendant, the trial judge in
Gigante’s case utilized a two-way system that effectively
preserved face-to-face confrontation.150 Free from Craig, the court
held that “[u]pon a finding of exceptional circumstances, . . . a trial
court may allow a witness to testify via two-way closed-circuit
143. Id. at 79-80. Specifically, a medical physician testified that it would
be “medically unsafe” for Savino to travel to New York to testify. Id. at 79.
144. Id. at 80.
145. Id. There was some dispute as to whether Savino could see Gigante,
but defense counsel waived the argument. Id. at 80 n.1. When the trial
judge specifically asked defense counsel if he wanted the camera placed so
that the defendant could “look directly eye-to-eye” with Savino, defense
counsel responded that it was unnecessary. Id.
146. Id. at 79.
147. Id. at 81-82.
148. Id. at 80.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 80-81.

television when this furthers the interest of justice.”151 Savino’s
terminal cancer diagnosis and participation in the Federal
Witness Protection Program, along with Gigante’s own poor
health and inability to travel for a distant deposition, presented
exceptional circumstances, and therefore Savino’s testimony did
not violate Gigante’s right to face his accuser.152
Contrary to Gigante, the recent decision of United States v.
Yates from the Eleventh Circuit held that trial testimony via twoway closed-circuit television violated the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights.153 There, Anton Pusztai and Anita Yates
faced charges of mail fraud, conspiracy to defraud the United
States, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and several
prescription-drug-related offenses arising out of their involvement
in an internet pharmacy.154 In a pre-trial motion, the government
moved to permit two witnesses to testify at trial from Australia
through live two-way video conference.155 The government argued
that the two witnesses were “essential witnesses to the
government’s case-in-chief,” and although the witnesses agreed to
testify by video conference, they were unwilling travel to the
United States and were beyond the government’s power of
subpoena.156 The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that
the testimony would deny them face-to-face confrontation and
thus violate their Sixth Amendment rights.157 The trial court
granted the government’s motion because the two-way video
conference procedure allowed the defendants and witnesses to see
each other during the testimony, thus preserving the defendants’
right to confrontation.158 The trial court also found that the
government had an “important public policy of providing . . . [this]
crucial evidence, and that the [g]overnment also ha[d] an interest
in expeditiously and justly resolving the case.”159 Similar to
Gigante, the witnesses were sworn under oath and acknowledged
that their testimony was subject to penalty for perjury.160 As the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 81.
Id. at 81-82.
United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1309-10.
Id. at 1310.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).
Id.

witnesses testified via video conference, the defendants, jury, and
judge could see them, and the witnesses could likewise see
everyone in the temporary courtroom.161 At the conclusion of the
trial, the jury found the defendants guilty on all counts.162
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants argued that
the video conference testimony violated their Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation under Craig because it was not necessary to
further an important public policy.163
In response, the
government argued that Craig did not apply for two reasons: (1)
the witnesses testified via two-way rather than one-way video
conference, and (2) because two-way video conference testimony
protects defendants’ confrontation rights more than depositions
permitted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15,164
whenever deposition testimony is admissible, two-way video
conference testimony should be as well.165 In rejecting both
arguments, the court noted that Craig provided “the proper test
for admissibility of two-way video conference testimony,”166 and
further emphasized that the Eighth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits agreed.167
Next, the court found that the trial court failed to apply the
Craig test, which required an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether an important public policy existed that necessitated the
denial of physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial, and whether
the reliability of the testimony was otherwise guaranteed.168 In
examining the trial court’s decision, the court held:

161. Id. The trial was temporarily moved to the United States Attorney’s
office for the video conference because the courtroom lacked the proper video
equipment. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1312. For Craig’s holding, see supra Part III.
164. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 provides in part: “A party may
move that a prospective witness be deposed in order to preserve testimony for
trial. The court may grant the motion because of exceptional circumstances
and in the interest of justice.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(1).
165. Yates, 438 F.3d at 1312.
166. Id. at 1313 (citing Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 930 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
167. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 554-55 (8th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894, 897-98 (6th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993).
168. Yates, 438 F.3d at 1315 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850,
855 (1990)).

[While] [t]he [g]overnment’s interest in presenting the
fact-finder with crucial evidence is . . . an important
public policy[,] . . . under the circumstances of this case
(which include the availability of a Rule 15 deposition),
the prosecutor’s need for the video conference testimony
to make a case and to expeditiously resolve it are not the
type of public policies that are important enough to
outweigh the [d]efendants’ rights to confront their
accusers face-to-face.169
In other words, the court found it significant that the witnesses
could have been deposed pursuant to Rule 15, which would have
guaranteed the defendants an opportunity to confront their
accusers face-to-face at the deposition.170
In his dissent, Judge Tjoflat disagreed with the majority’s
analysis and holding, stating that “[i]t is beyond reproach that
there is an important public policy in providing the fact-finder
with crucial, reliable testimony and instituting procedures that
ensure the integrity of the judicial process.”171 Indeed, as Tjoflat
emphasized, these are the same public policies the Craig Court
found important enough to uphold the use of the one-way closed
circuit television procedure.172 Moreover, he argued that the
majority’s position regarding the possibility of implementing a
Rule 15 deposition was irrelevant as to the necessity of using the
two-way video conference procedure in furthering the important
public policy of providing reliable evidence at trial.173 In fact,
because the two procedures are “not equivalent,” the trial court
has the discretion to determine whether a deposition is an
inadequate replacement for trial testimony.174 According to
Tjoflat, this is exactly what the trial court did in making a
carefully “considered determination that live, two-way video
transmission of unavailable witnesses’ testimony was necessary to
further the[se] important public polic[es] . . . that Craig
demands.”175
Tjoflat also opined that the majority failed to properly analyze
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1316-17. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(c).
Id. at 1320 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1322.
Id.
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1325.

the two-way video conference procedure. The court assessed the
testimony as if it were given in court, as opposed to hearsay,
Under Crawford,
which involves out-of-court statements.176
testimonial statements of witnesses not present at trial are
admissible “only where the declarant is unavailable, and only
where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine.”177 Tjoflat found that while the witnesses’ statements in
this case were undeniably testimonial, they satisfied Crawford
because the defendants were given a full opportunity to crossexamine the otherwise unavailable witnesses.178
Thus, he
concluded that the two-way video conference procedure “passes
constitutional muster.”179
Judge Marcus also dissented, arguing that the two-way video
conference procedure “fully comported with the text, historical
purpose, and modern understanding of the Confrontation Clause,”
and that the majority erroneously applied Craig.180 Even if Craig
did apply to this case, however, Marcus believed the two-way
video conference procedure was necessary to obtain the testimony
of the foreign witnesses.181 Furthermore, he contended that the
procedure satisfied the Confrontation Clause because “Yates and
Pusztai had every opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against them, and those witnesses testified under oath and under
the gaze of the defendants, the judge, and the jury.”182 He artfully
suggested that the majority’s conception of the Confrontation
Clause imposed a “one-size-fits-all requirement,” in that so long as
there is a face-to-face meeting between the defendant and the
witness, it is sufficient regardless of whether the meeting takes
place in the courtroom or in a Rule 15 deposition.183 Like Tjoflat,
Marcus also relied on Crawford, stating that if a face-to-face
meeting is not possible due to the true unavailability of the
witness, the Confrontation Clause imposes a “less stringent
confrontation requirement,” requiring only that the defendant
have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.184 Moreover,
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 1325-26.
Id. at 1326 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)).
Id. at 1326-27.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1327 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1332-33.
Id. at 1333.

Marcus advocated that cross-examination under the two-way
video conference procedure is more effective than a Rule 15
deposition because it allows the trier of fact to observe the
witness’s demeanor.185
In conclusion, he stated that “the
majority’s holding . . . disserves the Constitution and slights the
paramount public interest of admitting competent and reliable
testimony into evidence in criminal trials.”186
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TWO-WAY VIDEO TESTIMONY

Two-way video conference testimony in criminal trials is
constitutional because it provides the necessary protections and
upholds the goals intended by the Confrontation Clause. The
procedure is also more protective of defendants’ right to
confrontation than other accepted methods of testimony, such as
Rule 15 depositions. Further, two-way video testimony is superior
to one-way video testimony, which the Supreme Court has already
deemed constitutional.187 This alternative testimonial procedure
should not be limited to situations similar to the facts in Craig,
but instead should apply in situations “where necessary to further
an important state interest, [while maintaining] the truth-seeking
or symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause.”188
Video conference testimony fulfills the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause as intended throughout history.
As
exemplified by Paul’s trial in biblical times, the prosecution of
Christians under Roman Emperor Trajan, the trials of Sir Walter
Raleigh and Freeborn John in seventeenth century England, and
by the Salem witch trials in colonial America, the main goals of
the right to confrontation were (1) to afford the defendant the
opportunity to receive accusations directly from the mouth of his
accuser, (2) to prevent false accusations against the defendant by
those unwilling to state such allegations to the defendant’s face,
and (3) to allow the judge and jury to view the demeanor of the
witnesses testifying.189 Each of these goals is safeguarded by the
two-way video testimony procedure.
First, live video conference testimony provides the defendant

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1336.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990).
Id. at 852.
See supra Part II.

the opportunity to see the witness displayed upon the television
screen set up in the courtroom as the witness testifies. This
allows the defendant to hear the allegations directly from the
witness – rather than a mere a second-hand account of the
witness’s testimony – helping ensure that the testimony is
accurate and the accusations are real. Second, the witness can see
the defendant while testifying, which helps prevent false
accusations. Specifically, a witness will likely be less inclined to
provide false testimony if he must look upon the defendant, even if
it is only through a television monitor. Third, the video conference
procedure allows the judge and jury to observe the witness over
the television screen, providing them with the opportunity to
observe the witness’s demeanor to determine his credibility and
the truthfulness of his testimony.
Some might argue that it is more difficult to judge the
truthfulness and reliability of a witness testifying on a television
screen.
While truthfulness and reliability have long been
considered goals of confrontation, psychological research has
shown that “most people can do no better than chance in
determining when a person is telling the truth from observing
[him] in telling the story.”190 Further, video communication has
become ever more incorporated into our daily lives: corporations
and firms use video conferencing to hold meetings in two cities at
once, and friends and family members use cameras connected to
their computers to communicate live over the internet
everyday.191 Thus, there is certainly no reason to believe that
jurors observing a witness testifying via televised video conference
would be any more or less capable of making accurate
determinations regarding the reliability of the testimony.192
Video conference testimony also fulfills the four elements
established in Craig: (1) personal examination, (2) testimony
under oath, (3) cross-examination of the witness by defense
counsel, and (4) observation of the witness by the jury.193 The
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Marcus, supra note 1, at 681.
See, e.g., Michel Marriott, Waving Hello, From a Distance, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2004, at G1; Thomas C. Hayes, Doing Business Screen to
Screen, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1991, at D1.
192. Marcus, supra note 1, at 682.
193. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46. The test delineated in Craig is an
expansion of the purposes of confrontation set forth in California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). The Green Court noted that confrontation:

first element of personal examination prevents the usage of
depositions or ex parte affidavits against the defendant.194 Video
conference testimony satisfies this element because it subjects the
witness to personal examination by the parties for the defendant
to fully observe. Next, the witness is placed under oath prior to
the commencement of his testimony. Although the witness is not
physically in the courtroom, he is placed under oath at a remote
location by the same procedure he would be subjected to if he were
in the courtroom giving his testimony.195 Third, the defendant
has the same opportunity to cross-examine the witness testifying
via video conference that he would if the witness was in the
courtroom. There is nothing lost when witnesses are crossexamined during this procedure because the defense counsel may
still look directly at the witness during the examination, and the
witness may likewise look directly at the defense counsel and the
defendant just as he could if he were sitting in the courtroom.
Finally, the jury is given a full opportunity, and quite possibly a
better opportunity, to view the witness and his demeanor during
video conference testimony, because the witness is projected onto
a television or screen, potentially presenting him in a larger and
closer light than the jurors would otherwise be able to see with the
witness on the stand.
Nowhere in the text of the Sixth Amendment do the words
“face-to-face” or “physical” appear.196 In fact, the text of the
Confrontation Clause only requires the “right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against [the defendant].”197 As scholar Akhil

(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath –
thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and
guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2)
forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the ‘greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth;’ (3) permits the jury
that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe the demeanor of the
witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing
his credibility.
Id. Craig borrowed the first element, personal examination, from Mattox,
156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
194. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43.
195. See, e.g., Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 931 (11th Cir. 2001)
(court found that use of satellite procedure satisfied the oath safeguard of the
Confrontation Clause because the witnesses were placed under oath by the
court clerk at the satellite location).
196. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
197. Id.

Reed Amar noted, “in a Constitution ratified by, subject to, and
proclaimed in the name of, the people, it would be unfortunate if
words generally could not be taken at face value.”198 The concept
of “face-to-face” confrontation is met by the use of live, two-way
video conference testimony because both the defendant and the
witness can see each other as the witness testifies.
Critics of the two-way video conference procedure claim that
confrontation was meant to afford the defendant the opportunity
to be in the physical presence of the testifying witness. Justice
Scalia stated in Coy that “the Confrontation Clause guarantees
the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing
before the trier of fact.”199 On the other hand, the concurrence
and dissent both noted that the Confrontation Clause could not
literally require physical presence because that would be
inconsistent with deeply rooted hearsay exceptions.200 The Craig
Court further clarified that “the word ‘confronted,’ . . . cannot
simply mean face-to-face confrontation,” because it would prohibit
the admission of hearsay statements made by absent declarants,
contrary to the Court’s long history of hearsay jurisprudence.201 If
the Confrontation Clause was interpreted to mean physical
presence in every situation, many long standing common law
hearsay exceptions would become unconstitutional.202 Thus, the
Confrontation Clause “merely state[s] a principled preference for
live testimony.”203
Two-way video testimony is more protective of the interests
intended to be protected by the Confrontation Clause than already
accepted methods of presenting testimony. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 15, for example, allows parties to substitute
live witness testimony with deposition transcripts at trial.204
198. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES 127-28 (1997).
199. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (citing Kentucky v. Stincer,
482 U.S. 730, 748-50 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
200. Id. at 1024-25 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1030 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
201. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990).
202. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (listing twenty-three exceptions that apply
regardless of whether the declarant is available and can testify in court in the
physical presence of the defendant); FED. R. EVID. 804 (listing five exceptions
that are applicable only when the declarant is unavailable).
203. AMAR, supra note 198, at 126.
204. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(f) (“A party may use all or part of a deposition
as provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence.”); Lynn Helland, Remote

Under this rule, the testimony of the unavailable witness is taken
either by stenographic or videographic record.205 Stenographic
testimony is read to the jury, usually by having the attorney for
the examining party read the deposition questions while another
person plays the witness and reads the answers.206 If the acting
witness makes any changes in tone of voice or reflects even a hint
of emotion, the opposing party can object on the grounds that the
reader is improperly interpreting the testimony.207 Under this
method, the jury is deprived of the opportunity to assess the
witness’s demeanor.208 As Justice White explained in Green, an
important policy of the Confrontation Clause is to “permit[] the
jury that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe the demeanor
of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in
assessing his credibility.”209
Videographic depositions under Rule 15 are no better than
their stenographic counterpart. Although videotaped depositions
allow the jury to observe the witness’s demeanor, the deposition is
usually taken weeks, months, or even years before trial, often
because the same circumstances making the witness unavailable
for trial require the deposition be taken far in advance.210 And
even if the witness can testify by the time of trial, most judges will
not want to interrupt the trial to take a deposition.211 Moreover,
both stenographic and videographic depositions deprive attorneys
the opportunity to adapt their examinations to the evidence that is
presented during the course of trial.212
Live two-way video testimony corrects many of the problems
associated with the already approved and widely used Rule 15
deposition procedure. It allows the trier of fact to observe the
witness’s demeanor as he is questioned, and also permits
attorneys to craft their examination in light of the evidence and
testimony that has been presented at trial. Additionally, crossexamination is more effective under the two-way video conference
Testimony – A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 719, 721
(2002).
205. Helland, supra note 204, at 721.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
210. Helland, supra note 204, at 721-22.
211. Id. at 722.
212. Id.

procedure than with Rule 15 depositions because it allows the
judge to rule on objections as they are raised and to supervise the
course of questioning and counsel’s conduct.213
Furthermore, two-way video testimony better serves the
interests intended to be protected by the Confrontation Clause
than the one-way closed-circuit television procedure approved in
Craig.214 It is superior because not only does it allow the
defendant, the jury, and the judge to see the witness – just as oneway closed-circuit television – but it also allows the witness to see
the defendant and the courtroom as he testifies. Thus, using twoway video testimony during trial “allows the witness to see the
jury and the defendant, . . . achieving the Confrontation Clause’s
important goal of bringing the accuser face[-]to[-]face with the
accused and the factfinder, albeit through the medium of a
television screen.”215
There are also numerous other advantages to using video
conference testimony in criminal trials.
The procedure is
convenient, cost-effective, efficient, and comports with modern
notions of globalization and technological advancements. Indeed,
globalization has had a significant impact on the practice of
federal criminal law.216
As the means of travel and
communication have progressed, it has become easier to engage in
international commerce.217 Yet consequently, crimes such as
fraud, which at times may utilize international commerce, have
increased.218 Unfortunately, “the ability of nations to work
together to prevent or prosecute international crime has lagged
far behind the ability of the criminally inclined to exploit their
new economic opportunities.”219 Therefore, it is often necessary in
these cases to obtain evidence from any country in which the
defendant may have conducted dealings in the course of
committing the fraud.220 The prosecutor is often unable to
subpoena key witnesses due to the fact that they are located
outside of the United States and not subject to its jurisdiction.221
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
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Moreover, one of the greatest advantages to using live twoway video testimony is that it provides a better alternative for
obtaining foreign witness testimony.222 Yates is a good example of
when two-way video testimony becomes important. In his dissent,
Judge Tjoflat argued that two-way video testimony was necessary
because the witnesses were beyond the subpoena power of the
trial court, as they were citizens of, and resided in, Australia at
the time of trial.223 With the advent of improved technology that
makes it easier to conduct business and commerce globally,
procedures like two-way video conference will become increasingly
important when foreign witnesses cannot be subpoenaed by
courts.
Two-way video testimony therefore presents the
opportunity to obtain testimony from foreign witnesses in a
manner that not only complies more fully with the Confrontation
Clause than current methods – such as Rule 15 depositions – used
by courts, but that is also more effective and efficient in today’s
world.
Justice Scalia, among other critics, argues that video
conference
testimony
“improperly
substitute[s]
‘virtual
confrontation’ for the real thing required by the Confrontation
Clause in a criminal trial.”224 However, with the arrival of new
technology, Americans have generally become increasingly less
likely to participate in face-to-face interactions. Beginning with
the telephone, where people no longer needed to meet face-to-face
to verbally communicate, and expanded by the internet, people
now regularly make decisions through digital communications.225
Further, studies have found that jurors respond the same to live
witnesses as those testifying via video conference.226
CONCLUSION

Presenting testimony via two-way video conference is
constitutional under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
222. Id. at 723.
223. United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1324 n.6 (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting).
224. Marcus, supra note 1, at 676 (citing Amendments, supra note 14, at
93-94 (statement of Scalia, J.)).
225. Id. at 682.
226. Id. at 676 (citing Fredric I. Lederer, The Road to the Virtual
Courtroom? A Consideration of Today’s – and Tomorrow’s – High-Technology
Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. REV. 799, 819 (1999)).

Amendment because it is consistent with the goals and protections
intended by witness confrontation throughout history. It provides
the defendant with the opportunity to see and hear the witness as
he testifies, and the witness knows that the defendant is watching
and listening. It further permits the judge and jury to observe the
witness’s demeanor. Additionally, live two-way video testimony is
more protective of the defendant’s right to confrontation than
other currently accepted and widely used practices such as Rule
15 depositions and common hearsay exceptions under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Moreover, live two-way video testimony is
superior to the one-way closed-circuit television procedure
approved by the Supreme Court, and is more consistent with
normal testimonial procedures.
Finally, the two-way video
conference procedure is more efficient and effective in the
courtroom because it provides key witnesses who would otherwise
be unable or unwilling to testify the opportunity to do so in a
manner that still gives the defendant his basic right of
confrontation. For these reasons, live two-way video testimony is
consistent with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.
Hadley Perry∗

∗
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2008;
Bachelor of Arts in International Studies with a double major in Political
Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2004.

